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Abstract
Currently, Title II of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001
appears to be stalled as a result of controversy over the intent and meaning of the law.
Proponents of the title advocate the necessity of the act to combat modern terrorism,
whereas opponents warn of circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Using punctuated equilibrium as the theoretical foundation, the purpose of
this case study was to explore the dialogue and legal exchanges between the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Department of Justice related to the National Security
Agency’s metadata collection program. In specific, the study sought to explore the
nature of resistance to changes needed to mollify the controversies associated with Title
II. Data for this study were acquired through publicly available documents and artifacts
including transcripts of Congressional hearings, legal documents, and briefing statements
from the US Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union. These data
were deductively coded according to the elements of PET and then subjected to thematic
analysis. Findings indicate that supporters and opponents of the law are locked in a
consistent ideological polarization, with supporters of the law touting the necessity of the
authorizations in combatting terrorism and opponents arguing the law violates civil
liberties. Neither side of the debate displayed a willingness to compromise or
acknowledge the legitimacy of the other viewpoint. Legislators who accept the
legitimacy of both researched viewpoints could create positive social change by refining
the law to meet national security needs while preserving constitutional protections.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The 2013 revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance
programs brought increased attention to the ideological and partisan divide involving
Title II of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (U.S.C. §
1861). The basic debate involves striking the correct balance between national security
and civil liberties. Many scholars and policy makers view the objectives of security and
liberty to be diametrically opposed (Banks, 2010–2011; Bedi, 2014; Berghel, 2014;
Simmons, 2013; Xhelili & Crowne, 2012; Yoo, 2014). This qualitative case study
examined the polarizing debate about Title II provisions with the goal of identifying
common ground between the two sides in an effort help mitigate contentions. Objectively
examining the various points of view regarding the law, the chronology of security
policies, and legal precedencies could have potentially led to the discovery of refinements
to Title II that would make it more palatable to those who currently oppose it.
Background
In the realm of national security policies, currently there is no policy as
ideologically or politically polarizing as Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Francel
(2014), Kris (2014), and Regan (2014) warned of the title’s potential for abuse,
particularly the circumvention of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Although many concerns exist regarding Title II provisions, the basic contention is in
how the title allows for surveillance (including bulk collection) with Foreign Intelligence
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Surveillance Court (FISC) authorizations, which have been determined to have a lesser
threshold for probable cause than traditional Fourth Amendment warrant protections
(Donohue, 2014). The opposition voices vie that there is no legal justification for
circumventing Fourth Amendment protections during domestic criminal proceedings
even during times of crisis. The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect U.S. citizens
regardless of the state of affairs (Mondale, Stein, & Fahnhorst, 2014). Substantial
volumes of academic research support this opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act.
Due to the polarizing nature of the title, significant amounts of scholarly opinions
dismiss the aforementioned concerns about the circumvention of the U.S. Constitution
and instead praise the authorities of Title II. Gilbert (2013), Lungren (2012), and Yoo
(2014) strongly argued that not only are Title II authorizations essential for protecting
modern America, but they are in compliance with all U.S. Constitution protections.
Williams (2014) further explained that the courts’ warrant preference for surveillance is a
relatively recent development in U.S. law and during the first 150 years of the United
States it was not common for the courts to demand surveillance evidence to have been
obtained using a warrant. Shults (2011) elaborated that the president’s constitutional duty
to protect the United States would be in jeopardy if the executive’s access to FISC
authorizations was unreasonably hindered. Supporters of Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act make a strong counterpoint to the previously mentioned and equally compelling
opposition views.
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Both sides of the debate are compelling, eluding to the validity of both views.
Sufficient literature supports each view, but no literature acknowledges the legitimacy of
the opposite opinion. Most literature available for this study is either slanted in support of
the USA PATRIOT Act or in opposition of the law. The problem with these biases, in the
academic examination of the law, is that they ignore the likely truth that the USA
PATRIOT Act is both beneficial and imperfect. The articles seem to either fully support
or aggressively attack the act due to strongly held preconceived notions and attitudes.
Strongly held predetermined beliefs can cause individuals, including scholars and policy
makers, to reject information that does not fit into their previously developed line of
reasoning or agenda (Druckman & Leeper, 2012). Scholars and legislators should attempt
to avoid such attitudes with the USA PATRIOT Act. No truly convincing argument for
how or why these differing views need to be diametrically opposed exists.
The academic and legislative goal should be to determine what authorities are
needed and how these authorities can be granted without encroaching on civil liberties.
The lack of information about areas in which compromise could occur between the sides
of the debate creates a literature gap. No peer-reviewed articles were discovered that
expressed any common ground between supporters and critics of the USA PATRIOT
Act. Such information could be valuable to scholars and policy makers wishing calm the
polarizing debate about the law in order to strike an appropriate balance between liberty
and security. This study contributed to academia by examining the causes of the perpetual
clash with provisions of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
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Problem Statement
Ideological polarization routinely peaks and wanes (Jensen, Kaplan, Naidu, &
Wilse-Sampson, 2012). Recent decades have demonstrated a significant polarization peak
resulting in political gridlock (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014; Merrill, Grofman, &
Brunell, 2014). In U.S. domestic security policies, polarization is most evident with Title
II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Title II has always been controversial and continued to be
aggressively debated in numerous 2015 court rulings and congressional decisions.
Opponents of the act vilify its authorities, due to civil liberty infractions, without
recognizing its benefits, whereas supporters only recognize the benefits and dismiss the
act’s flaws. This polarization has even infiltrated peer-reviewed literature creating a
notable lack of literature acknowledging the legitimacy of both views.
The punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) of discontinuous change explained that
polarized issues will remain relatively stagnant until external forces cause rapid imperfect
change, as demonstrated by the USA PATRIOT Act enactment. Title II is likely both
flawed and essential to modern security. Remaining stagnant leaves the imperfections in
place, but rapid alteration could erode American citizens’ security or liberties. The PET
concept of bounded rationality states that stasis periods lack the political will to act, but
crisis periods lack the time to make perfect decisions (Tyson, 2007). A case study that
qualifies both the concerns and benefits of Title II within the confines of the policy
change PET framework could assist policy makers in developing more perfect decisions
prior the next exogenous change.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Research Questions
Central Research Question – Qualitative:
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions
of the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law?
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act?
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Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial?
Framework
The PET of public policy change, also known as the PET of discontinuous
change, asserts that policy changes occur gradually with time through incremental
adaptations until an outside source disrupts the status quo forcing immediate, significant
change (Sabatier, 2007; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012). This theory implies “there is
long-term and relatively incremental policy change followed by an exogenous shock to a
policy monopoly resulting in a tipping point oriented toward sharp and explosive policy
change” (Givel, 2010, p. 189). National security policies had incrementally evolved since
World War II with minor spikes during times of conflict until the disruption caused by
the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, evoked the rapid enactment of the USA
PATRIOT Act (Ripberger, 2011; Romano, 2011). Bounded rationality is a concept in
decision making in which a decision maker is forced to accept a less than perfect choice,
because it is the best possible choice at the time (Tyson, 2007). In the PET, decision
makers often exhibit bounded rationality during the incremental stage and during the
period of dynamic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the
incremental period of change, they are often unable to conjure enough influence to elicit
change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the period of dynamic
change, they are forced to make choices rapidly without adequate information or options
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). The PET and bounded rationality might
explain the continued controversies with the USA PATRIOT Act.

7
Evidence of the PET is present from the rapid enactment of the USA PATRIOT
Act to its lingering controversies and mild alterations. The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, was an exogenous shock to relatively stagnant national security policies. The
attacks generated public fear that transformed into unprecedented demand for security
policy change. This demand was immediately met by all the macro political institutions
including the U.S. Congress and the White House. On October 4, 2001, the first draft of
the USA PATRIOT Act made its way to the capital (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). In
modern American politics, having a draft presented to congress in 3 weeks of its
conception is fairly unheard of. The USA PATRIOT Act is arguably one of the most
influential national security policies in modern history. The bounded rationality aspect of
punctuated equilibrium of policy change would suggest that such a rapidly developed law
that significantly alters national security would be both imperfect and beneficial. The
PET would also suggest that despite these imperfections, the law is unlikely to change
significantly to address these issues.
The stagnant and incremental change periods described in the PET of public
policy change are easily identifiable with Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. A
contributing factor to the prolonged lack of refinement is political and ideological
polarization causes virtual legislative gridlock (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014).
Throughout history political tensions have come and gone and the current polarized state
in American politics is not new or uncommon (Jensen et al., 2012). The fringes of the
ideological field have become increasingly popular which has created a barrier between
the opposing views that prevents significant political actions (Merrill et al., 2014). This
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dissertation asserted that ideological and political polarization is the reason Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act continues to be trapped in the PET described stagnation period
despite being in the center of multiple controversies.
Comparing the legislative lifespan of the Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to the
PET of discontinuous change suggested one of 3 possible outcomes to the statute. First,
the title could be drastically changed in response to an external jolt such as another
terrorist attack or a blatant government overreach that enrages the American voter. If this
were to happen, it is likely the kneejerk reaction would have a second order effect of
either eliminating the benefits of the current version of the title or increasing the potential
for governmental abuses. A second possible outcome for Title II, as predicted through
PET, is that political and ideological polarization will keep the law in perpetual stasis.
The benefits of the law would remain, but so would its contentions. The third possible
outcome is that incremental change could preserve the benefits of the title while
eliminating the contentions. Incremental change that forms a more perfect statute should
be the goal of policy makers and understanding how such a goal is possible should be an
equally important objective to scholars.
The PET of public policy change suggested that an effective incremental change
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act would require a thorough examination of both sides
of the debate. Understanding both sides of the debate could lead to identifying areas in
which both sides are willing to compromise if such subjects exist. During the incremental
change periods of PET, there is little political motivation. The benefit to this is there is
more time to make decisions. The downside is, if there is opposition to change, as is the
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case with Title II, the change is easily stalled and there is not enough political will to
overcome the obstacles to change. If the proposed change is acceptable to both sides of
the dispute it will take much less political capital to achieve the change. A firm grasp of
PET’s incremental change and the contentions/benefits of Title II is essential to
understanding how legislators could refine title to achieve the goals of the law while
addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was a qualitative case study. Qualitative research is
capable of providing a better understanding of how the theory of punctuated equilibrium
applies to the USA PATRIOT Act. A qualitative methodology allowed a deeper look at
the intricacies of the law than what could be accomplished in a quantitative design
(Creswell, 2009; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2012). Each of the research questions align with a
qualitative design of a case study. Case studies analyze the intricacies of a singular object
and its subcomponents in a bound setting (Patton, 2002). This study analyzed the NSA’s
bulk metadata collection program as its primary case. The case is bound by both time and
the U.S. legal system. Case studies are commonly used with legal inquires, because the
depth of the study can illuminate the pros and cons of practices, which can provide
insight into preferred methods (Stacks, 2007). Case studies are done to achieve an indepth understanding of a phenomenon and its contextual circumstances (Yin, 2014). A
case study explores in great detail a single item or groups of items which are bound by
and affect a system (Stake, 1995). This case study provided a general overview of the
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USA PATRIOT Act and the views of those in support and opposition to the law, but its
primary focus was to determine exactly what each group desires in an effort to determine
whether common ground exists.
Assumptions
USA PATRIOT Act Assumptions
I made several assumptions involving the USA PATRIOT Act identified. First, I
assumed that even thou the NSA bulk metadata collection program theoretically ceased to
exist on November 29, 2015, the controversies about Title II have remained. I assumed
there are areas in which those who oppose and those who support Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act agree. I also assumed that those who oppose Title II provisions would be
satisfied if the potential for the circumvention of the Fourth Amendment was mitigated. I
further assumed that those who support the title are not actively looking to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment and are instead concerned maintaining Title II authorizations. The
most important assumption is: If Title II’s objectives could be met without the potential
of abuse, both sides of the debate would appeased. I have not found literature supporting
any of these assumptions, but congressional and legal developments in late 2015
contributed validity to these assumptions.
Methodology Assumptions
Many of the assumptions with this case study involved the data collection. The
first assumption was that subject matter experts would be willing to participate in
interviews. However, they were not. The second assumption was that the public relations
offices of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
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would be willing to facilitate an interview process, but they were not. As a result, it was
not possible to conduct interviews.
In addition, some assumptions were associated with the analysis of this
dissertation. The first assumption was the coding process and extensive self-reflection
helped eliminate researcher biases. No study could ever be free of all biases, but I made
every effort to mitigate potential validity threats from researcher biases. In addition, I
assumed that the qualitative analysis software did not generate any analytical errors. Any
errors contributed to the software likely stemmed from operator error. To combat this all
computations were checked and verified. Finally, I assumed that the results of this case
study were beneficial to broadening an understanding of PET and the USA PATRIOT
Act.
Scope and Delimitations
As previously mentioned, the primary focus of this dissertation was to search for
areas of mutual agreement between supporters and critics of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Nevertheless, I could not merely review current opinions about the law.
First, I needed to examine all national security policies throughout American history to
validate the PET of public policy change. Verifying PET is useful in predicting the
likelihood of policy change, because national security policy change tends to follow a
predictable pattern. The PET pattern provided much of the direction for this study.
The upcoming literature review chapter illustrates that throughout the history of
the nation all substantial security policy changes have followed a punctuated lifespan of
change. Typically, the national security statutes and policies have erupted onto the
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legislative scene rapidly as a direct response to an external stimulus. The resulting
policies and procedures have often been pragmatic but also deeply flawed as a
consequence of the PET explained bounded rationality associated with political action
during compressed timeframes. The policies remained both simultaneously useful and
imperfect for varying periods of stagnation. These policies are usually refined in one of
two ways, either through incremental change or rapid change in reaction to an exogenous
force. Both ways are known to suffer from differing types of bounded rationality. In this
dissertation, I assert that more perfect policy changes can be formed during incremental
change periods than during shock response changes. Because the bounded rationality of
PET explained that the more perfect proposed incremental changes usually lack the
political encouragement to overcome the resistance to change, this dissertation sought to
identify areas of potential compromise regarding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The
PET of discontinuous change provided the pattern analysis foundation from which to
base the scope of the study.
The scope of this study needed to include the history of national security policies,
legal judgements, and a careful examination of applicable statutes to establish a sound
academic foundation. Only after creating such a foundation and substantiating the
theoretical framework was it possible to begin to understand the intricacies of the USA
PATRIOT Act at the level needed for a case study. Chapter 2 provided the foundation for
this case study. The literature review illustrated patterns in national security. Then
explained these patterns using the PET of public policy change. This created both the
academic foundation and the case boundaries.
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The next logical step was to collect and analyze leading arguments on both sides
of the USA PATRIOT Act Title II debate. This included congressional testimony and
legal debate. The case was bound by focusing on the arguments made by the DOJ and the
ACLU. These organizations are the leading voices in support of and opposing Title II of
the USA PATRIOT Act. The data collection and analysis of the points made by the
contrasting organizations established the studies scope boundaries.
Limitations
The primary limitation to this study is that it is a dissertation rather than a paid
study. This limited both the time and resources available for the study. The primary focus
of this case study centered upon congressional hearings and legal proceedings between
the ACLU and DOJ. Neither organization seemed willing to participate in phone
interviews. In addition, the DOJ specified they could not sign any document including a
participation agreement. All the inquiries regarding potential interviews were made via
phone call or email. The phone calls all led to being told to send an email and most of the
emails did not garner a response, if time and resources were not limited the inquires could
have been made in person. This might have had better results than the phone calls. The
lack of time and resources available somewhat limited the data collection but did not
affect the dependability or transferability.
The transferability was limited by the study’s structure. The literature review only
examined national security policies leading up to and including the USA PATRIOT Act.
The theoretical framework of the PET of public policy consistently changing illustrated
how major national security policies rapidly evolve in response to an event but are often
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considered imperfect and undergo a period of stagnation followed by incremental change
which bring the policies into a more acceptable form. In this study, I did not apply the
theory to any policy not related to security and thus is limited to national security
policies. In addition, the data collection and analysis only researched Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act and because of such the transferability of the analysis is limited to Title
provisions.
Significance
Although contentions with the USA PATRIOT Act have not created
unprecedented polarization spikes, it has contributed to already increasing political and
ideological tensions in the United States. Partisan and ideological polarization has existed
since the founding of the nation and routinely punctuated by spikes in polarization
severity (Jensen et al., 2012). During the last 50 years there has been shift toward more
the extreme views on both sides of the ideological spectrum (Merrill et al., 2014). In
November 2013, Gallup polling data cited hyper ideological, partisan politics as the
primary reason for congressional and presidential gridlock producing the lowest approval
ratings to date (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014). In this dissertation, I not only contended
that debate about the appropriateness of the USA PATRIOT Act reflects the polarization
in the American political landscape, but I also deepened it.
As PET explains, rushed legislation typically remains in an imperfect stagnant
state until it is incrementally refined into a more acceptable form due to increasing public
tensions. Banks and Tauber (2014) and Scheppele (2012) described how the USA
PATRIOT Act’s rapid enactment led to unnecessarily intrusive security measures.
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Kisswani (2011) further illustrated how other western countries took longer to enact new
security policies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, but those policies were less controversial
than the USA PATRIOT Act. Bonet (2011) asserted the act was an egregious affront on
civil liberties and the U.S. Constitution. Yoo (2014) defended the act by expounding on
how and why the act is legal, ethical, and constitutional. These works reveal the
philosophical divide widened by the swiftly enacted law.
This dissertation provided an opportunity to examine the USA PATRIOT Act in
an effort to assess the potential for narrowing the political and ideological divide. A
multitude of divisive academic works and a series of contradictory legal decisions have
created a sense that both sides of the debate have valid points. What is lacking is an
effective solution to the rift between the competing ideologies. The goal of this
dissertation was to identify areas in which the opposing sides could potentially agree
upon. This by itself would not be enough to refine the law, but it could contribute to the
discussion. Identifying the areas of agreement could facilitate social change by
introducing areas of prospective conciliation in an otherwise polarized debate.
Summary
The purpose of this case study was to explore the advantages and contentions
associated with the Title II provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to determine whether
the objectives of the provisions could be achieved while eliminating the potential for the
circumvention of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This was
accomplished by answering the central research question: How does the bounded
rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent incremental change from achieving
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the surveillance and information sharing objectives of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution? The PET of discontinuous change was a valid and effective
theoretical framework for conducting this dissertation and answering the central research
question. Just as PET was the appropriate theory for the research, the case study design
was the correct approach to answering the research questions. Stacks (2007) explained
that the case study is ideal for researching law and policies. Before the case study or the
theoretical framework could be tested it was necessary to build a strong academic
foundation. I thoroughly describe the academic foundation in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Since its conception, the United States has strived to provide its citizens with
freedom and security. A pervasive academic assumption asserts that modern strategies for
providing freedom and security are diametrically opposed in a continuous balancing act
(Banks, 2010–2011; Bedi, 2014; Berghel, 2014; Simmons, 2013; Xhelili & Crowne,
2012; Yoo, 2014). Throughout the nation’s history, this perpetual equipoising between
civil liberties and national security has created times in which national security policy
debate has become polarizing and contentious (Ripberger, 2011). These contentions
typically develop in support of and opposition to the government’s response to a
traumatic event resulting in one faction championing increased security and an opposing
faction fearing civil liberty infringements (United States President’s Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). National security and civil liberty
tensions have spiked in recent years following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
and the enactment of several new security policies.
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 is both a widely supported and vehemently
opposed piece of legislation. The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive collection of
amendments to existing law designed grant the government the authorities to conduct
more effective investigations (Gilbert, 2013; Witmore-Rich, 2014). Despite the act being
drafted and enacted within 45 days of the terrorist attacks, many of the amendments
included in the USA PATRIOT Act had been proposed years before but never gained the
political traction to be enacted (Bellia, 2011). Immediately following the terrorist attacks
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of September 11, 2001, the American public demanded reform and the USA PATRIOT
Act received near unanimous support and little debate (Huddy & Feldman, 2011). Since
the law’s enactment, substantial, often polarizing, debate has occurred due to concern of
civil rights infringements (Bellas, 2012; Kisswani, 2011; Scheppele, 2012). Baldwin and
Koslosky (2012) explained that much of the civil liberty concern is due to “mission
creep” from national security investigations into non-security related investigations.
Mission creep has added to the division between those in favor of the law and those who
oppose it. Gilbert (2013) and Yoo (2014) dismissed claims of mission creep or of civil
rights infringement. This shift from near unanimous support to deeply divided opinions
about the law coincides with the popular policy concept, the PET in public policy.
This literary review examined the PET, the history of national security policies
affecting civil liberties, surveillance scandals, court decisions, the Church Committee,
and both sides of the contentions involving Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act with the
goal of developing an academic foundation and exposing literature gaps. A plethora of
current literature references these aforementioned topics. True literature gaps are found
with the USA PATRIOT Act. Literature focusing on this topic is nearly always biased
either for or against the law. There did not seem to be any literature that examined
potential common ground between those opposed to the law and those in support of it.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature search strategy for this literature review was straight forward. The
primary database used was Thoreau, but I found some articles in Academic Search
Complete, and ProQuest Central. Nearly every article was peer reviewed, with the peer-
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review verified on Ulrich's Periodicals Directory. Many peer-reviewed articles discovered
during the search could not be used due to extraordinary biases. This literature review
also heavily relied on laws, court decisions, and various federal government reports.
Punctuated Equilibrium
The PET provided an explanation to how and why security policies tend to go
through brief periods of rapid change and long periods of stagnation. The PET of public
policy change, also known as the PET of discontinuous change, asserts that policy
changes occur gradually with time through incremental adaptations until an outside
source disrupts the status quo forcing immediate, significant change (Baumgartner &
Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). The PET has been widely
accepted in the physical sciences of biology and seismology for decades (Givel, 2010;
Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Punctuated equilibrium has been an accepted public
policy change theory since 1993 (Givel, 2008). Jones and Baumgartner (2012) asserted
that their PET model was developed from both physical science and the “bounded
rationality” models of the 1950s and 1960s. The concept of bounded rationality is still
paramount to PET (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012).
Bounded rationality affects most public policies. Tyson (2007) explained that
bounded rationality is decision making in which a decision maker is forced to accept a
less than perfect choice, as it is the best available choice at the time. In the PET, decision
makers often exhibit bounded rationality during the incremental stage and during the
period of dynamic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the
incremental period of change, they are often unable to conjure enough influence to elicit
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change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the period of dynamic
change, they are forced to make choices rapidly without adequate information or options
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). This imperfect decision making process
has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout the history of security policies in the United
States and plays a key role in the current debate between the USA PATRIOT Act and
civil liberty concerns. In the next section of this literature review, I will examine security
policy history.
Security Policy History
Reviewing national security policy history provided a better understanding of the
controversies surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and illustrated the PET in
action. A comprehensive understanding of the USA PATRIOT Act can only be obtained
by understanding national security history, the laws, policies, and procedures affected by
the USA PATRIOT Act, and the nuances of modern security strategies (O’Brien, 2011).
Policy makers study history with the goals of predicting outcomes, avoiding previous
mistakes, and gaining a better understanding of present situations (Inboden, 2013). This
section showed that U.S. security policies remain relatively unchanged for decades at a
time then undergoes rapid imperfect change due to bounded rationality, just as the PET
would suggest. Studying the history of national security policy helped identify legal
precedence, illuminate previous errors, and possibly predict future outcomes. I began this
review by examining the early United States.
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Early America
The Founding Fathers faced both security and civil liberty concerns. The
Preamble of the U.S. Constitution clearly identified the need to “provide for the common
defense” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty” (U.S. Const., pmbl.). President John
Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were a series of 4 of the first national security
policies to create a clash between liberties and security (Olthof, 2013). President Adams
faced naval warfare in the Quasi-war with France abroad and stiff political competition at
home (Brookhiser, 2014; Olthof, 2013). The acts essentially gave the president special
detention and deportation authorities to quell political dissent (Claeys, 2012; Napolitano,
2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). The acts were immediately polarizing with both sides
of the debate claiming to have constitutional backing (Claeys, 2012; Olthof, 2013). The
response to the acts is significant due to its similarities with the current USA PATRIOT
Act controversies and because at the time many of the contributors to the U.S.
Constitution were still active politicians. The debate helps illustrate the original intent of
the U.S. Constitution.
The Alien and Sedition Acts ultimately pitted Adams against the combined
political powers of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. As the primary architect of the
U.S. Constitution, a prominent author of the Federalist papers, Secretary of State, and the
fourth President of the United States, James Madison’s intent to draft a form of
government that both provided physical security and protected civil liberties is well
documented (Dorn, 2012). As the author of the Declaration of Independence, Secretary of
State, Vice President, and the third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson’s
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opinion regarding civil liberties was equally well documented. After coming out of a
brief retirement in 1797, Jefferson lost the presidential election to his longtime rival,
Adams, by a mere 3 electoral votes and by doing so firmly established a partisan divide
between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans (Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013).
The partisan divide is significant as it illustrates that the political party polarization was
as intense and often more intense than its modern counterparts.
Considering dueling was still an acceptable means of settling political disputes in
the late 1700s it is not surprising that political contentions during this era were often less
civil than modern politics. Democratic-Republican Representative Matthew Lyon of
Vermont and Federalist Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut drove the Partisan
wedge even deeper in 1798 by having a fist fight during a session of congress
(Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013). Their physical altercation was not an isolated episode.
A month before the fight Lyon spit tobacco on Griswold (Olthof, 2013). These actions
did not degrade the standings of these politicians, instead it propelled them into the lime
light. Lyon became even more popular and started a magazine to have another platform
for expressing his anti-Federalist views (Napolitano, 2014). Adams immediately took
issue with Lyon’s ideologically biased publication and was not afraid to use his newly
acquired authorities to attempt to silence the congressman.
Lyon became the target of the Federalists and a hero to the American public,
which was wary of the authorities inherent in the acts. In October 1798 Lyon was
indicted on sedition for implying President Adams had gone mad and eventually was
sentenced to 4 months in prison by Justice Paterson of the Supreme Court, who was
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serving as a Circuit Justice. (Napolitano, 2014). Lyon was not alone in his legal battle.
Ten other Democratic-Republicans were convicted of similar antifederalist views, but
Federalists were free to engage in similar tactics without fear of prosecution (Plouffe,
2012). Of those sentenced to prison time and or fined most were either members of the
newly formed Democratic - Republican Party or members of the press (Napolitano, 2014;
Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). Aurora, a prominent newspaper of the time that was critical
of Adams, seemed to draw particular scrutiny under the acts (Olthof, 2013). This clearly
partisan bias did not set well with the American public.
The Alien and Sedition Acts cost the Federalists dearly in the polls. The
Federalists allowed the acts to sunset so they would expire on Adams last day in office,
but this inaction was not enough to secure votes for the party. Lyon won re-election while
in prison and was part of a Democratic-Republican sweep in the elections of 1800
(Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). Jefferson won the presidency and the
Democratic-Republicans took the majority in the Senate (Claeys, 2012; Napolitano,
2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). The Federalists maintained a majority in the House of
Representatives, but not many other significant government positions (Claeys, 2012).
Citizens raised funds to pay for fines imposed to many of those convicted under the act
(Napolitano, 2014). Jefferson pardoned Lyons and another Democratic-Republican still
imprisoned under the acts, dropped all pending fines, and ensured the government
returned all fines collected (Claeys, 2012; Olthof, 2013). The constitutionality of the acts
was never truly addressed, as the Supreme Court did even not start looking at the
constitutionality of legislation until the case of Marbury v Madison in 1803, but the
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American public soundly rejected the acts (Olthof, 2013). This is in no small part because
of how the acts seemed to clash with the U.S. Constitution.
The debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts, much like current discontent
with the USA PATRIOT Act, is twofold with both sides of the controversy having some
legitimate constitutional backing making analysis of this early controversy key for
identifying legal precedence. From President Adams’ and the Federalists’ viewpoint, the
president is constitutionally obliged to protect the nation due to his role as the
commander in chief (Claeys, 2012). This notion was actually somewhat supported by the
Federalist Papers, which repeatedly stressed the need for a strong executive to defend
against foreign powers (Shults, 2011). Adams held, as did many other Americans, the
belief that the last violent throws of the volatile French Revolution could spill into the
United States and the only way to avoid insurrection was to suppress the French migrants
(Plouffe, 2012). The repeated naval skirmishes between French and U.S. forces gave
credence to this threat (Napolitano, 2014). President Washington had been able to
mitigate the insurrection threat through his intense popularity and minimized the threat
abroad through skilled negotiation, but Adams lacked Washington’s skills as a statesman
(Olthof, 2013). There was a strong possibility that the U.S. would get drug into increased
conflicts with the French.
One of Adams’ first moves was to send a delegation to France to negotiate peace
talks. The emissaries were confronted with demands for bribes they could not meet and
the Marquis de Talleyrand, threatened to invade the United States (Napolitano, 2014).
The unstable and corrupt French government not only threatened U.S. foreign interests,
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but an influx of French citizens fled to the United States; creating turmoil in American
domestic policies (Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013). The Federalists believed that the
French influence was certain to result in a constitutional crisis and the acts was were the
only chance at preventing such an event (Olthof, 2013). For Federalists and their
supporters the threat seemed credible and justified the Alien and Sedition Acts. The
similarities with the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts due to the credible French
threat and the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act due to the current credible terrorist
threat are worth considering, but so are the parallels in the opposition to the acts.
The Democratic-Republicans led by Vice President Jefferson fervently opposed
the Alien and Sedition Acts believing it was unconstitutional. Jefferson promptly
denounced the acts as being in clear violation of the first amendment (Plouffe, 2012). The
use of the acts against unfriendly newspapers reinforced the Democratic-Republican
argument that the acts violated the first amendment (Olthof, 2013). Imprisoning sitting
congressman, Lyon, for remarks he made in his own publication truly drove the
antifederalist views into the American mainstream. State legislatures began developing
anti Alien and Sedition Acts legislation to minimize the effects of the laws in their
respective states (Claeys, 2012). This made it increasingly difficult for anybody to defend
the acts. The laws effectively silenced any meaningful political debate or dissent from the
Federalists, but the American populace did not tolerate the First Amendment violations
(Claeys, 2012). The importance of this is it set the precedence that even if the executive
branch is constitutionally obligated to protect the nation it must do so within the
constraints of the U.S. Constitution.
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Looking at the Alien and Sedition Acts through the lens of the PET is also
beneficial to this study. The exogenous shock to the national security policy came with
the French threat of invasion. Initially the public did not believe the threat was credible,
but to prove the validity Adams released correspondence with the emissaries with their
names changed to “X, Y, and Z” and the event came to be known as the XYZ affair
(Napolitano, 2014). The XYZ affair was enough of a disruption to the feeling of security
in the country that congress with support of the president drafted and enacted the laws
within weeks of the release of the letters. The legislators felt compelled to act rapidly to
mitigate the French threat and to gain political party superiority in the developing
partisan divide.
The time constraint led to the policy makers working within a bounded
rationality. They were expected to act in a limited time window, which did not give the
policy makers an opportunity to truly evaluate the situation and develop courses of action
that would meet the nation’s security needs in a way that was more acceptable to the
public. The assumption is that under different conditions the policy makers would have
worded the acts in a way in which they were less controversial. Unfortunately the
bounded rationality caused congress to produce acts that seemed to be in direct violation
of the Bill of Rights. The Sedition Act was the first time in American history political
dissent was considered a criminal act (Saito, 2011). The Alien and Sedition Acts were not
the last time the national security policy conflicted or appeared to conflict with the
constitution.
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Habeas Corpus
Title IV of the USA PATRIOT Act does effect habeas corpus proceedings and
there is a plethora of academic literature regarding how the act affects habeas corpus, but
this literature review is focused on Title II of the act. However, anytime the nation has
suspended habeas corpus there has been a public outcry because of concerns of
infringement of civil liberties which parallels current contentions about Title II
controversies. In addition, studying habeas corpus suspension provides a unique
perspective on security and liberty, because habeas corpus and its suspension is explicitly
addressed in Article I Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. art. , § , cl. ). The
focus of this section of the literature review will continue the examination of historic
security policies and the public’s mandate for securing freedoms. This will begin with
briefly defining habeas corpus.
Habeas Corpus, the Great Writ of Liberty, is a directive from a standing judge
ordering the government to present a prisoner to the court for proceedings to determine
the legality of the imprisonment (Loo, 2007). A writ is simply a legally binding command
(Federman, 2012). The concept of habeas corpus is believed to have originated in Fourthcentury England and was first codified with the British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 (Loo,
2007). In the United States the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was originally
dependent upon state legislation as the constitution does not specify between federal and
state prisoners. Then the Judiciary Act of 1789 clarified the matter, officially making
state prisoners a state issue (Federman, 2012).
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The first controversy involving habeas corpus occurred shortly after the Alien and
Sedition Acts had expired. President Thomas Jefferson sent the army under the command
of General James Wilkinson to arrest and detain without privilege of habeas corpus
individuals conspiring with Jefferson’s former Vice President Aaron Burr to start a
conflict with Mexico in an effort to acquire land in Texas. General Wilkinson did as
directed and ignored habeas corpus pleas. Eventually Chief Justice John Marshall ordered
the prisoners to be released reasoning that only congress not the president has the
authority to suspend habeas corpus (Scheppele, 2012). The reason congress and not the
president has the authority to suspend habeas corpus is the authorization is only found in
Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution placing the issue solely in the legislative domain
(Federman, 2012; Scheppele, 2012). Congress is further constrained to only suspend
habeas corpus privileges in times of rebellion or invasion (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
Jefferson tried condemn Burr’s actions as rebellion, but even if Jefferson had been able to
prove this claim it would have been a moot point as congress had not suspended habeas
corpus (Scheppele, 2012). The president simply does not have the authority Jefferson
sought.
Jefferson had to react rapidly to Burr’s scandalous actions to avoid frivolous
conflict with Mexico. It is likely that Jefferson thought he was acting in the best interest
of the country. The PET would assert that Jefferson was prompted by Burr’s action into
making a bounded rationality decision. It was not the perfect decision, but it can be
assumed Jefferson thought it was the best course of action at the time. Jefferson acted
outside his legal limits, but Chief Justice Marshall reigned in the president. This early
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habeas corpus case confirmed that even in times of peril, such as rapidly deescalating a
conflict with a foreign state, the government must work within the bound of the
constitution.
The next famous incidence of habeas corpus suspension was during the Civil War
when President Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus 3 times (Federman, 2012;
Mondale et al., 2014; Napolitano, 2014; Scheppele, 2012). Just as Chief Justice Marshall
had proclaimed during Jefferson’s presidency, the Supreme Court during the Civil War
soundly rejected Lincoln’s attempts to suspend habeas corpus (Federman, 2012; Loo,
2007; Scheppele, 2012). Lincoln essentially ignored the courts, but after the second time
congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which authorized the president to evoke
habeas corpus suspensions in areas under military controlled marshal law (Federman,
2012; Scheppele, 2012). This solution still had congress in control of the suspension of
habeas corpus and gave President Lincoln the authorities he felt he needed.
President Lincoln led the nation through undoubtedly its darkest hour. The nation
was truly dissolving, the casualty toll from the battles were astronomical, and civil unrest
plagued both the North and South. If ever there had been a time that the government
would have been excused for working outside the constitution it would have been during
the Civil War. President Lincoln articulated such a defense for his actions both publically
and to congress (Fallon, 2013; Scheppele, 2012). Lincoln suggested that there are times
when the law must be circumvented for the greater good (Fallon, 2013). At the time the
majority of congress and much of the public supported Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas
corpus initially and one of the Supreme Court rebuttals did not conclude until after the
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Civil War was over (Loo, 2007). The president had considerable support for his actions
when he was working under bounded rationality circumstances. The question arises in
retrospect, were the actions necessary to save the republic or not?
Alien Immigration Act of 1903
U.S. national security policy went relatively unchanged from the Civil War until
World War I, with the exception of the Alien Immigration Act of 1903. From the 1864
through World War II an often violent anarchist movement plagued much of the world
(Chamberlain, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The anarchist movement in America can be traced as
far back as the Revolutionary War, but it gained significant notoriety with Haymarket
Bombing and subsequent riot (Chamberlain, 2012). Anarchists assassinated the French
president in 1894, Spain’s prime minister in 1897, the Austrian empress in 1898, and the
King of Italy in 1900 (Kraut, 2012). In September, 1901 Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist,
assassinated President William McKinley (Chamberlain, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The Alien
Immigration Act of 1903, known as the Anarchist Exclusion Act, was enacted to expedite
deportations and limit immigration of known anarchists (Fox Jr., 2012; Kraut, 2012). The
act was the first to officially target political views for deportation purposes (Kraut, 2012).
The act also provided the legal precedence for the Espionage Act of 1917, the Internal
Security Act of 1950, and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Fox Jr., 2012; Kraut, 2012).
The legal precedence is what makes the study of this act significant to this dissertation.
Policy makers, presidents, and the courts often refer to this act when discussing the legal
foundation of the other acts.
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Sedition Act of 1918
The next major national security policy change was the 1917 Espionage Act and
the 1918 Sedition Act, which amended the 1917 act (Napolitano, 2014). In addition, the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 which augmented the Espionage Act (Ingram,
2012). Prior to the acts, subversive activities were dealt with solely through treason and
theft of government property statutes (Markham, 2014). The acts essentially made it
illegal to interfere with the war effort, disclose classified information, or conspire to do
either activity (Ingram, 2012). The Sedition Act took a more extreme stance of
prohibiting any criticism of the federal government (Saito, 2011). The primary objectives
of the laws seem straight forward and prudent, but their implementation made many
begin to worry if the 3 acts were in violation of the First Amendment.
The acts drifted from prosecuting those actively trying to subvert the government
to targeting political opposition. The acts were designed to prevent subversive activities,
but were often used to suppress political dissent to President Woodrow Wilson’s foreign
policy (Ingram, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). The DOJ conducted a series of warrantless
search and seizures in an effort to identify potential German sympathizers, antiwar
activists, or political dissidents (Napolitano, 2014). The laws cracked down on antiwar
protests and socialist, communist, and anarchist rhetoric (Rosa, 2007). The DOJ even
encouraged and offered immunity to vigilante surveillance of potential disloyal parties
(Napolitano, 2014). Prosecutors began to actively target private conversations of key
voices that were critical of the administration regardless of if the views were ever
expressed publically (Ingram, 2012; Kennedy, 2004). Post Masters were required to
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screen mail for anti-government correspondence (Napolitano, 2014). Journalists have
often been, and continue to be, investigated and threatened with prosecution under the
Espionage Act, but to date no journalists have been convicted (Markham, 2014). Between
1917 and 1919, at least 2,200 cases were prosecuted under the 3 acts with many if these
cases being settled by the Supreme Court due to First Amendment concerns (Ingram,
2012). Approximately half of those prosecuted were convicted, with approximately 800
convictions coming from the Sedition Act (Kennedy, 2004; Middleton, 2012). The steps
taken during the Wilson presidency to suppress opposition were considerably more
extreme than those taken during Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts (Kennedy, 2004;
Napolitano, 2014). The Sedition Act of 1918, considered the most controversial of the
acts, would have a similar fate to that of its 1798 predecessor.
The Sedition Act of 1918, like the Sedition Act of 1798, was contentious and its
political popularity quickly faded. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer used the Sedition
Act as part of the legal basis for prosecuting those who spoke out against the war effort or
had radical political views (Middleton, 2012). Palmer’s prosecutions became known as
the Palmer Raids, which resulted in more than 10,000 arrests, but only enough evidence
to facilitate the deportation of 56 people (Cecil, 2015). The opposition to the Palmer
Raids led to the development of the ACLU (ACLU website, 2014). One of the primary
concerns about the Palmer raids, was the allegations and some evidence of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) being used to target political opposition (Cecil, 2015). The
ACLU and some newspapers brought these concerns to the public with multiple cases
reaching the Supreme Court.
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The repeated Supreme Court decisions upheld the constitutionality of the acts, but
its growing unpopularity sparked a congressional debate (Middleton, 2012). The debate
to repeal the Sedition Act began on December 20, 1920 and led to its official repeal on
March 3, 1921 (Middleton, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). Even though the act was repealed,
Wilson was hesitant to release the prisoners. They remained imprisoned until President
Harding and President Coolidge eventually pardoned everyone remaining in prison
(Napolitano, 2014). The Sedition Act of 1918’s lifespan was nearly identical to that of
every other national security policy examined thus far in this review.
The PET explained why these national security policies tend to follow similar
paths. There is a natural resistance to any policy change, which prevents adjustments
even in the face of complications, but when the demand for change can no longer be
restrained by the macro-political bodies rapid, sweeping change occurs (Jones &
Baumgartner, 2012). Jensen (2011) explained that the electoral fear politicians have of
not acting creates a demand to rush through legislature often results in imperfect statutes
that require incremental change or eventual repeal. The Sedition Act had near unanimous
support when it was enacted because of the turmoil of World War I, the large scale labor
disputes, and the rise of anarchists, communists, and socialists in America (Ingram, 2012;
Kennedy, 2004; Middleton, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). The aggregate of these events
provided the exogenous shock expected to precede rapid bounded rationality changes in
the PET model. The Wilson administration desired more authority in combatting these
issues, because of there was tremendous political pressure for them to act immediately.
The Sedition Act of 1918 amended the Espionage Act of 1917 past what was politically
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acceptable at the time, but this was not immediately realized until a public feared the First
Amendment was in danger. This developed into congress being pressured into repealing
the law. Following this security policy correction, national security policy went back into
a period of equilibrium until the disruption of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor.
Japanese Internment
Pearl Harbor On December 7, 1941 Japanese forces conducted a surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor on Oahu, Hawaii killing 2,403 Americans, sinking 2 battleships,
damaging 6 others, and destroying a significant percentage of the U.S. military aircraft
(Caravaggio, 2014; Rosenberg, 2015; Zimm, 2015). The United States and Japan were
engaged in failing negations and war seemed like a real possibility, but most did not
expect a surprise attack (Caravaggio, 2014). In retrospect there seemed to have been
some evidence that the United States missed vital intelligence that could have thwarted
the Japanese attack (Burtness & Ober, 2013; Sales, 2010). The Japanese strategy
depended so heavily upon achieving surprise that had the U.S. forces been given enough
notice to get planes in the air, Japanese bombers would have been utterly decimated as
they did not have significant fighter support (Zimm, 2015). Unfortunately for the United
States, the attack was a surprise. The significant damage inflicted by the attack led most
Americans to expect immediate follow on Japanese attacks and in actuality, the Japanese
commander in charge of the attack wanted to continue attacks, but was denied by his
superiors (Caravaggio, 2014). This left the United States in a state of fear.
As the PET and history have demonstrated throughout this literary review, fear
generated from a significant event often leads to policy change that is latter considered
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deeply flawed. Beginning in 1924 the Federal Bureau of Investigation started collecting
information on millions of Americans in the name of national security screening (Saito,
2011). In the months leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack the FBI used this information
to generate lists of potentially disloyal Americans of German, Italian, or Japanese
heritage and within 3 days following the attack the federal government found and
detained these individuals (Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012). These people were detained
under a number of statutes, including a military order from Lieutenant General John L.
DeWitt that targeted West Coast Japanese Americans (Saito, 2011). This order was meant
to be a short term precaution, but presidential action turned the detention into a more long
term affair.
On February 19, 1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 9066, which allowed for the military internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans
(Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012; Wood, 2014). The bulk of those interned came from
California (Wood, 2014). The internment camps were filled and primarily staffed by the
U.S. military and the DOJ in conjunction with the War Relocation Authority (Watkins,
2012). What made these detentions different than traditionally accepted confinements is
the interned individuals were not suspected of any crime and were imprisoned solely
upon their heritage (Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012; Wood, 2014). This essentially made
being of Japanese heritage a punishable offense.
The common belief among several top U.S. officials of the time was for Japanese
Americans, heredity and ethnicity outweighed national citizenship (Wood, 2014).
Previously mentioned Lieutenant General DeWitt repeatedly and publically claimed that
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the war was not with the country of Japan, but was with the Japanese race (Saito, 2011).
This claim was not backed by any solid intelligence as there was few cases of seditious
activities or leanings by Japanese Americans (Wood, 2014). Despite the lack of empirical
evidence, DeWitt’s intentions were enthusiastically met by his subordinates. Lieutenant
Colonel Karl Bendetsen, who commanded the internment process, stated his belief that
internment applied to anybody that had any degree of Japanese heritage (Saito, 2011).
His interpretation of President Roosevelt’s intent translated into the internment of West
Coast first and second generation Japanese Americans (Wood, 2014).
Many of the Japanese Americans detained in the camps were held until the war’s
end (Saito, 2011; Wood, 2014). Some of those interned were allowed to join the U.S.
Army’s 442 Regiment, a highly decorated all Japanese American unit (Wood, 2014).
This not only provided a way out of the camps, but also the unit’s success helped
discredit the notion of race over national pride. Eventually the camps were disbanded and
gradually the anti-Japanese fervor resided. Decades later the government acknowledged
the inappropriateness of the acts. In August 1988 congress and President Reagan enacted
the Civil Liberties Act, which officially apologized to the former internees and provided
each surviving internee $20,000 (Saito, 2011; Wood, 2014). This was intended to provide
some closure to the internment debacle.
The internment provides another example of how a disruptive event can rapidly
generate questionable national security policies. In time, the public fear that facilitated
these policies dissipates and the policies tend to drift back into a more acceptable
equilibrium. Robinson (2014) opined that the PET is a “convincing cognitive
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foundation”. Policymakers develop procedures for maintaining the status quo, but when
an event disrupts the status quo the policymakers’ reactions are typically disproportionate
to the event in an effort to restore order as fast as possible (Robinson, 2014). The
contribution gained by studying the World War II internments is it both establishes the
validity of the PET and develops a foundation of historic national security policies. The
end of World War II ushered in a rather chaotic period for national security with the Cold
War tensions and policies.
Cold War
From 1945 to 1989 was one of the more dangerous periods in world history due to
the consistent friction between the communist countries and western democracies. The
Cold War tension between the United States and Soviet Union was so great and lasted for
so long that during the collapse of the Soviet Union, a prominent Soviet leader, Georgi
Arbatov, warned the US that not having a dedicated enemy could be devastating to the
United States (Fettweis, 2014). International threats can promote increased bipartisanship
and reduce internal political conflicts (Flynn, 2014). Arbatov assumed the United States
would become utterly dysfunctional and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
would dissolve, but neither of these events happened (Fettweis, 2014). The U.S. has not
become dysfunctional, but bipartisanship is not prominent in current American politics.
While international threat might bring U.S. politicians together, long term international
military conflict, including the current War on Terror, seems to drive them apart (Flynn,
2014). NATO continues to operate around the world in an effort to counter Russian
influence (He, 2012). In short Arbatov was wrong and despite the increase in Islamic
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terrorism, the United States is much safer now than it was during the Cold War (Fettweis,
2014). The point that the Cold War was even more dangerous than the global terrorism
threat is important, because it sets the stage for explaining domestic Cold War security
policy.
A common theme with domestic security policies during the Cold War was
countering the Red Scare. Communists were targeted under the Sedition Act of 1918 but
anarchists and disruptive labor union leaders overshadowed the communist threat (Rosa,
2007). Communist prosecutions significantly ramped up during and following World
War II (Wark & Galliher, 2013). The Alien Registration Act of 1940, known as the Smith
Act, expedited prosecution, detention, and deportation procedures for migrants
expressing communist or seditious views and (Bruce, 2014; Napolitano, 2014; Romano,
2011; Wark & Galliher, 2013). The act received substantial support because it was
championed as combatting communism and limiting migrant employment to boost the
economy as the positive economic effects had not yet occurred (Bruce, 2014). Many of
those initially charged under the act were convicted of actively trying to overthrow the
government of the United States during a time of war, which further solidified support for
the act (Wark & Galliher, 2013). As many other previous security policies have done the
Smith Act drifted from its documented purpose bringing it into a contentious relationship
with civil liberties.
In the debate leading up to the Smith Act and following the enactment the ACLU
repeatedly protested the Smith Act’s vague authorities and potential for abuse (Bruce,
2014). For 16 years, until the courts stopped the prosecutions, the Smith Act was used to
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reprimand political advocates for otherwise constitutionally protected speech (HavertyStacke, 2013). The FBI used the Smith Act to prosecute attorneys that defended
communists that were convicted under the Smith Act, despite the attorneys’ lack of
connection to communist organizations prior to the defense (Wark & Galliher, 2013). The
act also criminalized membership in any communist organization, but only one person
was ever imprisoned under this clause of the Smith Act and he was later pardoned by
President John F. Kennedy (Napolitano, 2014). The Smith Act set the precedence for
greatly expanding domestic national security throughout the Cold War and beyond
(Haverty-Stacke, 2013).
The Cold War brought a series of domestic security policies and procedures that,
in retrospect, are of questionable constitutionality. The Internal Security Act of 1950,
known as the McCarran Act required all communists register with the DOJ and denied
visa entry to known communists (Hefner-Babb, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The McCarran Act
and the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which passed in conjunction with the
McCarran Act, were part of the larger concerted effort to combat a domestic communist
threat (Hefner-Babb, 2012). The act brought stiff penalties for failing to comply with the
registration. Those convicted of failing to register with the DOJ incurred a fine of
$10,000 per day and a possible imprisonment of 5 years per day (Wark & Galliher,
2013). After registering with the DOJ the registered communist would then be required to
provide annual financial reports, notifications of change of addresses and membership
rosters (Hefner-Babb, 2012). The act was also seen as part of the legal basis for state and
federal “loyalty review boards” that conducted investigations of potential communists
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(Romano, 2011). These investigations were based upon political ideology rather than
suspicion of criminal activity, which creates a clash between security and civil liberties.
A significant difference between the McCarran Act and all the previously
examined statutes in this literature review is congress and not the president pushed for the
McCarran Act. President Harry S. Truman vetoed the law due to concerns about its
constitutionality, but congress overwhelmingly supported the act and easily reversed the
veto (Hefner-Babb, 2012). Fallon (2013) articulated that the constitution requires the
president to respond to security threats while constraining the actions available to the
executive branch. The courts traditionally interpret the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution as ensuring the freedom to associate with any peaceful political organization
(Bedi, 2014). President Truman and Senator McCarran were both Democrats, indicating
the veto was probably less about politics and more about substance.
President Truman was likely concerned about criminalizing any peaceful political
organization. While there were communist groups that advocated the overthrow of the
federal government, there was also a plethora of standing laws to deal with such
individuals and groups. The McCarran Act essentially sought to ban support of
communist ideology. Government monitoring and suppression of speech has at times
generated public support and possibly even short term benefits, but it is in direct violation
of the U.S. Constitution and detrimental to the more important American ideals (Hughes,
2012). President Truman seems to have realized it was better to defeat communism
through comprehensive debate rather than suppression. Regardless of the reasons
President Truman’s veto of the new authorities of the McCarran Act represents one of the
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few times that the executive branch chose not to pursue the acquisition of new security
provisions.
The first half of the 20th century was a turbulent time. There was threat from both
World Wars, the initiation of the Korean War, violent anarchist movements, disruptive
labor clashes, and 2 bouts of the “Red Scare” leading to the Cold War (Napolitano, 2014;
Romano, 2011). Historically periods of crisis tend to lead to security policies reflective of
government overreaction (Mondale et al., 2014). Benson and Russel (2015) elaborated
that the PET rapidly delivers a substantial policy change relative to the perceived social
severity of the preceding event or events (Benson & Russel, 2015). The importance of
examining these historic policies when looking at modern policy, such as the USA
PATRIOT Act, is it provides historical, theoretical, and procedural policy perspectives.
In addition, understanding the aforementioned perceived social severity of the
international wars and internal threats of the early to mid-1900s is paramount to
understanding modern security and surveillance doctrine.
Surveillance Scandals
The United States’ statutory structure is designed to both provide for national
security and establish safeguards against undue government intrusions (Baldwin &
Koslosky, 2012). This system typically is effective in meeting both goals. There have
been instances when retrospective analysis of select U.S. security / surveillance
procedures illuminate questionable authorizations (Anderson, 2014; Mondale et al., 2014;
United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, 2013). Usually these questionable programs are short lived responses to a
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crisis. Many of these events occurred in response to political and social turmoil in 20th
century America. A cumulative effect of these programs developed through the years
resulting in federal agencies and the executive branch conducting surveillance,
investigations, and even prosecutions outside the traditional limits of the law (Mondale et
al., 2014). Eventually the collective egregious nature of the programs prompted a public
outcry and the development of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978
to mitigate these programs. This section of the literature review examined some of the
programs and events that led to FISA.
Teapot Dome
After being formed in 1908 the Federal Bureau of Investigation underwent a
period of public scrutiny due to a series politically motivated investigations (Waskey,
2012). The bureau’s image was further damaged by its involvement in the Palmer Raids,
which John Edgar Hoover helped coordinate (Cecil, 2015). Hoover was concerned, as
much of America was, that the United States was vulnerable to a socialist, communist, or
anarchist insurrection similar to that of the Bolshevik Revolution afflicting Russia at the
time (Babic, 2012). Between 1919 and 1920 the bureau used questionable often violent
tactics to crack down on “disloyal” parties (Cecil, 2015). The Palmer Raids had a strange
effect of bringing the bureau both scorn and praise, because the public feared insurrection
and were leery of the bureau’s approach.
This situation did not negatively affect Hoover’s career. At the time of the raids
Hoover was not the widely known public figure he would later become. This anonymity
allowed Hoover to later be selected to “reform” the bureau following some controversial
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events (Babic, 2012; Cecil, 2015). The bureau did make a concerted effort to address
some of the issues that arose from the Palmer Raids (Waskey, 2012). Moreover, the
bureau under FBI Chiefs (later called Directors) William J. Flynn, William J. Burns, and
Hoover worked to improve the public image of the bureau through reforms,
standardizations, and an aggressive media campaign (Babic, 2012; Cecil, 2015). It took
several years for the bureau’s role to mature and develop into its accepted roles of today.
During the first several decades there were some growing pains as the roles were defined.
In the 1920s the FBI’s role in the federal government shifted away from the
policies that led to the Palmer Raids. With World War I and the first Red Scare coming to
an end, the nation began to incrementally shift back into the more traditionally acceptable
security versus liberty equilibrium. President Warren G. Harding freed many of those
convicted of antiwar activities in an effort to bring normalcy to the country (Waskey,
2012). The ending of first Red Scare did not reduce the importance of the bureau. The
reason for this is the Eighteenth Amendment brought in the federally prosecuted alcohol
prohibition and the rise of violent gangsters, which made the FBI more important than
ever (Babic, 2012). Much of the bureau focused on these tasks and created a generally
healthy image for the FBI. Unfortunately the FBI continued to engage in some
questionable behavior due to political pressures.
A common fear about the FBI in the early years was that the bureau would be
used to target political opposition (Babic, 2012). There were some accusations of this in
the early years of the bureau, but the FBI involvement with the Harding Administration’s
Teapot Dome scandal would truly shock the public. President Harding’s administration
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could have been seen being highly successful if it were not for some high profile
scandals. President Harding was able to reduce the size of government, cut the federal
budget in half, promote the free market, lower the unemployment rate, and generally
improve the U.S. economy (Folsom, 2012). Unfortunately the president was surrounded
by his “Ohio Gang”, a group of close friends many of whom exploited the president’s
trusting nature (Folsom, 2012; Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). The close friends of the
president conducted 2 large scale construction kickback schemes which netted them
millions of dollars in personal gain and eventual jail time (Folsom, 2012; Purdy, 2005).
President Harding’s administration was so tarnished by numerous outlandish scandals
that many believe his food poisoning death was actually a suicide (Purdy, 2005; Waskey,
2012).
The 2 primary scandals of the administration were similar in that they were
perpetrated by Harding’s friends who received kickbacks for accepted ridiculously
overpriced noncompetitive bids for construction. The first scandal involved President
Harding’s longtime friend Charles Forbes, whom Harding appoint to be the first head of
the newly formed Veteran’s Bureau (Folsom, 2012). The second involved Albert Fall,
Harding’s friend and Secretary of Interior (Purdy, 2005). Forbes received a number of
bribes during the construction of overpriced veterans’ hospitals (Folsom, 2012). Fall
received millions of dollars in bribes during the construction of oil storage facilities and
pipelines for the oil reserves of Teapot Dome, Wyoming that were under the control of
the Department of Interior (Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). The Veterans’ Bureau scandal
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was a disgrace for the administration and when the Teapot Dome scandal broke the
administration attempted to prevent a similar humiliation.
A bipartisan Senate investigation, led by Republican Senator Robert M. La
Follette Sr. and Democratic Senator Thomas J. Walsh, met stiff resistance at every turn
(Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). What happened next was inexcusable, illegal, and highly
controversial. The Harding Administration elicited the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
investigate, intimidate, and harass the senate investigators. Walsh endured break-ins,
constant unwarranted surveillance, personal threats, and even his 3 year old daughter was
threatened (Purdy, 2005). The bureau’s top leadership, including Chief Burns, authorized
the surveillances in 1923 (Cecil, 2015). After both senators endured unwarranted breakins, wire taps, background inquiries, and possibly even threats it became clear to the
public that the bureau had drifted into dangerous waters.
Hoover’s Surveillances
In the wake of the Teapot Dome scandal J. Edgar Hoover was chosen to lead the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the bureau faced uncertainties about its proper roles
and how to conduct those functions. In 1924 Hoover took the reins of the FBI from Chief
Burns (Babic, 2012; Miller, 2012). Hoover was able to transform the bureau’s image into
the iconic “G-men” in a relatively short period of time. Hoover ensured the bureau put
forth an ultra-professional, non-partisan, image through strict conduct and appearance
standards (Gage, 2012; Miller, 2012). The new image for the G-men was perfect timing,
as the bureau had a new set of public enemies with the rise of gangsters in the 1920s.
Hoover influenced the media to produce a number of extremely popular television shows,
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comic strips, and books showcasing the bureau taking on the high profile gangsters
(Cecil, 2015; Miller, 2012). The FBI’s performance, image, and popularity improved
tremendously under Hoover’s leadership.
Despite successfully fostering a non-partisan image for the bureau as a whole,
Hoover became incredibly well connected politically and amassed enough power with his
position that he could push political agendas. Throughout Hoover’s 5 decades with the
bureau, his personal connections with prominent politicians seemed to at times
inappropriately influence the bureau’s actions and policies (Gage, 2012). Hoover’s first
years as director were spent developing and expanding the bureau’s national influence
through increasing its size, training, capabilities, and political connections (Babic, 2012;
Brame & Shriver, 2013; Gage, 2012). The first Red Scare established Hoover with the
anti-communist sphere of politicians. This undoubtedly aided Hoover in soliciting
resources for the growing bureau.
The communist movement did not die out in America with the decline of the first
Red Scare, only the hysteria surrounding it did. As World War II neared, the public once
again began to take notice of communists in the United States. The second Red Scare
brought Hoover new resources, extensive authorities, and connections to prominent
members of congress and even presidents (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Gage, 2012). With
the passage of the aforementioned Smith Act of 1940 the Hoover gained the authority to
investigate anybody he “deemed a threat to national security” (Brame & Shriver, 2013).
Hoover maintained this ability for the rest of his life, using it both legitimately and
illegally.
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Hoover’s surveillance capabilities made him an extremely feared and powerful
bureaucrat. Hoover conducted surveillance on an untold number of individuals based
solely upon Hoover’s determination without any probable cause or suspicion of a crime
(Brame & Shriver, 2013; Miller, 2012; Richardson, 2015). The surveillances began with
the communists with the intent of preventing subversion of those looking to overthrow
the government, as the communists did in Russia (Brame & Shriver, 2013). As World
War II progressed the bureau began an aggressive counter-intelligence program
(COINTELPRO) initiated with the goal of countering the real threat of subversion, which
it accomplished in several cases (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Romano, 2011).
COINTELPRO was a domestic program that mimicked Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) and later Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black operations” abroad including
“false media stories, bogus leaflets, pamphlets and other publications, forged
correspondence, anonymous letters and telephone calls, pressure through employers,
landlords and others, tampering with mail and telephone service” (Romano, 2011, p.
173). COINTELPRO operations never resulted in arrests and in 1971 after the program
became public knowledge Hoover publically abandoned it, but it was likely just false
information (Miller, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). COINTELPRO continued after the war
and well into the 1990s, but it is how Hoover used COINTELPRO authorities against the
civil rights movement and his political enemies that caused concern (Brame & Shriver,
2013; Miller, 2012; Romano, 2011).
The civil rights movement did contain some groups that sought the violent
overthrow of the United States’ government (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Phelps, 2012). Part
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of how the bureau came to investigate these groups was the fringes of the communist and
socialist movements had crossed over into diametrically opposing, violent groups such as
the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan (Napolitano, 2014; Phelps, 2012). The FBI was
justified in investigating these groups as they were and still do call for violence and
subversion of the United States. The more questionable infiltrations occurred with groups
like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), which did not advocate violence (Phelps, 2012).
Hoover’s programs targeted violent and nonviolent groups on the political left and right
(Greenberg, 2011; Holst, 2007). Hoover believed that much of the civil unrest in the
South was due to a communist plot to agitate racial tensions (Phelps, 2012). Hoover
notably authorized an extensive investigation of Martin Luther King Jr. out of concerns
about his anti-Vietnam views, which Hoover considered to be communist leaning (Miller,
2012; Purdy, 2007). Basically anybody Hoover deemed radical or a political dissent was
a potential target.
Worse than how the bureau handled political groups, was how Hoover used the
bureau to further his political influence. Hoover made himself indispensable to every
president between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Richard Nixon (Holst, 2007). It is
believed that Presidents Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson all
wanted to fire Hoover, but were afraid that Hoover’s investigations of them and their
families would be leaked to the public (Miller, 2012). Hoover began the investigations of
powerful Americans early in his career, with one of his earliest targets being Eleanor
Roosevelt (Holst, 2007). In essence Hoover was untouchable by the end of World War II
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and would remain so until his death. Hoover was so connected that President Johnson
would waive the mandatory retirement age for Hoover allowing him to remain in charge
of the FBI until he died (Miller, 2012). Hoover would be the only director to hold the
position for such an extended period of time. Promptly upon his death congress placed a
ten year term limit on the position and eventually began congressional investigations into
the FBI, something that had been thwarted repeatedly during Hoover’s lifetime (Holst,
2007). J. Edgar Hoover amassed more clout than any bureaucrat in American history.
While he did amazing things for the FBI and the country, his private surveillance
undertakings compromised the integrity of the bureau.
Even now, well past the 50 year expiration of their classification, the FBI refuses
to release of millions of files related to these investigations to the national archives
despite no ongoing investigations or national security concerns (Richardson, 2015).
Regardless of how the records could potentially affect the image of Hoover or the bureau,
these records should be transferred to the national archives. It seems some of these
records would probably be of historical significance. Any confidential information would
be protected under standard national archive policies, so there truly is no valid reason for
withholding the files. Withholding information to paint a narrative does not do history
justice. Furthermore there is evidence that some of these documents were destroyed by
flooding during Hurricane Sandy due to insufficient storage facilities (Richardson, 2015).
The refusal to release these records furthers speculation as to how far the bureau went
astray with Hoover’s private missions.
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Watergate
Just a month and a half after Hoover’s death, the biggest scandal in the nation’s
history would transpire and Hoover’s longtime friend President Nixon would be at the
center of the controversy. On June 17, 1972 5 Nixon campaign workers were arrested
while breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at Washington
D.C.’s Watergate Hotel in an attempt to adjust existing unwarranted wire taps for better
reception (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014; Gage, 2012). The arrests exposed a
conspiracy with origins leading all the way to the President of the United States. The
ensuing investigation led to more than 70 convictions for illegal break-ins, wire taps, and
numerous other crimes which netted some of the perpetrators 40 years in prison
(Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014). Many top White House advisors received
jail time (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013). After 2 years of investigation and scandal President
Nixon resigned in disgrace (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014; Gage, 2012).
Despite all of Hoover’s previously questionable surveillance choices, in his last
several months he did have reservations about the constitutionality of Nixon’s preWatergate actions. The two had been friends for decades, but Hoover adamantly resisted
Nixon’s attempts to use the FBI for partisan purposes (Gage, 2012). With COINTELPRO
being exposed in 1971 Hoover attempted to limit the bureau’s involvement with
questionable activities, which conflicted with Nixon’s agenda resulting in increasing
tensions between the men (Gage, 2012; Miller, 2012). Upon Hoover’s death, Nixon
attempted to get a more compliant director, but the bureau’s leadership would never be
truly united behind Nixon’s unconstitutional endeavors (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013). In
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fact Hoover’s protégé, Mark Felt, later FBI Director Felt, would become the famous
“Deep Throat”, who exposed the Nixon conspiracy (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein,
2014; Gage, 2012). Nixon did not have FBI support and the bureau did investigate the
Watergate scandal (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Gage, 2012). The CIA did try to delay the
bureau’s investigation (Gage, 2012). This turned out to be Nixon’s undoing, as he taped
White House conversations including the one where he prompted the CIA to slow the
FBI investigation, which was eventually heard by investigators (Faulkner & Cheney,
2013; Gage, 2012). The Watergate scandal toppled the Nixon presidency.
The events described throughout this section of the literature review illustrated
how domestic security practices have, at times, led to abuse. It is vital for scholars and
policy makers to understand what has happened and be vigilant against future abuses.
Studying the Watergate scandal, Hoover’s surveillances, and the Teapot Dome scandal
provides clear examples of such abuses. With Watergate as the pinnacle of half a century
of questionable practices, the American public was ready for reform. The stage was set
for the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, also known as the “Church Committee”.
Court Decisions
While examining the history of security policies suggested the validity of the PET
and proposed there is an acceptable balance between liberty and security, it did not fully
address the legality of the issues. The courts had several significant rulings in the 20th
century regarding the legality of security and surveillance policies. It is critical to review
these ruling in an effort to fully understand modern surveillance authorities. Since
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antiquity it has been common practice when reviewing a statute to refer to previous
relevant decisions that form the legal precedence of the statute in question (Strouthes,
2007). This section of the literature review explored some of these rulings in respect to
their contribution to the legal precedence involving surveillance cases.
Olmstead v. United States
The first court case with bearing on this study was the 1928 Olmstead v. United
States. The basic premise of the case was Olmstead contended that a wiretap should
require a warrant or it would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Emas & Pallas,
2012; Ferguson, 2014). At the time, wiretaps were a relatively new technology and had
yet to be challenged at the Supreme Court level. In the Olmstead investigation a
wiretapped recorded conversation was presented as evidence, which led the Olmstead
defense to present a case that the incriminating evidence was inadmissible and
unconstitutional (Ferguson, 2014; Jones, 2011). When writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Taft concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to electronic
surveillance if there was not a physical intrusion or seizure (Bedi, 2014; Ferguson, 2014).
In 1942 and in 1951 the courts reconfirmed Olmstead ruling with the similar cases of
Goldman v. United States and Lee v. United States (Emas & Pallas, 2012). For nearly 4
decades electronic surveillance would not require a warrant if there was not a physical
intrusion.
Katz v. United States
In 1967, the Olmstead decision would again be challenged in the Supreme Court.
Charles Katz was accused of conducting interstate gambling operations via telephones

53
booths and the FBI and local police were able use recording devices to obtain
incriminating about the case (Emas & Pallas, 2012; Sales, 2010). In all 6 recorded
conversations were heard at the trial contributing significantly to the conviction (Emas &
Pallas, 2012). The case was appealed until it reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior
to conducting electronic surveillance, as the amendment safeguards the person rather than
just their property (Bellia, 2011; Ferguson, 2014; Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann,
2007). The Supreme Court decision asserted that the intrusion occurred in a
constitutionally protected area, as Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
phone booth (Davis, 2014). Katz did not have the expectation of privacy that he would
not be seen or photographed, as the booth was predominately clear glass in a public
setting, but he could reasonably expect that his conversation would not be heard outside
of its intended audience (Emas & Pallas, 2012). Also in 1967 Berger v. New York came
to a similar conclusion only with eavesdropping of a house rather than a phone booth
(DeVito, 2011). Katz v. United States adequately addressed its reasons for changing the
Olmstead procedures for conducting electronic surveillance in criminal cases.
What the Katz decision did not address was domestic security surveillance cases.
The courts did not require warrants for domestic security investigations that used
electronic surveillance techniques (Francel, 2014; Harper, 2014). Shults (2011)
contended that by not tackling domestic national security investigations the Katz decision
suggested that the Fourth Amendment argument does not necessarily apply to executive
directed surveillance. Shults (2011) further proclaimed that this lack of judgment made
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foreign intelligence confusing and ripe for abuse. Whether or not the lack of depth of the
decision led to any abuse, the Supreme Court was deciding on a gambling case not a
foreign intelligence case.
The Katz and Berger cases provided the exogenous shock the PET suggests is
necessary for significant change. A review of literature suggests the 2 similar cases
created a public demand for change. Congress adopted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, known as Title III or the Wiretap Act to coincide
with the trends established in the Katz and Berger cases (Bellia, 2011). Title III
established the warrant requirements for electronic surveillance in criminal cases (Harper,
2014; Jones, 2011). While Title III became the standard for wiretap procedures in
criminal cases, it did not apply to domestic security cases (Shults, 2011). This further
implies that the Katz, and to a lesser extent the Berger, case was the catalyst for the Title
III provision as these cases were criminal cases not domestic security cases. Title III
would not remain strictly within the realm of criminal justice for long.
(Keith) United States v. United States District Court for Eastern District of Michigan
The next major court decision involving surveillance procedures would come in
1972 with the famed “Keith” case, named after Judge Damon Keith of the United States
District Court for Eastern District of Michigan. In the United States v. United States
District Court for Eastern District of Michigan the defendants were accused of plotting to
bomb a CIA building in Michigan (Francel, 2014). The prosecution used electronic
surveillance without a warrant, but failed to prove a connection to a foreign power
(Bellia, 2011). The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Executive Branch does not have
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the authority to conduct surveillance without a warrant unless there is a connection to a
foreign power (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 2007; Shults, 2011). Furthermore the
Keith ruling added to the legal precedence that information gathered for foreign
intelligence investigations cannot be used in criminal cases unless a traditional warrant
authorized the collection (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). This standard remained until the
creation of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Church Committee
The Church Committee, in response to numerous scandals, helped reform and
shape domestic security policies from the late 1970s until the 2001 terrorist attacks. The
committee was formed to investigate executive branch surveillance practices, the US
Army surveillance on American citizens, CIA programs on U.S. soil, and even the
previous analysis of the assassination of President Kennedy (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976).
The Church Committee was the most thorough investigation of U.S. intelligence policies
and practices in American history (Mondale et al., 2014). There was public pressure for
the investigation to be free of political gaming, as a result the committee was well
balanced by party and ideology with both Republicans and Democrats carefully selecting
members across the political spectrum (Donohue, 2014). The committee was chaired by
Senator Frank F. Church (D-ID), with Senator John G. Tower (R-TX) as Vice Chairman
(S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Church’s committee was an effort to counter the hazards of
unfettered government surveillance (Berghel, 2014).
One such moral hazard was President Nixon’s Huston Plan, which essentially was
a joint CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
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and NSA intelligence collection operation that targeted Vietnam War protesters (Mondale
et al., 2014; S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). In some ways this cooperation could have been
seen as a positive step forward as years later the 9/11 Commission would recommend
increased cooperation between the agencies (9/11 Commission, 2004). In fact the
cooperation between the organizations was used as the justification for the program (S.
Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The problem with Nixon’s plan was the military and CIA are not
supposed to conduct operations in the United States and the president targeted all those
publically opposed to the war rather than just radicals advocating for violence. The Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878 prevents the United States military from conducting domestic law
enforcement activities (Sales, 2010). The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA
but specifically prohibited the agency from conducting domestic security functions
(Donohue, 2014; Sales, 2010). The Church Committee found that the DIA and CIA’s
involvement with domestic counterintelligence operations was inappropriate and illegal
(S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The moral hazard of using the DIA and CIA in domestic
programs could have been avoided by limiting their activities to outside the country while
still increasing information sharing regarding international pursuits amongst the
intelligence community. In addition, the committee found using the IRS to harass
organizations based upon their political leanings to be troublesome and clearly not within
the service’s intended purpose (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Using the IRS as a political
weapon should not have been considered a viable option and demonstrates how far the
administration was willing to push the limits of the law.
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The worst aspect of the Huston Plan was not with its enactment, but its
cancellation. The Huston Plan was soundly and immediately rejected by J. Edgar Hoover,
which led to President Nixon revoking the plan within the week of its enactment, but only
the FBI actually heeded the revocation (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Essentially either the
other intelligence agencies went rogue or the president covertly authorized the actions in
direct violation of the law. The Church Committee believed the latter to be the case (S.
Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Without official authorizations the intelligence community
collected on more than 100,000 American citizens due to their opinion on the Vietnam
War (Mondale et al., 2014). The Church Committee found these operations to be illegal
and egregious, but not uncommon.
The Church Committee found literally volumes of information about questionable
to blatantly unconstitutional intelligence activities. The following is a highlight of some
of these activities as found in the Church Committee reports:
•

The FBI investigated approximately 500,000 U.S. citizens for the purpose
of domestic intelligence. Some of these individuals might have been
relative to a criminal investigation, but if they were it was pure
coincidence. The investigations led to the development a national name
index of potential political dissidents.

•

The CIA had a similar program which collected on 1.5 million Americans
resulting in a computerized index system.
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•

At least 380,000 first class letters were opened, read, photographed,
resealed, and delivered by the postal service in conjunction with the FBI
and CIA in 2 unwarranted operations spanning approximately 20 years.

•

All international telegraphs were from 1947–1975 were obtained by the
NSA through a secret arrangement with the telegraph services.

•

From 1969 – 1973 the IRS kept secret files on 11,000 individuals based
upon their political affiliations.

•

The FBI secretly infiltrated civil and women’s rights group with the
expressed intent of disrupting the movements from within. For example
the bureau had agents in the NAACP for more than 25 years without any
evidence of criminal activity.

•

Each president from Roosevelt through Nixon conducted flagrantly illegal
and progressively worse surveillance of their political opposition.
Watergate is a clear example of this, but was not much worse than
President Kennedy’s action. President Kennedy wiretapped at least one
member of congress, a congressional staffer, and other Washington D.C.
insiders.

•

The military and CIA conducted extensive human experimentation using
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and other destructive drugs for several
years with limited controls, goals, or scientific purpose. The CIA
continued the experiments for several years with unwitting subjects, no
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stated objectives, and limited medical staffing inferring the “experiments”
had more sinister motives.
The Church Committee reports are noteworthy in modern domestic security
policy administration and this study in that they comprise an exhaustive inquiry into
domestic practices and mission creep. More than that, the reports were designed to not
only expose abuses but to provide recommendations to prevent future abuses. The United
States has had repeated episodes of security policy abuses, which are quickly rectified
and forgotten upon exposure, but the Church Committee was the first serious attempt to
prevent future abuses (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The reports generated the political
momentum to reform domestic security practices (Mondale et al., 2014). This shows that
not only are surveillance authorities susceptible to mission creep but that the American
public eventually brings these authorities into a more acceptable role. It is typically not
the surveillance procedure that is the problem, but how it is used. With this dissertation
examining the allegations of mission creep with the USA PATRIOT Act, the Church
Committee reports provided essential historic perspective of previous misuses of
domestic security authorities.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The domestic security policies, procedures, and practices from World War I until
the 1970s was problematic, as demonstrated in the last several sections of this literature
review. The PET would assert that these practices were bound to only undergo
incremental change until an external force would create the demand for change. The
literature examined thus far showed that there were in fact incremental changes through
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various policy changes and court decisions. The public became more and more aware of
the need for reform due to the coverage of the Katz case, Watergate scandal, and Keith
decision. These incremental events spawned the Church Committee which served as the
external force needed to reform policy. The reform came as the FISA.
FISA was an ambitious act designed to clarify authorities, reign in abuses, and
provide a codified approach to domestic security. FISA was congress’ most significant
attempt at regulating domestic intelligence gathering (Jones, 2011). FISA was drafted to
restrict domestic intelligence gathering, based upon the Church Committee findings
(Butler, 2013). FISA’s primary functions created a system of checks and balances on the
Executive Branch’s unilateral surveillance practices (Davis, 2014; Howell & Lesemann,
2007; Sales, 2010; Shults, 2011). The checks and balances are achieved through the FISA
court (FISC).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
The creation of the FISC greatly changed domestic security practices in the
United States. Traditional federal courts lack the security clearance requirements related
to many domestic security policies. For this reason the U.S. Congress was compelled to
create a court with the necessary clearance qualifications and with doing so the FISC was
born (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, 2013). The FISC convenes in an undisclosed secure location within the
DOJ in Washington D.C. to help maintain a level of secrecy (Pfander, 2013; Ruger, 2007;
Walton, 2013). The FISC can authorize the clandestine electronic surveillance of a target
for up to a year at a time provided the Attorney General submit an application showing
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probable cause that the target is affiliated with a foreign power (Gilbert, 2013). This
probable cause does not specifically demand suspicion of nefarious activities, but there is
an extensive review process to assess the legality of the surveillance (Francel, 2014;
Ruger, 2007; Walton, 2013). In addition, the application must show that the desired
foreign intelligence cannot be obtained through traditional investigative techniques
(Harper, 2014; Shults, 2011). The application is secretive and submitted without
knowledge of the targeted individual (Shults, 2011). The secrecy and access to classified
information requires the FISC to be carefully staffed.
The FISC is currently comprised of 11 judges appointed by the Chief Justice of
the United States to serve staggered term of 7 years or less (Davis, 2014; Pfander, 2013;
Ruger, 2007). Congress changed the number of FISC judges from 7 to 11 in 2002 (Ruger,
2007). Presumably this change was to accommodate an expected increased workload in
response to the War on Terror. The judges preside over the FISC for one week at a time
with the off duty judges typically assisting with unusual or complex surveillance
applications (Walton, 2013). Despite the weekly rotation judges are expected to make
well informed, contemplative rulings not quick decisions.
Approval Rate
The literature regarding FISC application rulings was polarizing with literature
defending the practice and others excoriating it. The reason for this seems to be the way
in which the approval rate is reported. The FISC provides an annual report to congress,
which provides the statistical information for the number of FISA applications submitted,
approved, and rejected (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
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Communications Technologies, 2013). These reports show in the FISC’s first 20 years it
never rejected a submitted application (Ruger, 2007). In all of FISC’s history only 11 of
the more than 20,000 submitted applications have been rejected (Francel, 2014). This
leads many question how critically the FISC judges review these applications and several
media outlets routinely refer to the FISA process as a rubber stamp (Francel, 2014;
Ruger, 2007; Walton, 2013). The criticism and the statistical information seems solid to
those opposed to FISA.
To those who support FISA the criticism of the FISA approval rate and the
statistical information backing it does not have sound footing. The FISC procedures start
well before the final application is submitted with the requestor and FISC attorneys going
back and forth until the application is ready for final submission (Francel, 2014; Walton,
2013). Most, if not all, applications are altered based upon the FISC attorneys’
recommendations, which generally make the applications acceptable to the FISC judges
(Walton, 2013). The annual report only accounts for applications actually submitted to
the FISC judge, meaning the applications that would have been rejected have likely been
changed or abandoned (Francel, 2014; Walton, 2013). In addition,, as FISC’s Judge
Walton (2013) pointed out, from 2008 through 2012, only 5 of 13,593 traditional Title III
wiretap applications were rejected. Between the FISC attorneys’ guidance making the
applications more acceptable to the FISC judges and the FISA approval rate being similar
to the traditional wiretap approval rate, the rubber stamp criticism loses validity with
those in support of FISA.
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FISA Application v. Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV)
Most of those opposed to FISA claim FISA authorizations violate the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United States
that Fourth Amendment protections applied to electronic searches when it intrudes on a
reasonable expectation of privacy (Davis, 2014; Sales, 2010; Shults, 2011). The Katz
ruling does not make the leap that Fourth Amendment protections apply in national
security cases (Shults, 2011; Yoo, 2014). Thus the electronic surveillance warrant
requirement only extends to criminal cases (Banks, 2010; Shults, 2011). Despite the
robust deliberation process of FISA authorizations, in the United States v. Cavanagh the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that FISC proceedings do not satisfy Fourth
Amendment requirements, (United States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). This creates a
controversy when FISA authorized information is used in criminal proceedings.
The Cavanagh ruling raised concerns about the use of FISA materials in criminal
cases and strengthened the wall between FISA and criminal proceedings. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that “FISA court is not a detached and neutral body,
but functions instead as a compliant arm of the government” (United States v. Cavanagh,
1986/1987). Rightly or wrongly this ruling combined with the perception of the FISA
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approval rate gives the impression that FISA authorized surveillance is akin to the British
general warrants of pre-revolutionary America. The general warrant allowed the British
to conduct searches and seizures without probable cause of a criminal offense (Mondale
et al., 2014; Napolitano, 2014). The Fourth Amendment was specifically designed to
prevent such activities through specific warrant requirements (Mondale et al., 2014).
Throughout the history of the United States, the courts have preferred specific warrants in
the investigation of a crime (Banks, 2010; Williams, 2014). Searches not specifically
authorized by warrants have been permitted since the founding of the country, but
typically involve reasonable suspicion and a need for immediate search (Williams, 2014).
The Cavanagh ruling reaffirmed the courts’ preference for traditional warrants rather than
FISA authorizations.
There have been controversial instances in which FISA authorized information
was used in the prosecution of a U.S. citizen. While investigating the 2004 Madrid train
bombings the FBI misidentified fingerprints at the bomb site as belonging to Brandon
Mayfield (Rush, 2008). The FBI then used FISA authorizations and National Security
Letters (NSL) to conduct various physical and electronic searches / surveillances for the
Mayfield case (Mayfield v. United States, 2009). Next the FBI detained Mayfield without
charge for 2 weeks (Rush, 2008). Ultimately it was discovered that Mayfield’s
fingerprints did not match those at the site and was not likely involved in any criminal
activities (Mayfield v. United States, 2009; Rush, 2008). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Mayfield’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated as the NSLs
and FISA authorizations did not meet Fourth Amendment protections (Mayfield v. United
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States, 2009). Mayfield was awarded $2 million for his troubles (Rush, 2008). The
Mayfield case illustrates how FISA authorizations can be problematic when the
investigated individual is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Discovery
Another common complaint against FISA authorizations in criminal cases is the
lack of discovery. In criminal proceedings throughout the United States since early in the
1900s the prosecution has had to provide the discovery of evidence to prevent the
defendant from being blindsided by unexpected evidence during the trial (Heeren, 2014).
In FISA cases defendants are not likely to have total access to the prosecutor’s evidence
against them as its disclosure is always suppressed (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann,
2007). This is especially troublesome if the legality of the FISA authorized surveillance is
questioned as the defense counsel is never granted access to FISA materials (Harper,
2014). In the criminal setting FISA obtained information is usually controversial and
denying the defense discovery due to security classification creates constitutionality
concerns (Butler, 2013). The lack of discovery in criminal cases with FISA authorized
surveillance could lead to abuses or at least the perception of abuse as the defendant has
less protections than in a traditional warranted surveillance.
This potential for abuses or the appearance of abuses is largely because FISA was
not originally drafted to be used in criminal proceedings. Changes to FISA created the
prospective contentions. The USA PATRIOT Act contained some of the first and more
significant FISA changes. More specifically most of the changes are in Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act. The next section addressed the title.
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USA PATRIOT Act – Title II
As mentioned in the introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act was passed during
the turbulent weeks following the 2001 terrorist attacks with near unanimous support, but
has since been the subject of criticism. On September 24, 2001 the DOJ presented a draft
of the requested authorities to the House of Representatives (Gibbons, 2007). The DOJ’s
requests rapidly gained traction. On October 4, 2001 a draft was introduced to the Senate
and one week later received Senate approval (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). The final
version of the act introduced to congress on October 23, 2001 was passed with 83% of
the House of Representatives voting yea on October 24, 2001 and 98% of the Senate
voting yea on October 25, 2001 (GovTrack.US website, 2004). President Bush signed the
bill into law on October 27, 2001 (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). By modern standards the
statute was enacted exceedingly quickly, but as the PET would explain speed in
enactment does not necessarily translate into flawlessness.
The USA PATRIOT Act’s enactment is a prime example of the PET in action.
The external shock to the system was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This
eliminated the standard ebb and flow of incremental security policy change for the abrupt
changes ushered in under the USA PATRIOT Act. The law rapidly fixed many national
security vulnerabilities, as demanded by the American public. As with many of the
previously mentioned, rapidly enacted national security policies, the legislators faced a
serious time crunch. They needed to act quickly to meet the electorate’s mandates, which
did not give them time to craft the most faultless bill possible. This perfectly represents
the bounded rationality of the PET. Since the act became law there have been concerns
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about some of the law’s faults. Some of these concerns have been soundly rejected or
ignored while others have garnered support and lead to amendments to the USA
PATRIOT Act. This illustrates the shift back to incremental policy changes.
Among the first to identify the polarizing effects of the USA PATRIOT Act was
President Bush. The acronym USA PATRIOT Act is polarizing in that it implies that
disagreeing with provisions of the act is unpatriotic (Levinson, 2008). President Bush had
pushed for rapid congressional approval of the act, but opposed its name (Baker, 2013;
Jones, 2012). The president’s opposition to the name was so strong that he considered
sending it back for revision, but worried about the political fallout and potential danger of
delaying the act (Baker, 2013; Jones, 2012). There was a national sense of urgency at the
time that mandated increased security measures (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Traister,
2013). The terrorist attacks generated a temporary window of opportunity, in which
partisan politics subsided allowing congress and the president to come together to
strengthen security (Traister, 2013). Rejecting the act based upon its name would have
appeared petty and imprudent, because a speedy enactment seemed necessary at the time.
The unifying urgency eventually faded. As the political environment returned to a
competitive atmosphere, the USA PATRIOT Act was looked at more critically.
Contentions began to emerge about the surveillance aspects of Title II of the law. The
next portion of the literature review examined some of the more controversial aspects of
Title II. This segment of the literature review built the academic foundation about Title II
and illustrated the ideological divide regarding the title.
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Section 203: Information Sharing
One of the increased security measures demanded by the public was improved
information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The driving
force behind the public’s demand for information sharing was primarily for predicting
terror attacks (De Goede, Simon, & Hoijtink, 2014). The general premise is that the
various information gathering entities might fail to piece together bits of information
because they are focused on their agencies’ specific missions (Sales, 2010). This is a
noble goal, but its practical implementation needs to be carefully monitored for potential
mission creep; because while foreign led terrorist attacks are subject to national security
law, domestic terrorism is a criminal offense. The Keith ruling prevents information
obtained through national security intelligence gathering to be used in criminal cases
unless a traditional warrant was used to collect the information (Baldwin & Koslosky,
2012). The legality of any information sharing in criminal cases must be assessed using
this precedence.
Striking the appropriate procedures for sharing information amongst agencies has
been debated for some time. In the 1980s and 1990s the DOJ conducted limited
interagency information sharing in the prosecution of criminal cases (9/11 Commission,
2004). In the 1980s various joint counterterrorism task forces provided platforms for
information exchange between local law enforcement and federal authorities (Jones,
2011). By 1995 the DOJ essentially abandoned the practice due to concerns of legality
(Sales, 2010). There was a general fear in the department that using information gathered
for another criminal or intelligence investigation could be a “career ender”, especially if
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the information was obtained through FISA authorizations (9/11 Commission, 2004).
This fear, combined with the innate secretive nature of any investigation, led prosecutors
to avoid providing information to other agencies or using others’ information in their
cases. In 2001 the federal government would seek to change this tendency.
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act is encourages information sharing
amongst government agencies, but has been the center of some debate. As with most
contentions involving the USA PATRIOT Act, the controversial authorities does not
come solely from Section 203, but rather an amalgamation of sections, laws, policies, and
procedures. Sections 203, 504, and 905, as well as, Title II of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 and Title II of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
all effect post 9/11 interagency information sharing (H.R. Res. 3525, 2002; H.R. Res.
5005, 2002; Martin, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). In addition, Executive Order 12333
and the 3 executive orders that amend it, guide the collective information gathering and
dissemination operations inside and outside the nation (Exec. Order No. 12333, 19812008; United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, 2013). Information sharing operations are not exclusively dictated by
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
While Section 203 is not the sole source of information sharing legislature, its
cumulative effects with Section 504 and Section 905 are significant. Section 203
essentially permits and directs law enforcement officials of varying jurisdiction to
disclose information pertaining to national security to federal intelligence officials
(DeRosa, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Section 504 allows federal intelligence officials
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operating under FISC authorizations to coordinate and share information with law
enforcement (Martin, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Section 905 requires any information
gathered that might pertain to national security must be promptly disclosed to the
Director of National Intelligence (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001; Philbin, 2002). In a 2002 DOJ
legal counsel opinion, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General explained that sections 203
and 905 have a necessary synergistic effect that authorizes and requires disclosure while
safeguarding confidentiality provisions (Philbin, 2002). The combined effects of these 3
sections constitute the USA PATRIOT Act’s information sharing properties.
Some people have and continue to question the legality of the USA PATRIOT
Act’s information sharing properties. In the aforementioned DOJ legal opinion, Philbin
(2002) recognized that no law, including the USA PATRIOT Act, is perfect. Martin
(2005) argued that Section 203, 504, and 905 created an atmosphere in which the
government overstepped its bounds in several ways. The argument is the sections create
an environment in which the government disregards privacy, stores investigative
information beyond its authorized time period, and bogs down national security
operations with insignificant material related to criminal cases (Martin, 2005). Sales
(2010) addressed similar concerns of privacy intrusion and “flooding” investigators with
inconsequential information. More recently Husain (2014) argued that information
sharing generated by the USA PATRIOT Act is appropriate for law enforcement agencies
operating with traditional warrants or for intelligence agencies working under FISA, but
is absolutely inappropriate for FISA information to be shared for criminal prosecution.
Husain (2014) argued that the theoretical wall between domestic and criminal
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investigations should be restored to prevent civil liberty offenses. Husain’s analysis is
backed by some legal precedence.
The legal precedence of FISA cases has included the aforementioned Cavanagh
and Mayfield cases, both of which were critical of FISA information in criminal cases,
but FISC authorized surveillance has never truly been forbidden in criminal proceedings.
In the Cavanagh case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that FISC authorizations
do not meet the same standards as a traditional warrant, which added inherent legal
uncertainty to information sharing in criminal cases (Ruger, 2007; Sales, 2010; United
States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). There is a general understanding that Fourth
Amendment restricts FISA obtained information in criminal cases (Shults, 2011). While
the Cavanagh and Mayfield cases both address the Fourth Amendment concerns never
ruling has prevented the use of FISC authorizations in criminal cases (Mayfield v. United
States, 2009; Rush, 2008; United States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). Rush (2008) argued
that in both instances the Ninth Circuit attacked FISA procedures, but failed to actually
rule on the constitutionality of FISA surveillance in criminal proceedings. These legal
actions are significant in understanding the legal precedence of FISA in criminal cases,
but they do not prevent FISA information from being used to prosecute criminals.
The Ninth Circuit judgments do not prevent prosecutors from using FISA
information and as evident by the Cavanagh case, the use of FISC permissions in
criminal prosecution precedes the USA PATRIOT Act. In general sections 203 and 905
are designed to eliminate hesitancy in providing information regarding a terrorist threat,
discovered during a criminal investigation, to the appropriate federal authority (Kisswani,
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2011; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). As previously mentioned the 9/11 Commission uncovered a
reluctance in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to share information,
because of a fear of legal or administrative repercussions (9/11 Commission, 2004).
Despite this finding there were procedures for information sharing long before the USA
PATRIOT Act. Confusing internal policies and misunderstandings of federal statutes is
what created the “wall” that prevented the free exchange of information between the law
enforcement and intelligence communities (9/11 Commission, 2004; ACLU, 2011).
Section 203’s effect was not in changing federal law, but removing misconceptions about
information sharing (ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). In this way Section 203 is an effective
provision. Section 203 removed any doubt that it is legal for agencies to share grand jury,
electronic surveillance, and foreign intelligence information.
Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act contend that the sharing of grand jury
information can lead to personal liberty abuses. Section 203 (a) provides guidelines for
the sharing of grand jury information (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Grand juries are law
enforcement investigations conducted in secret to determine if criminal charges are
warranted (Merkey, 2015). The grand jury process is constitutionally protected by the
Fifth Amendment and has been practiced in America since colonial times (Collins, 2002;
Merkey, 2015). The main advantage of a grand jury is the subpoena duces tecum. The
subpoena duces tecum directs the production of evidence with less or insignificant
probable cause (Donohue, 2014). Collins (2002) opined that while sharing grand jury
information is beneficial to national security officials, it could also lead to abuses because
of the less rigid requirements, secret nature, and lack of congressional oversight. Banks
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(2010) noted that critics of Section 203 believe the sharing of grand jury information
compromises civil liberties. Martin (2005) and Husain (2014) both contend that
information sharing during criminal or potential criminal investigations could lead to
political abuse by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or similar
federal intelligence entity.
The 9/11 Commission recognized that a substantial information gap existed in the
Osama bin Laden case precisely because the FBI’s grand jury information could not be
paired with the CIA’s intelligence (9/11 Commission, 2004). Dahl (2014) observed that
bin Laden was tracked down and successfully killed, because of increased interagency
information sharing. Sales (2010) explained that sharing bits of information creates a
mosaic allowing investigators to develop a clearer picture of the situation. In United
States v. Jones and United States v. Maynard the FBI and the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets Task Force conducted several types of
surveillance which led to convictions of Jones and Maynard in an illegal drug bust
(United States v. Antoine Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010). The
FBI and police tracked the pair in the course of several weeks using wiretaps, direct
observation, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to establish their daily patterns
eventually leading to their arrests and convictions (Kerr, 2012; United States v. Antoine
Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010). Jones and Maynard appealed
their convictions based upon the “mosaic” of the surveillance used against them (Kerr,
2012; United States v. Antoine Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010).
The mosaic theory asserts that collective, long term surveillance regardless of the level of
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intrusion constitutes a search (Kerr, 2012). While the Jones and Maynard case did not
truly illustrate the information sharing described in the USA PATRIOT Act it did
illustrate how effective the mosaic of surveillance can be.
The literature review of the USA PATRIOT Act information sharing provisions
has revealed several key points. First following the terrorist attacks of 2001 the American
public demanded increased information sharing (Ripberger, 2011; Sales, 2010). The
assumption that FISA had created a wall between the agencies preventing information
exchange had been exaggerated (ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). There were ways for
interagency information exchange, but confusing policies prevented it (9/11 Commission,
2004). The USA PATRIOT Act clarified and even demanded information exchange
(ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). Finally the literature review illustrated a divide a between
those that support the information sharing aspects and those that oppose it.
There was a notable literature gap explaining any common between the opposing
ideologies. Some of the opposing groups suggest basic reversal of the law, or increased
oversight, but any change would need to meet the investigatory requirements of law
enforcement and national security. There was not any literature that addressed how
information can be shared while mitigating civil liberty concerns. This dissertation will
focus on examining the common ground between those in opposition to the USA
PATRIOT Act and those who support it. While Section 203 is not the most controversial
section in Title II concerns about information sharing seem to contribute to the more
contentious sections.
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Section 206: Roving Wiretaps
Section 206 is worth briefly mentioning in this literary review, because there has
been limited concerns about FISC approved roving wiretaps. Section 206 allows FISA to
authorize roving electronic surveillance (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). A roving (multipoint)
wiretap order targets a person rather than a specific electronic device in an effort to track
foreign agents as they cycle through communication devices ( DOJ, 2005). Prior to the
adoption of Section 206 spies or terrorists, trained in tradecraft, understood simply
changing phones would thwart surveillance (Mueller, 2005). Multipoint electronic
surveillance has been part of criminal investigations since 1986. Section 106 (d) of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 allows criminal investigators to
apply for an order attached to a specific person allowing them to wiretap any device the
person uses (H.R. Res. 3778, 1986).
Despite the long standing practice of roving wiretaps in criminal investigations
the ACLU and others have expressed some concerns about granting this authority to
intelligence agencies. The ACLU contends the secrecy of FISC authorizations, unlike
those of traditional courts, does not facilitate adequate judicial oversight of multipoint
surveillance (ACLU, 2011). The claim implies there is a potential for intelligence
agencies to abuse this authorization. In addition, the ACLU (2011) asserted that the
provision could be read to require neither a specific name nor device. This could be
troubling, if found to be accurate, as it could be used to justify sweeping surveillance of
broad sections of the population.
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Some political leaders have opposed the concept of roving wiretaps in foreign
intelligence. One of the earliest opponents to the practice was U.S. Representative Jan
Schakowsky, Chief Deputy Whip. The congresswoman voted against the USA PATRIOT
Act in 2001 in part due to the roving wiretap provision. Then she voted against the
extension of the provision in 2005 (Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky website, 2005).
Representative Schakowsky urged Congress to allow the practice of roving wiretaps to
expire and warned against the potential erosion of civil liberties due to the USA
PATRIOT Act. In her words the “Sweeping and unnecessary federal surveillance and
unchecked law enforcement powers undermine the rights that are the cornerstone of our
democracy" (Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky website, 2005, para. 10).
It is difficult to determine the validity of these arguments given the secretive
nature of foreign intelligence surveillance. It is easy; however, to realize the importance
of roving wiretaps to national security agencies. Without this authorization a spy or
foreign terrorist could merely use multiple phone to avoid electronic surveillance. There
needs to be a pragmatic approach to electronic surveillance of foreign threats, but the
approach must not unjustly erode civil liberties. Like Section 203, there is a split between
those opposed to the authority and those in support of it, but unlike Section 203 there is
little recent scholarly research on Section 206. On June 1, 2015 Section 206 technically
expired as a second order effect of Senator Rand Paul’s procedural delay of the renewal
of Section 215 (Kelly, 2015). The section was inactive for slightly more than 24 hours
prior to it getting re-enacted in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (H.R. Res. 2048, 2015).
The bulk of academic work mentioning the section is more than 5 years old and when
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combined with the secretive nature of foreign intelligence surveillance, the legitimacy of
the concerns cannot be qualified in this dissertation.
Section 213: Delayed Notice
Section 213, much like Section 206, was somewhat controversial at first, but has
not raised much concern recently. Section 213 allows for the delayed notification of the
execution of warrants in both criminal and foreign intelligence cases (H.R. Res. 3162,
2001). The section allows for investigators to petition the courts for authorization to
conduct surreptitious searches or seizures (Witmore-Rich, 2014; Xhelili & Crowne,
2012). The DOJ has benefitted the most from the section. Section 213 searches have been
used in various crimes such as child pornography, drug trafficking, etc. and is not limited
to international terrorism (DOJ website, 2013). Approximately 75% of the delayed notice
authorizations were used in drug trafficking investigations (Witmore-Rich, 2014). The
success of the section has been overshadowed at time by controversy.
The contentions began early in the life of the USA PATRIOT Act. A 2005 Center
Survey Research & Analysis (CSRA) survey found that 71% of Americans opposed the
sneak and peak provision (Herman, 2006). There were a variety of reasons for the
opposition. First many were concerned because the delayed notification is primarily used
in routine criminal investigations with only one percent of authorizations having a
connection to terrorism (Witmore-Rich, 2014). Next the length of notification delay and
scope of the search or seizure is rather vague and subject to change on a case by case
basis (Herman, 2006). Finally the provision limits the likelihood that the suspect is able
to observe the search or seizure going against American and English law dating back to
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the Magna Carta (Whitehead & Aden, 2002; Witmore-Rich, 2014). Despite these
arguments there has been little recent attention paid to the subject in the public, political,
or academic realms. The relevance of reviewing the literature pertaining to this section is
to help build a better overall understanding of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Section 215: Access to Records
Unlike Section 206 or Section 213, Section 215 has received political, academic,
and media attention in the past couple years. Section 215 amends the FISA to grant the
FBI access to “any tangible things” relevant to an international terrorism or foreign
intelligence investigation (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Davis (2014) opined that the change
from “business record” to “any tangible things” broadly expanded the government’s
investigative authorities by granting new accesses. Yoo (2014) explained that the tangible
things clause of Section 215 is part of the legal basis for the bulk metadata collection
programs revealed by Edward Snowden in June 2013. Section 215 programmatic
surveillance practices are further sanctioned by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and
the FISA Amendment Acts Reauthorization Act of 2012 (Anderson, 2014; Banks, 2010;
Gilbert, 2013). Since the Snowden controversies Section 215 has been repeatedly in the
public eye, but the contentions did not begin with Snowden’s June 2013 leaks.
In fact Section 215 was almost immediately considered contentious by some.
Early in the section’s existence, opponents raised concerns that investigators accessing
library records could infringe upon library users’ privacy rights (Matz, 2008). Whitehead
and Aden (2002) argued Section 215 gave investigators secret access to any record
without probable cause and little oversight. Whitehead and Aden were not alone in these
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concerns. By September 2003 the public outcry for privacy in libraries led to the DOJ
declassifying statistical information about the section, which had reportedly never been
used at the time (Herman, 2006). The public apprehension of potential Section 215
abuses eventually led to the section being amended.
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 addressed the
procedures for applying for, approving, and conducting Section 215 searches (Matz,
2008). The major change from the act was the requirement of “a statement of facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible objects sought are
relevant” (H.R. Res. 3199, 2005). This change in conjunction with other amendments
positively affected public opinion about the section. Theissen (2012) opined that the
amendments of 2005 and 2006 clarified the law and resolved much of the legal concerns.
Judging by a relative lack of scholarly work regarding Section 215 between 2006 and
2013, as well as some praise of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005, it seems the amendments quelled some of the early contentions about the
section.
As previously mentioned, the general acceptance of the section was short lived.
The 2013 Snowden leaks led to the public disclosure of multiple NSA domestic
surveillance programs authorized under Section 215 (Banks & Tauber, 2014). Section
215 of the FISA allows the government to store bulk telephony metadata such as phone
numbers and time stamps (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, 2013). The various NSA programs seemed to have ran
somewhat consistently between 2006 and 2013 with FISC authorizing bulk metadata
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collection at least 34 times covering all major telecommunication service providers
(Donohue, 2014). Most of this bulk collection was consolidated into a single database
essentially spanning 5 years’ worth of U.S. cell phone activities (Davis, 2014). The
revelation of the bulk collection led many to wonder how such a large amount of data
could possibly be relevant to any investigation (McGowan, 2014). There is some
credibility to this assertion.
The main contention with Section 215 authorized bulk collections is its
questionable legality. Barnett (2015), Berghel (2014), Davis (2014), Kris (2014),
McGowan (2014), and Regan (2014) raised concerns that any bulk collection should be
considered a search without probable cause; thus, violating Fourth Amendment
protections. The primary concern is the overwhelming majority of call data collected was
of innocent people making innocent calls, which could not be relevant to any
investigation (Barnett, 2015; Kris, 2014; Regan, 2014). Regan (2014) further claimed
bulk collection could potentially be used to monitor and punish dissenting,
constitutionally protected, voices in the United States. Davis (2014) warned that the
NSA’s bulk collection creates a moral hazard as the secrecy of database could lead to
rampant abuse without fear of retribution. McGowan (2014) asserted the metadata
collection program is an illegal, unwarranted invasion of privacy. Kris (2014)
additionally pointed out that Section 215 is specifically written to authorize FBI
collection procedures not NSA collections, which should limit 215 authorizations strictly
to the FBI. On May 7, 2015 the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in New York ruled the
programmatic surveillance practices should be considered an overextension of the law,
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but did not rule on the constitutionality of the program and instead noted Section 215
would undergo congressional review in June 2015 (Mills, 2015; De Vogue, 2015). In
June 2015 Senator Rand Paul utilized a procedural maneuver to ensure Section 215
would expire. The culmination of these issues raises serious concerns about bulk
collection.
Despite these concerns there are also many voices in support of the bulk
collection procedures. Gilbert (2013), Mastracci (2014), Walton (2013), and Yoo (2014)
contended that bulk collection authorized by Section 215 is legal. Mastracci (2014)
opined that bulk metadata collection does not constitute a search, does not violate Fourth
Amendment protections, and is essential for counterterrorism operations. Yoo (2014)
articulated that Section 215 is not unique in American legal history, because its
authorizations are basically the same as a grand jury subpoena. Walton (2013) explained
the extensive legal considerations that goes into authorizing the now somewhat routine
bulk collection authorizations. Gilbert (2013) explained that prior to the USA PATRIOT
Act metadata collection crossing state lines could require several different warrants, but
now the same collection can be achieved by a single authorization. The single
authorization is more practical and allows investigators to focus more time on the
investigation (Gilbert, 2013). With the Gilbert article it is important point out the article
was published before the Snowden leaks. The Gilbert, Mastracci, Walton, and Yoo works
create a sense of dismissal of Section 215 apprehensions.
Other scholars that seemingly oppose Section 215 and / or bulk metadata
collection have also acknowledged an existing legal precedence for the procedures. Bedi
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(2014), Davis (2014), McGowan (2014), and the United States President’s Review Group
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (2013) recognized the Third Party
Doctrine provides the legal precedence for Section 215 bulk collections. The Third Party
Doctrine states that any record or information voluntarily given to a third party no longer
is subject to the same constitutional protections as if the records were maintained by the
individual (Bedi, 2014; Davis, 2014; Yoo, 2014). The Third Party Doctrine was
established through the court cases of United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, as
well as the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (United States President’s Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). Xhelili & Crowne
(2012) argued information voluntarily presented to a third party could then collected by
the government, as was the case in United States v. Miller. The Miller case dealt with
bank records being seized while the Smith case dealt with phone records being seized in
an investigation (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, 2013). The Smith case is of particular importance,
because its 1979 Supreme Court ruling determined there was no reasonable expectation
of privacy with metadata (McGowan, 2014). This has provided more than 3.5 decades of
legal precedence involving metadata collection, albeit never on the scale of the current
NSA collections.
Critics allege the effectiveness of the NSA database authorized by Section 215
does not justify its size and scope of collection. The NSA metadata database is
presumably the largest surveillance related database in the world containing call
information on billions of calls (Regan, 2014). Despite capturing a portion of cellphone
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metadata in the United States the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) explained the
database has been used less than 300 times (Davis, 2014). Morrison (2014) argued that
data mining on the scale of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection is likely frivolous,
because it wastes limited resources and increases the proverbial “haystack”. There seems
to be truth to the belief that the practice of bulk metadata is ineffective, but do to the
secretive nature of the NSA it is difficult to determine the true effectiveness of the
program.
The importance of Section 215 in this literature review is it illustrated the rift
between those who support the section and those who oppose it. The benefits of Section
215 all involve the practical applications of the section. The contentions tend to center on
the legality of the section and the NSA metadata collection. Some claim the NSA
metadata collection is impractical, but this is difficult to truly judge as the NSA doesn’t
typically publish the results of investigations. Even the courts are divided on the legality
of the section. Judge Leon of the District Court for the District of Columbia held in
Klayman v. Obama, that the bulk collection of telephony metadata violates the Fourth
Amendment (Davis, 2014). Then just 11 days later in American Civil Liberties Union v.
Clapper, Judge Pauley ruled the bulk collection is not even a search (Davis, 2014). The
facts, opinions, and analysis gathered from these articles left a literature gap of how the
benefits of the section can be achieved while mitigating the controversies.
Section 218: Significant Purpose
Section 218 is one of the smallest sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, but it has
at times been the center of some contention. Section 218 amends sections 104 and 303 of
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the FISA by striking ‘‘the purpose’’ and inserting ‘‘a significant purpose’’ (H.R. Res.
3162, 2001). This simple change in wording expanded FISA authorizations to be
available for non-foreign intelligence related cases, perhaps even including common law
enforcement investigations (Francel, 2014; Sales, 2010). The term “significant” was
added as a compromise between the legislators wanting the amendment to read “a
purpose” and those opposed to the amendment all together (Glick, 2010). The conflict
between the 2 sides basically centered on whether it was appropriate for FISA
authorizations to be used in criminal investigations.
While there has not been many recent scholarly works regarding Section 218,
there is still a divide between those whom embrace the section and those whom oppose it.
Francel (2014) contended that FISA was created with the intent purpose of preventing
secret investigations to be used in common criminal proceeding and Section 218 alters
the original intent of the law. Glick (2010) dismissed similar assertions stating that the
section does not violate any statute and is a practical solution for both intelligence
agencies and law enforcement. For the purpose of this literature review, Section 218
furthers the divide between USA PATRIOT Act support and opposition. It also illustrated
how the Title II sections of the USA PATRIOT Act are interconnected. For example
theoretically an intelligence investigator could obtain a FISA authorization for a roving
wiretap with delayed notification through Sections 206, 213, and 218, then share the
information with a criminal prosecutor through Section 203. These observations made
Section 218 important to this dissertation.
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Summary of Literature
Punctuated Equilibrium
The PET provided the theoretical framework for this dissertation. A
comprehensive understanding of the theory was essential, because PET was clearly
illustrated with each of the national security policies examined in the literature review.
The Givel (2010) description of PET was the most coherent of all the literature reviewed
for this dissertation. PET is “long-term and relatively incremental policy change followed
by an exogenous shock to a policy monopoly resulting in a tipping point oriented toward
sharp and explosive policy change” (Givel, 2010, p. 189). The reviewed literature
regarding PET provided a basic understanding of the theory, but reviewing security
policies throughout America’s history validated the theory.
Security Policy History
Reviewing U.S. national security policy was necessary for this dissertation in
many ways. First it legitimizes PET by showing a consistent pattern of security policies
remaining stagnant for long periods of time then rapidly and dramatically changing
during episodes of crisis. Following the crisis, incremental changes typically bring the
policy back to more equilibrium between civil liberties and security. Examining the ebb
and flow of security strategies indicated that controversy, partisan politics, and
ideological polarization is nothing new to national security policies. In addition, the
historical review provided insight into the original intent of several statutes, policies, and
procedures. The early American security policy history was particularly valuable as it
demonstrated the Founding Fathers’ vision of balancing national security with personal
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freedoms. Finally history confirms that U.S. national security policies occasionally lead
to abuses.
Surveillance Scandals
Exploring historic surveillance abuses was as essential to understanding the
development of current national security policies as PET and previous security practices.
The various FBI and Watergate scandals contributed to national security discussions by
providing concrete examples of what the American populace would not tolerate. They
each demonstrated how access to unconstrained surveillance assets has a tendency of
leading to corruption. Time and time again surveillance has been used for personal
political gain. Modern national security debates often look for the potential for abuse in
an effort to avoid mistakes of the past. Often the debate spills into the courtroom.
Court Decisions
The Olmstead, Katz, and Keith court decisions were also paramount to the
development of modern national security policies. Among the most important aspects of
understanding any law is establishing firm legal precedence by reflecting upon previous
decisions (Strouthes, 2007). The Olmstead ruling briefly established the notion that
electronic surveillance did not constitute a search and was thus not subject to Fourth
Amendment protections (Bedi, 2014; Ferguson, 2014). The Katz ruling reversed the
Olmstead decision, but only in criminal cases (Francel, 2014; Harper, 2014). The Keith
decision established the notion that surveillance must have either a direct connection to a
foreign power or be authorized by a warrant (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 2007;
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Shults, 2011). These court cases and the others examined in this literature review shaped
not only the law, but the public opinion about how surveillance should be conducted.
Church Committee
The Church Committee investigated, exposed, and provided suggestions for
eliminating numerous questionable surveillance practices and policies (Berghel, 2014).
Never before or since has there been such a comprehensive, objective, and public
examination of U.S. surveillance operations (Mondale et al., 2014). No literature review
involving modern surveillance policies would be complete without exploring the Church
Committee Reports. The reports chronicled several decades of surveillance practices and
developed recommendations based upon these findings (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976).
These recommendations ultimately led to the FISA.
FISA / USA PATRIOT Act
The FISA is as important to this dissertation as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
FISA was established to constrain the federal government’s domestic surveillance
procedures (Butler, 2013). As described in the FISA section of this literature review,
FISA created a theoretical wall between domestic and foreign investigations. This wall
has been considered both a positive development for civil liberties and a negative
development for national security concerns (Francel, 2014; Yoo, 2014). Much of Title II
of the USA PATRIOT Act is designed to strike a balance in the FISA wall between
security and liberty concerns (Gilbert, 2013; Harper, 2014). These amendments to FISA
are at the center of USA PATRIOT Act controversies and there is adequate literature both
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in support and opposition to the amendments. There was, however; a literature gap
regarding any common ground between the sides of the debate.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Chapter 4, I reaffirm the research
questions and explain the central concept, research design, and methodology. After
providing an in-depth look at how I conducted the study, I address trustworthiness and
ethical concerns associated with the study. All studies have some issues of
trustworthiness and ethical considerations. In this chapter, I identify these matters and
plans for combatting the potential problems.
Research Design and Rationale
Central Research Question – Qualitative:
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act?
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Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions
of the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law?
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial?
Central Concept
The central concept of this study centered on the division between those that
support Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and those that oppose it. This dissertation
proposed it might be able meet the surveillance and information sharing objectives of the
Title II provisions while mitigating the risk of circumventing Fourth Amendment
protections. There have been, as I described in the literature review, repeated
controversies related to Title II. It was essential to examine these contentions in the
literature review to develop the academic foundation of the research. In the literature
review, I pinpointed a literature gap involving how the differing factions agree or any
potential for compromise. This dissertation contributed to filling this important gap.
Research Design
This dissertation was a case study. Case studies provide an in depth, contextual
examination of a specific facet of a subject (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012). The case study
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approach is a preferred method of examining a law or policy, because of the depth of the
analysis allows the researcher to truly examine the effectiveness of given strategies
(Stacks, 2007). This is exactly what this dissertation hoped to accomplish; examine
competing strategies and look for areas of compromise. More specifically, I used a
holistic, single-case study to accomplish that goal. A holistic, single-case study, as
defined by Yin (2014), is a study that concentrates on a lone unit of analysis without
embedded subunits. The unit of analysis for this research was Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
There are several reasons this study focused only on Title II. First, of all the
controversies associated with the USA PATRIOT Act, none better illustrated the
dissention between supporters and critics of the title. This provided a comprehensive
answer to the central research question and subquestions. Second, the disagreement about
Title II is a current point of contention. During this dissertation, a May 2015 court ruling
soundly pushed the topic back to Congress (De Vogue, 2015; Mills, 2015). The House of
Representatives renewed the act, but the Senate failed to vote in time to confirm the
renewal allowing Section 215 and others to expire (Kelly, 2015). The expiration did not
last, as congress reauthorized Section 215 the next day with the passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act.
The bulk metadata collection first authorized by Section 215 and recently the
USA FREEDOM Act is an excellent example of Title II controversy. Much of the latest
data collected and analyzed in this dissertation focused on the bulk metadata program. In
addition, the bulk collection was a continuous endeavor that was reauthorized several

92
times per year to collect from each of the communication carriers, which explains why
the analysis contained a disproportionate focus on the bulk metadata collection program.
Finally most other controversies involving the USA PATRIOT Act are linked to a web of
other laws or there is some disagreement about what actually authorizes the controversial
action, but the government has been clear that Section 215 is the authority for the NSA’s
bulk collection efforts. Information about other controversial programs, policies, and
even potential programs, including roving wiretaps, library record collections, and
information sharing also contributed to the data analysis. These simple reasons make
Title II an excellent case for determining if the objectives could be met without
potentially violating Fourth Amendment protections.
In addition to having a well-defined unit of analysis, case studies must be clearly
bounded (Putney, 2010; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012). Time is a common boundary for most
case studies (Yin, 2014). Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is clearly bounded by time as
the act came into existence in 2001. In addition to this chronological boundary there is
another time related boundary is found in the study’s theoretical framework.
The PET of public policy change in itself provides limited construct boundaries,
but this case study is looking for information that could potentially be used in the specific
incremental change period of PET. Yin (2014) opined that case boundaries are often
“fuzzy”, however; a sound theoretical framework can assist in defining the boundaries.
The PET incremental change period has a unique style of bounded rationality with a high
resistance to change and low political capital (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Boushey,
2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Any data deemed to be useful to this case study
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would need to lower the resistance threshold while increasing political motivation for
change. This creates a clearly defined boundary. Limiting the data to information directly
related to the incremental change process creates a substantial boundary. This is not the
most significant boundary for this particular case.
The most significant boundary for this case is its central focus on examining
potential legislative refinement of data mining and information sharing. These 2 activities
comprise most of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The synergistic effects of data
mining and information sharing is at the center of most of the contentions with Title II.
Focusing on these 2 specific activities established an effective boundary for this case
study. This is essential for the practicality of the study as it narrowed the emphasis to a
manageable topic.
The second most important boundary for this case study was, as defined by the
central research question, the specificity of achieving the security goals of Title II without
circumventing the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This greatly narrowed the
focus of the case study as the bulk of Title II focuses on data mining and information
sharing. Scholars and policy makers have identified multiple potential conflicts between
the USA PATRIOT Act and the constitution. The boundary of only addressing the Fourth
Amendment limited the size and scope of the study without diminishing its significance.
The constitution is not the only legal boundary for this study.
The case was also bound by Title II of USA PATRIOT Act, FISA, and the
procedures of FISC. It is important to note that many scholars might argue that some
programs attributed to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, including the NSA
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programmatic operate outside the letter of the law. Barnett (2015), Berghel (2014), Kris
(2014), McGowan (2014), and Regan (2014) argued that the bulk collections violate
Fourth Amendment protections, because the lack of probable cause makes the collection
an unreasonable search. Other scholars acknowledge the Third Party Doctrine, which
essentially states that any information voluntarily turned over to a third party loses its
privacy protections thus making the bulk metadata collection legal (Bedi, 2014; Davis,
2014; Xhelili & Crowne, 2012; Yoo, 2014). Kris (2014) further observed if taken
literally, Section 215 only applies to the FBI not the NSA, making the collections illegal.
As described in the literature review, the courts have issued conflicting decisions about
the legality of surveillance practice (Davis, 2014). Despite the concerns of legality the
program remains. For the purpose of this case study the NSA programmatic surveillance
program is bound by the legal system.
Case studies are all also bounded by participation and sampling criteria (Miles,
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The draft sampling plan for this dissertation contemplated
drawing data from a wide variety of civil liberty organizations that oppose Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act and multiple government organizations that benefit from the
increased authorities of the title. While this would have generated an overabundance of
information for the case study, it simply was not practical due to time and resource
considerations. To narrow the scope of the study the sampling will be limited to the
ACLU and DOJ. The ACLU is the leading opponent of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
DOJ has been the most vocal governmental supporter of the statute. This created a
boundary of membership in the ACLU or DOJ. The bounds of this case study are defined
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by the numerous aforementioned boundaries. It is essential in a case study to understand
how it is bounded (Putney, 2010; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012).
The next step in the case study was linking the data to propositions. Linking the
data to propositions is accomplished by using analytical techniques to foreshadow the
outcomes of the data enquiry (Yin, 2014). The proposition in this particular case was that,
there is a possibility to meet the surveillance and information sharing objectives of the
Title II provisions without the risk of violating Fourth Amendment protections, which
would ultimately lead to security/liberty equilibrium. The literature review produced
repeated circumstances in which a threat to national security generated an aggressive,
rapid response that garnered overwhelming, but short lived, support. In each case
following the abrupt response, incremental changes restored the balance between security
and liberty to a more socially accepted level. This ebb and flow of security policy
validated conceptual framework of the PET of public policy change. This made relying
on the theoretical proposition strategy a viable option for this case study.
Using the PET as the foundation for the theoretical proposition strategy in linking
the data to the proposition lent credibility, validity, and reliability to this research. Valid
theoretical constructs and propositions can be generalized and identified across time and
space (Patton, 2002). Throughout American security policy history, PET is easily
identifiable and consistently evident suggesting the theory is sound. This established a
predictable pattern in regard to security policy lifespans and the aforementioned USA
PATRIOT Act Title II proposition. If the policy cycle follows this pattern with the USA
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PATRIOT Act, public tensions will continue to mount until incremental change makes
the law more tolerable to the American public.
As the review of historic security policies and PET demonstrated, security
policies and laws incrementally change either through legislative compromise or
imbalances in partisan / ideological political control. Due to the current divisive nature of
the USA PATRIOT Act, even changes in partisan control of the legislative and executive
branches would not likely produce enough of an ideological shift to substantially affect
the law. Barring any significant threat to security or clear cut example of substantial
abuses of the authorities, Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is unlikely to change in the
near future. This case study sought signs that compromise is possible. Using the patterns
established throughout security policy history, PET, and data collected through policy
review, and document examination provided the basis for predicting the near future of the
law. The stability of the USA PATRIOT Act, despite the simmering debate about the
law, made searching for incremental change key to using PET in a theoretical proposition
strategy.
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical proposition strategy linked the data to the
proposition. The theoretical proposition strategy took the theory used to develop the
research design, research questions, and general concept into the analysis phase by
organizing the data evaluation procedures and establishing contextual conditions (Yin,
2014). The data for this project was organized into the general categories of in support of
and in opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act based upon the ACLU and DOJ
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perspective on the law. Any commonly shared viewpoints would have been considered
potential areas of compromise, but only if the contextual conditions were met.
The contextual conditions for the proposition were as follows: 1.The polarization
surrounding the USA PATRIOT Act remains general gridlock. 2. No credible threats to
national security emerge. 3. No flagrant abuses of USA PATRIOT Act Title II authorities
are revealed to the public. 4. The USA PATRIOT Act follows a path similar to what is
described in PET. If these four contextual conditions remain it will become increasingly
likely the USA PATRIOT Act will undergo additional refinement through incremental
change. If there had been evidence of areas of compromise and the contextual conditions
were met it would be likely the incremental change will involve compromise.
Role of the Researcher
I conducted the data collection and analysis from thousands of pages of legal
documents and congressional hearings. All of the data is unclassified and available in the
public domain. I have no conflicting interests or power relationships involved with the
data collection. The data focused solely on ACLU and DOJ public interactions. I do not
and never have worked with or for any of the organizations involved in the interview
process, which could have adversely affected the analysis.
I do not have strong biases about the USA PATRIOT Act, as it does not affect my
career or personal life in any facet. I believe there is credibility to both the argument for
and against the Title II provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. I hoped the study would
reveal some areas of potential compromise between the opposing sides, but did not find
any strong evidence of this and realize this is unlikely as the division between the sides of
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the debate is significant. This dissertation was never meant to heal the rift between the
ACLU and DOJ over the USA PATRIOT Act. It was, however; designed to contribute to
the discussion about the rift, which it does.
Methodology
Participants
This case study used policies, testimonials, and relevant legal documents to
collect data for the case study. The primary data was the spoken or written words of
members of the DOJ and the ACLU. These organizations contain leading experts that
clearly articulated the supporting and opposing views of Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act. The DOJ was selected because of the department’s direct knowledge of USA
PATRIOT Act Title II authorities and the organization is the leading voice in support of
the law. The ACLU was selected because many leading opposition voices have emerged
from this organization.
Sampling
In qualitative research there are no regulations governing sample sizes for the
various approaches, as it is dependent only upon answering the research questions to the
satisfaction of the researcher (Patton, 2002). In a case study the participants are
purposefully selected (Patton, 2007). This case purposefully selected data related to the
DOJ and ACLU for the reasons previously mentioned. This case study purposefully
selected data that fully and accurately expressed the DOJ and ACLU viewpoints. The
bulk of the data was from the records of members of the ACLU and DOJ in congressional
testimony and legal proceedings.
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Instrumentation
This case study used congressional hearings and legal arguments made in a court
of law as the primary sources of data. The reputability of the sources is well known and
accepted. Congressional testimony and court arguments are typically carefully articulated
lines of reasoning, especially in such high profile topics as national security and civil
liberties. These arguments were made in front of members of congress, judges, and even
Supreme Court Justices. These were the best sources of data available at the time of
collection. There is a likelihood for additional Supreme Court proceedings regarding at
least one of the ongoing legal clashes over Title II authorities between the ACLU and
DOJ, but as of now there are no superior sources of information on this topic.
Data Collection
As previously mentioned, the data collection for this case study focused on ACLU
and DOJ exchanges about the contentions and benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act on the floor of congress and in numerous court cases. This study examined thousands
of pages of debate between the ACLU and DOJ in congressional hearings. This resulted
in more than 1200 pages of coded references. The criteria for using the congressional
testimony in this study was simple. First the witness needed to officially represent the
ACLU or DOJ. Second the testimony needed to contribute to answering the study’s
research questions. The data from the congressional hearings was vital to answering the
research questions and the earlier hearings formed the foundations for both the ACLU
and DOJ arguments that have since been repeated in several legal battles.
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This study also examined thousands of pages of legal documents and oral
arguments between the DOJ and ACLU over Title II authorizations. This resulted in more
than 1,500 pages of coded material. Much like the congressional testimony these
documents needed to either record a member of the ACLU’s or DOJ’s spoken words
about Title II or directly expressed their respective organization’s viewpoints on the
subject. Furthermore the documents needed to assist in answering the research questions.
One notable circumstance with the legal material was that often verbatim material ended
up in multiple court proceedings as many of the cases were concurrent and virtually
identical with simply different plaintiffs and defendants. In many cases the same
attorneys contributed to multiple cases and submitted the same materials to different
courts with only a change of name. In these instances the duplicate material was
discarded for the purposes of this study.
A number of non-official documents including blogs and organizational posts
were also considered and reviewed for this study, but ultimately these materials were not
as useful to the study as the highly refined answers to congressional inquiries or legal
arguments. Out of these sources only one ACLU speech and no additional DOJ material
made it to data analysis. In addition, the data collection process examined thousands of
pages of data in 99 Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) obtained documents, although
many of these documents proved irrelevant to answering the study’s research questions
and were also discarded.
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Data Analysis
Due to the reliability and validity of the PET of public policy change the logic
model technique of data analysis was appropriate for this dissertation. The logic model
technique is a form of deductive qualitative analysis that involves generating a paradigm
of expected outcomes based upon previously verified and consistent cause and effect
patterns in the theoretical framework (Yin, 2014). Deductive analysis begins analysis by
first looking at theory then narrowing down to specific data to see how the data results
compare to the expected results (Trochim, 2006). Deductive analysis involves
discovering patterns through the use of a preexisting organizational framework (Patton,
2002). This case study analyzed data using predictive coding schemes derived from the
previously established PET patterns.
The literature review of this study demonstrated how all major national security
policies in American history have followed the PET framework. The consistency of PET,
in regard to political and ideological polarization, made it possible to predict themes in
the data prior to collection. The deductive approach to analysis and coding consists of
establishing codes and predicted outcomes prior to collection (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) opined that in the theoretical proposition strategy guides
every aspect of the dissertation including the questioning and expected results. Studying
PET led to the development of the predictive coding used in this study. The logic model
complemented the theoretical proposition strategy described in the research design.
The logic model for this case study effectively narrowed the analysis down to a
single pattern matching variable seeking any crossover between those who support or
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oppose Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The basis of the predetermined framework
was the categories of in support of and in opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act based upon the interviewees’ perspective on the law. This is precisely what was also
used to link the data to the proposition with the theoretical proposition strategy. The
deductive analysis was used to search for common ground between critic and supporters
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. By deducing that data from advocates of the title
would be in the in support of category and critics of the title would be in the in opposition
to category any anomalies outside this pattern might represent common ground. This
formed the framework for coding scheme.
By applying the PET framework to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act it appeared
the statute has entered the stagnant change period. The hallmark of this stage is long
periods of the policy only undergoing limited incremental change (Jones & Baumgartner,
2012). Generating a logic model based upon PET and the USA PATRIOT Act the
incremental or stagnant change stage revealed opposing viewpoints with little or no room
for compromise. The literature review has already illustrated the polarizing nature of the
USA PATRIOT Act, but it has not revealed if there is any possibility of compromise. The
logic model technique in this case predicted the leading voice of support (DOJ) and
opposition (ACLU) would have strongly differing views. This case study searched for
any instance that did not fit the prediction.
It was expected, due to the polarity of opinion about Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act, that each of the following categories would have at least 2 trends emerge
from the data with one supporting the title and one critical of the title: Information
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Sharing, Roving Surveillance, Metadata Collection, Significant Purpose Clause, and
Delayed Notice Searches, Appropriateness of FISC Authorizations. The coding
categories must be evaluated by their internal homogeneity and their external
heterogeneity (Patton, 2002). In other words the data needed to be judged by how well
they belong in their respective categories and how different the categories are. The
categories mentioned provide distinct separation for the data and generated 12 coding
sets. Following the logic model for PET during this stage in the USA PATRIOT Act’s
lifespan, it was predicted the following categories will be agreed upon by the ACLU and
DOJ: USA PATRIOT Act could not have existed without the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, Title II is polarizing, Title II will not significantly change in the near
future, compromise is unlikely, and change won’t happen unless their side scores a
decisive legal victory. This would have added another 5 – 10 coding categories
depending upon the data results, but during analysis it became apparent that only the
“USA PATRIOT Act could not have existed without the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks” was relevant to the study. Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, (2014) suggested that
deductive coding should have between 12 and 50 codes annotated in a precise and logical
structure. This study had 12 predetermined codes.
To better identify the crossover between supporters and critics of the law this
study employed the QSR NVivo 10 software. The QSR NVivo 10 qualitative research
coding software is a computer program that provides some advantages over hand coding
when dealing with large volumes of qualitative data. The process of coding is used to
populate a database in qualitative research in an effort to lend quantitative properties to
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qualitative research, which is often subjective and not readily available for numerical
analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The QSR NVivo 10 organizes data to
decrease biases and errors during numerical analysis. The software did not eliminate the
need for researcher input and analysis, but did aid in these tasks. Yin (2012) opined that
currently there is no computer algorithm that adequately analyzes narrative data. The
auto-coding function in this software struggled with accurately coding the data and all
data was manually coded and uploaded in the program. The biggest benefit of the
software was that the program provided an excellent organizational system for the vast
amounts of data analyzed in this case study. The program also offered a variety of
outputs. For this study all software generated products were manually verified to further
the validity of the analysis.
Trustworthiness
Credibility (Internal Validity)
The internal validity, or credibility, of this case study should be assessed by
carefully examining the theoretical framework, literature review, interviews, data
analysis, and the researcher. Credibility is the degree of which the findings of a study
make sense and produce an authentic account of the situation (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2014). With all qualitative studies, internal validity is a determination of the
trustworthiness of the research as substantiated through the empirical evidence and
previous findings (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). The credibility of this dissertation will
likely be judged by standards similar to those described by Rudestam and Newton in
2007 as well as the standards of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña in 2014. This section of
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Chapter 3 evaluated the credibility of the theoretical framework, literature review,
interviews, data analysis, and the researcher by looking at the authenticity of the subjects
using the available empirical and historic data.
The theoretical framework in this case study was intertwined in all aspects of the
study. Maxwell (2013) explained that the root of credibility concerns with theoretical
frameworks generally stem from the underuse of an acceptable theory or from uncritical
acceptance of a theory. The PET of public policy change has been widely accepted in
academia for more than 2 decades (Givel, 2008). This lends to the credibility of the
theory, but it was still important to validate PET for use in the study. Patton (2002)
rationalized that for a theory to be a valid theoretical framework it must provide an
accurate interpretation of the particular situation across time and space. The literature
review examined several contentious national security policies throughout American
history. The examination of each policy displayed the PET pattern of rapid change in
response to an event, followed by stagnation and incremental change until equilibrium
between liberty and security was reached. The literature review confirmed PET was a
valid option for the theoretical framework of this case study.
Examining PET patterns in the literature review supports the use of the theory, but
was not enough to mitigate the credibility risk of underusing the theory. To help
eliminate the credibility risk, the PET was used in the data analysis as the foundation for
the theoretical proposition strategy. The decision to use the theoretical proposition
strategy was made after the literature review illustrated a consistency in security policies
to follow the PET pattern. There was growing evidence that Section 215 of the USA
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PATRIOT Act is on the precipice of incremental change designed to restore equilibrium
between liberties and security. Using the PET pattern it was possible to predict general
coding categories from both sides of the USA PATRIOT Act debate. The prediction in
this case study was that there will be some overlap between the opposing sides and
eventually an incremental change will develop from this common ground that will restore
equilibrium and effectively end the debate. The prediction was derived from analysis of
the reviewed literature.
The literature review also contributed to the credibility of a study. Yin (2014)
asserted that credible case studies need a literature review that examines relevant topics
to a point of saturation. Chapter 2 explored PET, pertinent security policies, surveillance
scandals, applicable court decisions, the Church Committee, FISA, and of course, Title II
of the USA PATRIOT Act. While reaching saturation is subjective, the literature review
seems to provide a robust academic foundation that offers adequate information for
understanding PET patterns in security policy history, historic surveillance abuses,
relevant legal proceedings, and current points of contention with Title II. In addition, this
literature review exhausted multiple scholarly databases of suitable peer reviewed
articles.
To be considered a suitable article for this study the articles had to meet several
requirements. First the articles had to contribute to the knowledge base of the study. With
few exceptions, for current news articles, all the articles were peer reviewed.
Unfortunately the peer review did not eliminate extraordinarily biased literature. Several
articles could not be used, because, despite their peer review, they were steeped in
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propaganda style talking points and void of useful information. The articles that did
qualify, usually still had a noticeable agenda. To combat this a conscious effort was made
to use articles both for and against the USA PATRIOT Act making it possible to express
both sides of the debate. In addition, government reports, legal decisions, and U.S. laws
were reviewed to fill gaps left by the articles. The extensiveness of the literature review
added to the study’s credibility.
My research credibility was not as strong as that of the theory or literature review,
but should not significantly affect the case study’s overall credibility. The primary
credibility concern was my lack of research experience, as this was only the second time I
have conducted true academic research, with the first time being my Master’s Degree
capstone. To mitigate this risk to credibility I have read nearly a dozen works that explain
the inner workings of case studies. In addition to the Creswell, Patton, Maxwell,
Rudestam, and Newton books that are mandatory in the Walden University curriculum; I
have also looked to the works of experts in case study methodology. This additional
research has included multiple articles and books from Stacks, Stake, Yin, Miles,
Huberman, and Saldaña. With each aspect of this dissertation I referenced these books to
ensure my plans and actions have been in line with the aforementioned case study
experts.
Another common credibility concern with regard to the researcher is the
researcher’s biases (Patton, 2002). To combat this internal validity challenge I chose a
topic that I find interesting and significant, but don’t really have any predetermined
assumptions about. The USA PATRIOT Act does not affect my career or daily life in any
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noticeable way. Throughout the literature review I became hyperaware of the deeply
polarizing nature of the debate that swirls around the USA PATRIOT Act. Most peer
reviewed articles on the subject display some biases either for or against the law. By
reviewing hundreds of articles looking at both content and predispositions has made me
more aware of my own biases. While nobody is capable of being truly free of partiality, I
do not hold strong feeling for or against the USA PATRIOT Act. Ultimately this relative
impartialness contributed significantly to the credibility of this case study and even fill a
niche mostly ignored by other studies on the subject.
Transferability (External Validity)
Case studies generate considerable amounts of information about a specific case,
but the information does not necessarily only apply to that particular case. The more
easily the results of a study can be applied to a related topic, the greater the transferability
the study has (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) suggested that single-case
studies should be well grounded in theory and theoretical proposition to increase the
external validity. The primary purpose of theory is not just to explain a phenomenon, but
to build a framework of knowledge upon which to expound upon an explanation
(Reynolds, 2007). A sound theory crosses time and space (Patton, 2002). The PET was
not only the theoretical framework and basis for the theoretical proposition strategy in
this case study, but it was also a sound theory with extensive empirical evidence of its
suitability throughout key policy changes in history.
Using PET for the theoretical framework and proposition strategy added to the
transferability of the study. The pattern described in the PET of public policy change was
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consistently illustrated in the literature review. Despite actively looking for instances
when the pattern did not match, none were found. This means it is likely that the theoretic
proposition strategy used in the examination of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act can
not only be used for pattern recognition and predictive purposes for the single case, but
could also be adapted for similar security policies. There have been numerous
contentious security policies enacted since 2001. Researching these laws under a similar
PET framework could help the search for areas of compromise, which would ultimately
help usher in equilibrium between security and liberty. Following Yin’s 2014 advice
about using theory to promote transferability should be beneficial to this case study or
any other single case study.
After clearly linking the single case to an acceptable theory, it was then necessary
to present all new data with an abundance of “thick description”. Thick description is
accurately capturing perceptions of the various participants (Stake, 1995). Using an
interview guide, digital recording devices, and transcription should make it easier to
effectively portray the interviewees’ opinions in a manner worthy of being pronounced
“thick description”. The more articulate the description of the data is, the better other
researchers are able to determine if the case is similar enough to their case to consider
using the same strategies or methodologies (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). A goal
of this dissertation is to provide a thick description that is useful to other researchers.
Dependability
This section addressed dependability concerns with this case study. Dependability
is the consistency and stability of the study (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin
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(2014) further addressed dependability as being the process that mitigates errors and
reduces biases in research. Maxwell (2013) suggested the best way to create a consistent
and stable study is to identify the threats to validity and draft a strategy aimed at those
specific threats. The most significant threat to errors and biases in this holistic single-case
study came from the data analysis. Repetitive examination of the results helped mitigate
data analysis errors.
Dependability confirmation is obtained through rigorous auditing (Creswell,
2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). This includes the data analysis process. Yin
(2014) explained that an evaluation of the analysis process must demonstrate how all the
evidence, regardless of how it affects the study’s proposition, was explored. To help
illustrate how all data has been examined for this study, the results of the analysis made
special mention of any data that falls outside expected results or was significantly
different than similar data. In addition, the codebook, notes, and all source are available
to further the dependability of the case study.
There were a few errors that were identified upon further review of the data, but
none of these errors would have significantly affected the results of the study. A
reoccurring error that was caught during the analysis was on a few occasions statements
from non-ACLU or non-DOJ participants in the legal proceedings were attributed to the
ACLU or DOJ. This error occurred because in some of the legal documents it was
difficult to ascertain when the shifted to a third party. This problem was quickly
identified and rectified. With each legal document the participating attorneys and their
respective organizational affiliation was identified either on the first page of the
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document or the last. By simply printing off the listed affiliation it was easy to identify
each attorney’s affiliation during the oral arguments and thus eliminate the potential for
that error.
Confirmability
Confirmability is the degree of which a study is free from the burden of researcher
biases or how differently the results would be if the research was conducted by a different
researcher (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Basically if identical procedures were
performed by different researchers in parallel studies the differences in the results due to
researcher biases illustrates confirmability. Fortunately confirmability can be
strengthened through methods used to diminish threats to other trustworthiness aspects.
Chronicling the data collection and analysis with thick description, illustrating how all
evidence affected the study, and being vigilant for researcher biases all reduce threats to
confirmability (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Patton, 2002). As previously
explained each of these techniques were employed to bolster the trustworthiness of this
case study.
Of these techniques reflexivity is among the most effective way to reduce
researcher biases (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014).
Reflexivity is consciously being attentive to the perspectives of the participants and the
researcher (Patton, 2002). To accomplish this I continuously assessed myself and the data
collection and analysis procedures for potential biases. It is especially important to
monitor the influence of my preexisting attitudes and opinions when conducting the data
analysis. The main evidence I have that I kept my biases in check was that I truly desired
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to find a significant potential area of compromise between the 2 groups and even though
such findings eluded this dissertation I did not skew the data to illustrate an area of
potential compromise. For example I believe the USA FREEDOM Act amendments to
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act should be palatable for both organizations, but the
evidence suggests that the compromise does not please either group, so I mentioned the
changes without inferring it was an acceptable compromise.
Ethical Procedures
IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet / NIH Certification / IRB Approval
Prior to conducting this dissertation I completed both the Walden University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) ethics planning worksheet and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) human research protections certification. These items are mandatory for
IRB approval to collect data. The ethics planning worksheet included a proposal to
conduct telephone interviews, but ultimately that method of data collection was not used
and instead publically available records were used instead. The overall ethical risk for
this dissertation was minimal. The IRB application was approved on November 16, 2015.
The IRB ethics planning worksheet is available in Appendix A and my NIH certificate is
available in Appendix B.
Summary of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 has presented the plan for this study. The chapter has described in detail
the research methodology of this study. The central concept of this study centered on the
division between those that support Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and those that
oppose it. An examination of this central concept drove the research to answer the
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question: How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent
incremental change from achieving the surveillance and information sharing objectives of
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential
circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? The methodology
was designed to adequately answer this question while mitigating issues of
trustworthiness and ethical risks. For each ethical concern or trustworthiness issue,
Chapter 3 provided a plan to address the problem. With the IRB approval and acceptance
of the proposal, I was approved by Walden University to conduct research starting in
November 2015.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The data that I examined in this case study provided ample information to answer
all the research questions to a point of saturation. In Chapter 4, I will explain how I
collected and analyzed the data. The data collection relied heavily on numerous
congressional testimonies and volumes of legal material developed in a multitude of court
cases. All the data directly represent either DOJ or ACLU viewpoints. As I previously
explained, these organizations were purposefully selected as they are the leading voice of
support for Title II authorities and the leading voice of opposition respectively. Due to
the consistency of the PET of public policy change, the logic model technique’s
predictive coding was a logical choice for the data analysis. The results from the
predictive coding were as I expected, showing that bounded rationality caused by
ideological polarization is preventing incremental change from achieving the security
objectives of Title II while mitigating constitutional concerns.
Purpose
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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Central Research Question – Qualitative:
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions
of the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law?
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act?
Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial?
Chapter Organization
This chapter begins with a description of the political, legal, and ideological
contentions peaking between the ACLU and the DOJ during the time of the data
collection. I will illustrate the demographic identification of the data sources. Next, I will
explain in detail the data collection methods. Following the data collection methods, I
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will dissect the data analysis (logic model technique with predictive coding) procedures
including the results and evidence of trustworthiness. I end the chapter with a summary
of its contents.
Data Collection Setting
Origins of Contentions
Understanding the setting for this data collection it is important to review the
strife between the ACLU and the DOJ. The current friction between the ACLU and DOJ
over national security surveillance, especially bulk collection of non-content data, began
in 2001 and has had incremental spikes in recent months, as the subject of bulk collection
has continued to make headlines. The federal government enacted a series of data
collection programs within weeks of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks designed to
reform intelligence operations related to national security (Gonzales, 2015). Almost
immediately the ACLU took issue with Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. By 2005
the ACLU was engaged in a legal battle over the potential collection of library records by
the DOJ (Oder, 2005). This case, Doe v. Gonzales, would be the first of many
surveillance related litigations brought by the ACLU.
In midst of this initial legal battle, which ended with the DOJ dropping the
specifically opposed collection, the New York Times exposed the controversial Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP). The TSP was an NSA, CIA, and DOJ bulk international
communication collection program (Gonzales, 2015). The ACLU claimed to have
suffered injury due to chilled communication caused by the TSP violating their First and
Fourth Amendment rights (Wong, 2006). The ACLU eventually lost the case and was
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denied a Supreme Court appeal, but the TSP was ended due to constitutional concerns
(Gonzales, 2015; Hughes, 2012). Even with the ending of TSP neither bulk collection nor
the ACLU’s opposition truly subsided.
While TSP was stopped, a series of acts were used as the justification and
authorization of the bulk collection of telephone and internet non-content information.
The bulk collection was authorized by FISA Section 402 in 2004, FISA Section 501 in
2005, then the Protect America Act of 2007, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the
FISA Amendment Acts Reauthorization Act of 2012, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act, and FISA Section 702 (Anderson, 2014; Banks, 2010; Gilbert, 2013; Office of
Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2013). As of November 30, 2015, the USA
FREEDOM Act is the source for NSA metadata monitoring, but now rather than the
government maintaining the metadata the communication carriers maintain the data (H.R.
Res. 2048, 2015). The changes to the bulk data programs, brought about by the USA
FREEDOM Act, appears to be a compromise by the government and a win for the
ACLU. Somewhat surprisingly, the ACLU has not embraced the changes. Alex Abdo,
Staff Attorney in the ACLU's Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, described the
USA FREEDOM Act’s changes as a “symbolic victory” (Duncan, 2015).
Recent and On Going Legal Battles
There is some reluctance from the DOJ and ACLU to participate in a study
involving national security, which could be due to the fact that the ACLU and DOJ are
engaged in several high profile court cases. These court battles have amplified in
intensity and frequency during the past 2.5 years. This is in part because of the publicity
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of Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosure of various national security programs
including bulk metadata collection. Most of the lawsuits have involved bulk data
collection or Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) requests related to bulk data
collection, but not all of these cases were in response to Snowden’s exposure of data
collection programs.
Amnesty International v. Blair (later Clapper) began prior to the Snowden
releases and focused upon the potential for the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 to
authorize bulk collections that could infringe upon First and Fourth Amendments
protections. The Supreme Court decided the ACLU and Amnesty International did not
have standing, as there was not concrete proof of injury (Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence, et al. v. Amnesty International USA et al., 2012).
Shortly after the Snowden leak, Larry E. Klayman, in conjunction with the
ACLU, sued the federal government over the constitutionality of the bulk phone and
internet collections. Klayman v. Obama (actually 3 sequential cases) claimed that the
bulk collections authorized under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act violated First
and Fourth Amendment protections (Klayman, 2015). In a series of court actions from
August through November 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court declared Klayman, et al. did
have standing due to the speculative nature of their claims (Whitaker, 2015). This case is
currently back at the district court level. Klayman v. Obama, like many national security
related court battles, is likely to last several years. Klayman is not the only current case
between the ACLU and DOJ regarding bulk metadata collection.
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Anna Smith, with legal assistance from the ACLU, Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF), and the Smith + Malek law firm, filed a claim against the government
similar to Klayman’s claims (Electronic Frontier Foundation website, 2015). Smith
asserted the amount of information collected, presumably including hers, constituted an
unwarranted virtual search due to the potentially rich and revealing description that could
be attained through the analysis of the data (Smith IV, 2015). The DOJ countered by
stressing that the Section 215 authorized collections have been repeatedly reviewed by
congress and the courts and have been found to be constitutional, but even if it were
unconstitutional Smith’s case would no longer have standing, because the USA
FREEDOM Act now expressly authorizes the analysis of metadata (Whitaker, 2015).
Smith like Klayman continues to be played out in the courts and likely contributes to the
ACLU’s and DOJ’s hesitance to be interviewed about the USA PATRIOT Act. The
Smith and Klayman cases are not the only cases still clinging to life in the legal system.
2015 was an interesting year for another relatively long lasting court battle,
ACLU v. Clapper. On May 7, 2015 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
NSA metadata bulk collection program exceeded the authorities of Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act (Dunn, Eisenberg, Jaffer, Abdo, & Toomey, 2015). This ruling
effected both the Klayman and Smith cases, but not significantly. All 3 cases were
basically put on hold as Section 215 was set to expire less than a month after the ruling
and the courts expected congress to settle the issue (De Vogue, 2015; Mills, 2015). This
eventually led to the USA FREEDOM Act and questioning the legal standing of the
plaintiffs in each case.
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The 3 cases are likely to have similar outcomes. They have had a history of
following parallel trajectories. There was one seemingly major difference in December
2013 when the courts declared in Klayman v. Obama that the bulk data collection
violated the Fourth Amendment, but days later in ACLU v. Clapper stated there was not a
search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment (Davis, 2014). Even this apparent
drastic difference faded and the cases quickly aligned once more. The advantage the
closeness of these cases present to this study is they provide the ACLU and DOJ
platforms to clearly express and perfect their arguments for and against the surveillance
programs once authorized by Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Demographics
This study examined the works of the 2 most prominent voices regarding the USA
PATRIOT Act. As previously described the ACLU has been the leading opponent of the
USA PATRIOT Act and the DOJ has been the leading voice in support of the law. The
ACLU is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, civil rights organization with more than 1 million
members (ACLU website, 2014). While the ACLU performs a multitude of functions it is
best known for its legal services. The ACLU appears to be rather selective of whom
represents the organization on the national stage, as a very select number of ACLU
attorneys ever participate in the high profile engagements. Typically the leading attorneys
in a specific field handle all the congressional hearings and complex court cases. In this
study, many of the ACLU attorneys were repeatedly the authors or orators in legal
proceedings, debate, or testimony. Jameel Jaffer, Alex Abdo, and Patrick Toomey were
commonly the originators of sources coded in the data collection.
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This study used a somewhat wider selection of DOJ representatives than that of
the ACLU’s representation, but this was somewhat expected and easy to explain. The
primary cause of this difference is, in many of the congressional hearings high level
officials testified rather than DOJ attorneys. The various court cases examined in this
study illustrated that the DOJ handled its representation much like the ACLU with a
select group of top level attorneys articulating the DOJ’s view. Works of staff attorneys
Douglas N. Letter, H. Thomas Byron III, Henry C. Whitaker, and Benjamin C. Mizer
accounted for a significant amount of the data collected in this study. As mentioned
before the advantage of having a limited amount of high level professionals articulate an
organization’s views is that viewpoint comes across clearly and consistently. Both the
DOJ and ACLU accomplished this by having the same people repeatedly engaged in the
legal debates.
Data Collection
Congressional Hearings
The data collection for this case study began with an examination of the numerous
congressional hearings in which the ACLU and DOJ debated the USA PATRIOT Act.
This study coded the transcripts of 8 such congressional hearings and 2 additional
Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation hearings that had particular relevance to
the study. The 1,240 pages of these transcripts yielded 600 references relatively equally
split between the ACLU and DOJ. These hearings were essential to both organizations in
forming their respective viewpoints on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The themes
developed in the hearings changed little through the years.
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Many of the talking points used in even the earliest of hearings was repeated in
later hearings and numerous court battles throughout the years. Due to this fact, starting
with the hearings provided an effective platform for refining the coding references. All
changes to the coding were developed while coding the hearings. The repetitive nature of
the arguments made by the ACLU and DOJ aided the study. This allowed the same
arguments to be consistently coded, which generated a clear and concise representation of
the ACLU’s and DOJ’s views on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. It also facilitated the
answering of the research questions to the point of saturation.
Responses to Congressional Inquires
The ACLU has a Freedom Of Information Act collection which contains
approximately a hundred works related to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
including the 2 responses to congressional inquiries coded in this study. Both of these
letters were penned by Assistant Attorney General, Ronald Weich as he represented the
DOJ in a congressional review. Mr. Weich was the Assistant Attorney General from
2009-2012 (DOJ website, 2013). It is important to note these letters, one written in 2009
and one in 2011, were both authored before the Snowden leaks. This demonstrates both
that there were concerns about Section 215 prior to public knowledge about the NSA
metadata collection program and that the DOJ has consistently valued aspects of the
provision. In this study these letters only generated 32 references to 4 codes, but the
references clearly articulated the DOJ’s views. In addition, the Assistant Attorney
General used at least one of these letters repeatedly just changing the names of the
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addressed member of Congress. The letter was only coded once as not to skew the study
findings.
Human Rights Hearing
The ACLU has regularly been a leading public voice of concern about the balance
of surveillance and liberty. One such public petition by the ACLU came when Alex
Abdo, one of the primary ACLU staff attorneys, testified before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on October 28, 2013. Mr. Abdo’s testimony was valuable
to this study because this it demonstrated the organization’s consistency in expressing its
concerns in multiple forums, as this hearing does not share the magnitude of legal cases
or congressional hearings. The testimony was consistent with other coded ACLU sources
and provided a total of 18 references. This testimony was the only non-legally binding
deposition used in this study.
Amnesty v. Blair (Clapper)
Amnesty v. Blair (Clapper) was crucial to the data collection for the case study.
While many of the available legal documents for this (and all the court cases) were not
applicable to the study, there were still ten documents that contributed 410 coded pages
and 325 references. The arguments used by the ACLU and DOJ in this case mimicked the
arguments used in the congressional hearings and other court proceedings.
ACLU v. Clapper, Klayman v. Obama, Smith v. Obama, ACLU v. FBI
The ACLU v. Clapper case was equally as important to this case study as
Amnesty v. Clapper was. The legal documents presented in this case contributed 360
coded pages and 548 references. Again the arguments presented by both sides changed
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little in this case, but there was one difference in both sides of the debate. Since ACLU v.
Clapper was in response to the Edward Snowden leaks, the ACLU arguments changed
from the theoretical potential of abuse from USA PATRIOT Act authorities to declaring
the bulk metadata collection program was an abuse. This in turn caused the DOJ to
change their argument from declaring there was no evidence of abuse to explaining how
the program authorized under Section 215 was constitutional. This also played out in the
court case’s doppelganger cases of Klayman v. Obama and Smith v. Obama.
ACLU v. Clapper, Klayman v. Obama, and Smith v. Obama are all such similar
cases that their outcomes seem destined to be intertwined. Whenever a significant
development occurs in one of the cases the other two often must explain or defend the
happenings. This has led to the arguments being carefully and consistently articulated to
ensure all the attorneys are in unison. In fact many of the attorneys participate in all 3
cases. This has been beneficial to the case study presenting clearly definable viewpoints
for both organizations.
Much like ACLU v. Clapper, the cases of Smith v. Obama, Klayman v. Obama,
and ACLU v. FBI all express these viewpoints. Smith v. Obama documents provided 7
source documents to this study. From these 7 documents there were 499 coded pages and
197 code references. Klayman v. Obama did not start out as an ACLU case, so most of
the documents related to this litigation were outside the parameters of the data collection,
but there were 5 source documents that met the data collection criteria. The 5 sources
provided 237 pages, which generated 94 code references. ACLU v. FBI is a supporting
legal battle directed by the ACLU to prompt the FBI to deliver on a number of Freedom
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of Information Act requests. This case only produced one legal document applicable to
this case study, but in its 33 pages were 93 code references.
How Data Were Recorded
To better identify the crossover between supporters and critics of the law this
study utilized QSR NVivo 10 software. The QSR NVivo 10 organizes data to decrease
biases and errors during numerical analysis. The software did not eliminate the need for
researcher input and analysis, but did aid in these tasks. QSR NVivo 10 has an auto
coding function, but it was unable to accurately delineate between the ACLU and DOJ
nor consistently determine the correct code to use for the specific passages. For these
reasons I deductively coded the approximately 3,000 pages of data using a predictive
coding strategy of a logic model technique based upon the consistent finding of the PET
of public policy change. This is explained in further detail in the Data Analysis section of
this chapter. In addition, I manually extracted the subthemes from the coding by moving
each code onto a word document for ease of printing and analysis. QSR NVivo 10 was
very helpful in organizing the 45 sources of data. The software increased the efficiency,
reliability, and credibility of this study.
Variations from Original Data Collection Plan
The most significant variation from the original data collection plan was the
inability to conduct the telephone interviews. The original plan called for telephone
interviews with 5 members of the ACLU and 5 members of the DOJ. The DOJ was
willing to allow one interview, but was not willing to sign any document including
Walden University’s mandatory consent form. The ACLU never responded to any
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emailed request, but I did not pursue it further, because of the inability to interview the
DOJ. Initially this seemed to be an impassable obstacle to continuing the study.
The original plan had always called for examining and coding congressional
hearings and court cases prior to conducting the interviews. I decided to begin this coding
process and wait 2 months before re-approaching the DOJ and ACLU. During the months
of coding the congressional hearings it became clear that the interviews would be less
necessary than originally thought, as both sides of the argument changed little in the last
decade. I contacted the DOJ again a couple months after initially being told only one
interview and no signing consent forms. This time I received an email back from the DOJ
that did not specify only one interview, but did state that 5 interviews was very unlikely.
The email reiterated that the interviewee was not allowed to sign any forms. This only
seemed like a moderate set back the second time around, because by this point in the data
collection it appeared there was a chance of answering all the research questions to a
point of saturation without the interviews.
Due to the lack of interviews, the court case documents coded in this study
became paramount in answering the research questions. Every source related to the court
cases echoed the arguments made in congressional testimony and confirmed each
organization’s stance on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The combination of the
congressional hearings and court cases answered the research questions to the point of
saturation. This was fortunate as the inability to conduct the interviews could have
derailed the case study, had the legal battles and congressional inquiries not answered the
questions. With 3 current court cases involving the ACLU and DOJ debating the
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contentions and merits of the USA PATRIOT Act playing out at the time of the data
collection, I was able to obtain current relevant information. The arguments made in the
legal proceedings essentially answered the questions I would have asked in the
interviews. Ironically I believe the 3 ongoing lawsuits contributed to the reluctance of the
organizations to participate in the interviews, but their legal arguments sufficed to answer
the research questions.
Data Analysis
Logic Model Technique / Coding Process
The reliability and validity of the PET of public policy change made the logic
model technique of data analysis an appropriate choice for this dissertation. The logic
model technique is a form of deductive qualitative analysis that involves generating a
paradigm of expected outcomes based upon previously verified and consistent cause and
effect patterns in the theoretical framework (Yin, 2014). Deductive analysis begins
analysis by first looking at theory then narrowing down to specific data to see how the
data results compare to the expected results (Trochim, 2006). Deductive analysis involves
discovering patterns through the use of a preexisting organizational framework (Patton,
2002). This case study analyzed data using predictive coding schemes derived from the
previously established PET patterns. The predetermined codes were:
ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)

DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)

ACLU Opposition to Section 203

DOJ Support of Section 203

ACLU Opposition to Section 206

DOJ Support of Section 206

ACLU Opposition to Section 215

DOJ Support of Section 215
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ACLU Opposition to Section 218

DOJ Support of Section 218

ACLU & DOJ: USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11
The coding process for this dissertation was designed to highlight that the current
policy stagnation of Title II is aligned with the bounded rationality element of the PET of
discontinuous change. The PET illustrates how stagnation occurs when bounded
rationality prevents the forces of change from overcoming the resistance to this change
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). The
literature review demonstrated with previous national security policies that political and
ideological polarization contributed to the bounded rationality. This dissertation’s logic
model technique used predictive coding analysis to illustrate the seemingly complete
polarization between the leading support and opposition voices to Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
The USA PATRIOT Act has been supported and opposed equally by both major
U.S. political parties, so for the purpose of this dissertation political polarization was not
a significant factor. Ideological polarization appeared to be the dominant contributing
factor to the bounded rationality surrounding Title II. Ideologically, the DOJ (made up of
both Democrats and Republicans) seems to be collectively in favor of Title II authorities
because of the benefits to security operations. Ideologically, the ACLU (made up of both
Democrats and Republicans) seems to be collectively opposed to Title II authorizations
due to civil liberty concerns. By focusing on the more contentious sections of Title II, it
was possible to use predictive analysis to deduce how these 2 organizations would
respond to the various Title II authorities. This allowed for a predictive coding scheme in
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which the ACLU would always publically oppose Title II and the DOJ would always
publically support the title. Any significant deviation would have illustrated areas of
potential compromise, but none were found with this data.
The sections selected for the predictive codes were developed by reviewing Title
II of the USA PATRIOT Act to deduce which areas of debate would likely illustrate the
ideological division between the ACLU and DOJ. Ideological polarization is a
contributing factor to the PET described, bounded rationality that has prevented
meaningful incremental policy change with Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. One of
the most easily identifiable points of contention between the DOJ and ACLU is how the
title has affected FISA. It was expected that the data would show that the ACLU
generally objects to how Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affects FISA, while the DOJ
supports the changes. The FISA codes were expected to be infiltrate all the Title II
debates, regardless of which specific provision was being argued.
As expected FISA was mentioned extensively throughout various debates about
Title II, but the codes about specific Title II sections were equally as important. These
codes not only show elements of bounded rationality, but also explain the specific
benefits and contentions of the title, answering Research Subquestions 3 through 5.
Although several sections of Title II have been controversial at times, Sections 203, 206,
215, and 218 have consistently been debated by the DOJ and ACLU. By selecting these
codes it was possible to chronicle the arguments in the course of nearly 15 years. The
other sections of the title simply do not have enough associated data to adequately
identify the elements of bounded rationality preventing effective incremental change.
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Following the typical tract of the PET of public policy change, it was expected that the
DOJ and ACLU would be completely locked in opposition.
The exception to this is the last set of codes (USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to
9/11) which assumed both organizations would agree that the USA PATRIOT Act could
not have been implemented if it were not in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. For this particular code it was expected that the DOJ would state that the USA
PATRIOT Act was designed to correct security deficiencies that contributed to the
attacks. It was also expected that the ACLU would state that Americans would not have
tolerated the passage of the act except for during the distress of the attacks. This code was
designed to further anchor the logic model technique to the PET of public policy change.
The foundation of PET is that rapid and dramatic change occurs due to a shocking event
that spurs action. This dissertation asserts that the 2001 terrorist attack was that outside
event that generated the USA PATRIOT Act’s momentum and put the law on the PET
pathway.
During the coding process I paid particular attention to any instance in which the
ACLU supported Title II authorities or the DOJ opposed the authorities. There was very
little substantial Title II support by the ACLU or DOJ opposition to the authorities. In an
April 2004, hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Dani
Eyer, representing the ACLU, expressed limited support of Section 203 of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Ms. Eyer explained that she understood why the wall between criminal
and national security investigations should a “little less substantial” (Preventing and
responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). While this was not a
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definitive showing of support, it was the only example found of the ACLU supporting
Section 203.
In the same hearing Ms. Eyer also stated the ACLU was not in favor of “doing
away with” the roving wiretap provision. This was the only example found of the ACLU
lending any support to Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Clearly this, like the
Section 203 support, was a somewhat trivial expression. I believe Ms. Eyer’s support was
to show that she was open to pragmatic national security solutions as long as they did not
interfere with civil liberties. I also believe that these 2 instances in which the ACLU
seemed to sway from what was expected by the PET of public policy change were not
indicative of any significant potential for compromise between the DOJ and ACLU.
Neither of these notions of support were very substantive and given they were the only
illustrations of ACLU support of these provisions, it is unlikely this represents an area of
compromise for the organization.
There were also 5 instances in 2 separate congressional hearing in which the DOJ
expressed some opposition to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This is not to say
there is any sign of compromise in the 5 instances. Four of the accounts expressed
concern that Section 215 was too time consuming or difficult to use. These seemingly
opposing viewpoints were really a way of defending against the ACLU’s presumption
that the FBI used Section 215 to avoid the rigors of a warrant or subpoena. The final
instance of opposition to Section 215 was the DOJ stating they were not opposed to the
language of Section 215 being clarified in an amendment if it helped with the renewal
process. This brief line in the testimony could be seen as admission that the section’s
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authorities are not clearly defined, but I believe it is more a testament to the DOJ
understanding that they do not write law, but rather work within the confines of the
written law.
Throughout this study I did not find any other instance in which either the DOJ or
the ACLU expressed views that were inconsistent with what was expected. This lends
credibility to study as it demonstrates that the logic model based on the PET of public
policy change is sound. The few discrepant cases had little effect on the study due to their
lack of consistency and intensity. If any of the discrepancies had been routinely repeated
or if any of them had been a strong showing of support or opposition it would have
represented an area of possible compromise between the organizations. The ACLU and
DOJ have both repeatedly and consistently expressed their official viewpoints and as
predicted using the PET of public policy change these viewpoints are locked in
opposition with little chance for change unless acted upon by an outside force.
Code: ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)
The code “ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)” refers to the ACLU’s general
opposition to the changes to FISA brought about by Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. The ACLU’s opposition to current
FISA and FISC operations was one of the most prevalently discussed issues found in this
case study. This particular code was found 323 times in 20 different sources. Most of the
sources were from congressional hearings after 2008 related to the USA PATRIOT Act
and FAA or from the recent court cases between the ACLU and DOJ.
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The main theme discovered in this code stemmed from the USA PATRIOT Act
Section 215’s bulk collection programs. The ACLU often argued against the legality of
the FISC authorizations of bulk collections. Approximately 249 (77%) of the 323 coded
references related in some way to FISC’s role with bulk collection authorizations. Section
215 was specifically mentioned 13 times. Bulk collections were specifically mentioned
another 8 times and dragnet surveillance was mentioned 14 times. The ACLU also
contended that the FISC bulk collection permissions violated the U.S. Constitution with
explicitly expressed concerns of Fourth Amendment infringements 11 times and First
Amendment violations 12 times. General constitutionality concerns related to large scale
surveillance were raised 36 times. Similar ACLU themes were discovered repeatedly
throughout the study.
Code: DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)
The code “DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)” refers to the DOJ’s general approval of
FISA and FISC changes brought about by Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This code was important to the study because it
chronicled the DOJ’s rebuttal to the ACLU’s claims about the post - USA PATRIOT Act
FISA system and explained some of the benefits of FISA to the DOJ. This particular code
was found 191 times in 25 different sources. All but one of these sources came after the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Much like the code “ACLU Opposition to FISA
(FAA)”, sources for “DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)” primarily stem from recent court
cases, but a few of the sources are congressional testimony.
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Again like the code “ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)”, the main theme
discovered in this code stemmed from the USA PATRIOT Act Section 215’s bulk
collection programs. The DOJ repeatedly touted the legality of the FISC authorizations of
bulk collections and the oversite the FISC brought to the metadata program. This code
mentioned Section 215 a total of 67 times. It referred to the general constitutionality of
the bulk collection program 12 times. It specifically referred to the Fourth Amendment 13
times, often using the phrase “consistent with the Fourth Amendment”. In addition, there
was one example of the DOJ citing Judge Batchelder’s explanation of subjective chill
from a First Amendment violation and applying that to the ACLU’s argument against
mass collection to suggest the ACLU had not suffered under the program (West, Bharara,
Letter, & Lenerz, 2010). Many of the DOJ related themes discovered in this study were
refutation of ACLU claims.
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 203
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act is an effort to mitigate barriers to
information sharing between criminal investigations and national security investigations
(H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). The so called “wall” between criminal and national security
investigations was a contributing factor to terrorists being able to carry out the September
11, 2001 attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). The literature review identified the potential
for Section 203 to circumvent the Fourth Amendment by funneling information into
criminal proceedings without warrant or even probable cause (Martin, 2005; Husain
2014). Due to this identified theme in the literature review, it was expected that there
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would be substantial evidence of the ACLU opposing the section, but this was not the
case.
This code was not found as much as expected prior to the data collection. The
“ACLU Opposition to Section 203” code was only found 8 times in 5 different sources.
Five of the referenced excerpts explained the potential for abuse of information sharing if
Fourth Amendment protections were circumvented. The remaining 3 references (all from
the same source) were related to how information from a FISC authorized investigation
of Brandon Mayfield under Section 218 authorities was ultimately shared under Section
203 leading to Mayfield’s detention (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). Generally the evidence of
ACLU opposition to Section 203 was inconsequential in both frequency and intensity.
Code: DOJ Support of Section 203
The DOJ’s support of Section 203 was much more robust than the ACLU’s
opposition of the provision. This code was referenced 78 times from 7 sources. The
references in this code were somewhat generalized and there was not a dominate theme in
this code. Fifteen of the references were generally related to the value of information
sharing. Ten references explained the use of Section 203 leading to the prosecution of
various crimes related to terrorism. The 9/11 Commission’s results and the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks were represented in 9 references in this code. Five of the references
explained how the combination of Section 218 and Section 203 were beneficial to
national security. Despite not having a definitive theme with this code the number
references and sources combined with the ACLU’s lack of opposition demonstrates that
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Section 203 might be somewhat less controversial than what the much of the literature
about the section seemed to suggest.
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 206
Section 206 authorizes roving wiretaps in national security investigations (H.R.
Res. 3162, 2001). The ACLU has expressed opposition to this provision. In 5 separate
sources the ACLU’s opposition to Section 206 was coded 24 times. The dominate theme
expressed in this code is the ACLU contends the national security roving wiretap
procedures should mimic the criminal investigation roving wiretap procedures. Nearly all
the references alluded to differences between the criminal and national security roving
wiretap procedures. The primary difference according to the ACLU is Section 206 allows
the roving wiretap to not target a specific person. In other words, the roving wiretap
theoretically is not tied to a person or a communication device allowing for vague wiretap
authorizations. It is also worth noting in a few sources Section 206 was referred to as a
“general warrant” similar to the general warrants that prompted the Founding Fathers to
draft the Fourth Amendment. These particular claims were not made by the ACLU and
were not coded, because of this.
The 24 instances that were coded in this code illustrates the ACLU’s opposition to
Section 206. In 5 of the coded references, the ACLU specifically calls for Section 206 to
be more in line with criminal roving wiretap codes. In 3 of the code’s references, Section
206 is said to authorize “John Doe” wiretaps. Two of the codes express concern about
innocent conversations being intercepted. In addition, there are 2 examples of the ACLU
claiming Section 206 violates the Fourth Amendment and one claim that the provision
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violates the First Amendment. The ACLU’s opposition to Section 206 is clearly defined
in the data gathered in this study.
Code: DOJ Support of Section 206
The DOJ’s defense of Section 206 is slightly more vigorous than the ACLU’s
opposition, but this is expected as the DOJ had to defend against several entities not just
the ACLU. This code gathered 50 references from 4 sources. The basic theme that
emerged from this coded data is that the Section 206 roving wiretap is essentially the
same as a criminal wiretap that has been used since 1986. This code contains 7 detailed
mentions of Section 206 wiretaps being similar in scope and practice to criminal
investigation roving wiretaps. There are 14 mentions disputing the claims that roving
wiretaps are not tied to a specific person. The DOJ explains that the FISC requires the
target to be “is in fact a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (USA PATRIOT
Act: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate,
2005). In a letter to Senator Feinstein the DOJ also explained “the "roving" authority is
only available when the Government is able to provide specific information that the
target may engage in counter-surveillance activity” (Weich, 2009). This countersurveillance requirement was mentioned in at least one other reference in this code. These
references seem to effectively counter most of the opposing ACLU claims.
In addition, there are 2 citations that explain the origins of the criminal
investigation wiretaps. These citations illustrate that in 1986 the roving wiretap
procedures were established as part of the War on Drugs campaign because drug dealers
were changing phones to defeat wiretaps and that terrorists and spies use the same
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tradecraft. The general theme revealed here is that if a tool can be used to thwart common
criminals it should also be legal in terrorist and spy investigations. There were 18
mentions of Section 206 roving wiretaps being used to defeat terror plots, which lend
some credibility to the aforementioned theme. Furthermore Section 206 was not
mentioned in any sources dated after 2011, possibly indicating that the controversies
around the provision have faded. To truly determine if it has faded would require an
exhaustive search of data that extended beyond the ACLU and DOJ.
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 215
Section 215 amended the FISA to grant the FBI access to “any tangible things”
relevant to an international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation (H.R. Res.
3162, 2001). This has been the most controversial aspect of the USA PATRIOT Act
beginning with the concerns that all U.S. library records would be seized and continuing
into late 2015 with Section 215 being the legal authority to the NSA’s bulk metadata
program. This was the most cited ACLU code in this study. It was also the most recent
and relevant ACLU code, because the ACLU is actively engaged in 3 high profile legal
battles with the DOJ over Section 215. This code was referenced 424 times throughout 22
sources. Five of the sources were within 6 months of the data collection.
The dominate theme found with this code is the ACLU’s contention that the
NSA’s bulk metadata collection violates First and Fourth Amendment protections and
creates an unreasonable communication chill. The ACLU referred to the NSA program as
bulk, blanket, mass, or dragnet surveillance 79 times throughout this code. Eighty-five
citations described the program as unconstitutional or in violation of First and Fourth
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Amendments. Seven other references asserted the program is an invasion or “gross
invasion” of privacy. Another 16 coded mentions claimed the program is unreasonable.
Twelve coded sections stated the program chilled free speech. Thirteen citations
explained that the collection of metadata should constitute a search and thus deserves
Fourth Amendment protections. The ACLU described the program as warrantless twelve
times throughout this code.
The ACLU made other effective arguments such as when the ACLU stated “the
record is clear that the government need not collect Plaintiffs’ call records in order to
obtain the call records of suspected terrorists and their contacts” (Dunn et al., 2015, p.
15). This simple statement is a cornerstone of any argument against Section 215
collections. The reason for the outrage with the metadata collection is it captured millions
of records that had nothing to do with terror investigations. This argument from the
ACLU was echoed by politicians from both parties and much of the public. On
November 29, 2015 the NSA bulk collection program was altered to require
communication carriers to retain the metadata and now the NSA only acquires records
specific to national security investigations (Duncan, 2015). This compromise would
seemingly negate the argument against the metadata collection as it is no longer mass
collection.
Throughout this code the ACLU referred to the NSA program as exceeding the
legal authorities of Section 215. In this code the U.S. Congress was mentioned 56 times
with 24 of those times explaining that the bulk metadata program is beyond Section 215’s
original intent. The most powerful representation of this claim came from 2 citations in
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which the ACLU quoted Section 215’s author, Senator Jim Sensenbrenner, as stating the
program was an abuse of that law (Jaffer et al., 2013). The collective data composed in
the 424 coded references illustrated the ACLU’s comprehensive and consistent argument
against Section 215. This prompted the DOJ to generate an equally strong and reliable
rebuttal.
Code: DOJ Support of Section 215
The DOJ’s support of Section 215 is as solid as the ACLU’s opposition. This was
the most used code in this study. This code was discovered 617 times in 19 sources.
Seven of the 19 sources were within 6 months of the onset of the data collection. This
demonstrates how relevant and current this topic remains. Twenty-eight of the references
were derived from a 2005 document, which illustrates the longevity of the contentions.
Due to the nature of the congressional hearings and lawsuits in which the DOJ has had to
defend Section 215 authorities since shortly after the provision’s conception.
The theme expressed with this code is the polar opposite to the ACLU opposition
to Section 215 code. The theme is a 2 prong confutation of the ACLU’s claims with the
first prong addressing the legality of Section 215 and the second discrediting ACLU
claims as speculative. First 132 of the coded references refuted the claims that Section
215 or the NSA’s metadata program under that section violated the U.S. Constitution or
any of its amendments. Approximately 80 of the codes were repudiating the claim that
Section 215 violated the Fourth Amendment. The code contained 27 explanations of why
the collection of records under Section 215 is not a search under Fourth Amendment
standards. Seven additional references explained that even if the Section 215 collections
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were a search, they would be permitted due to the government’s “special needs”.
Approximately 40 other citations suggested the collection of metadata or other records
under Section 215 was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. This study also
found 7 instances in which the DOJ argued the legality of Section 215 collections by
touting that 14 separate federal judges had authorized the collections on 34 separate
occasions. This code also contains 125 DOJ mentions of congress’ authorization,
knowledge, or oversite of Section 215 collections. The DOJ took great care to repeatedly
address the legality of Section 215.
The important point the DOJ’s 2 prong defense was that the ACLU’s claims were
mostly speculative, because there was no evidence that any of their communications had
been queried even if their metadata had been collected. The DOJ used the word
speculative 19 times in this code when describing ACLU claims. On 3 separate entries
the DOJ stated there was “no evidence” of a chilling effect. In legal documents
containing this code, the DOJ questioned the ACLU’s standing 32 times. This dismissive
legal approach has had mixed results in the courts, as each of the legal scuffles between
the ACLU and DOJ have had victories and defeats by both organizations with the 3
current cases seemingly locked in perpetual appeal.
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 218
Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended sections 104 and 303 of the
FISA by striking ‘‘the purpose’’ and inserting ‘‘a significant purpose’’ (H.R. Res. 3162,
2001). This syntactic variation created a potential for FISA authorizations to be used for
non-foreign intelligence related cases, perhaps even including common law enforcement
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investigations (Francel, 2014; Sales, 2010). The theme that emerged from this code is
best described by the coded reference that states “The danger of section 218’s lower
standard is that the government will cut corners in criminal cases” (USA PATRIOT Act:
Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005).
This concept appears in virtually all the coded references of this code. In addition, there
are 3 mentions of potential Fourth Amendment violations and 11 assertions that Section
218 led to civil liberties violations in the Mayfield case. This code has a limited number
of references due in part because Section 218 has not recently been indicted in public
controversies like Section 215 has, but the consistency of the argument adequately
explains the ACLU’s stance on Section 218.
Code: DOJ Support of Section 218
The code “DOJ Support of Section 218” chronicled the DOJ’s effort to have the
provision extended beyond its original sunset by disputing the critics of the section and
touting its successes. Throughout this code are examples of the DOJ crediting the
cumulative effects of Sections 218 and 203. The basic theme is that the combination of
the 2 sections helped mitigate the organizational cultures that led to a hypothetical wall
that prevented criminal and national security investigations from cooperating. This code
referred to the “wall” 8 times and Section 203 9 times. There were also 4 mentions of the
9/11 Commission’s recommendation that a lack of information sharing led to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. There were 7 coded references to Section 218’s
information sharing properties. This code also revealed the DOJ’s assertion that the
section was fundamental to the disruption of the Portland Seven and the Virginia Jihad

143
terrorist plots. Much like the previous code this code reveals a reliable, well-articulated
organizational viewpoint about Section 218.
Code: ACLU - USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11
The code “ACLU – USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11” was developed as
part of the predictive logic model to illustrate the validity of the PET of public policy
change. The purpose of this code was to demonstrate that the ACLU would contend that
the USA PATRIOT Act would not have been enacted if not due to the terrorist attack of
September 11, 2001. Precisely as predicted the ACLU repeatedly mentioned the events of
9/11 as the catalyst for the USA PATRIOT Act. This code contains 13 examples from 5
sources that attest to this notion. Many of the examples clearly state the act was in
response to the attacks, while others allude to it. All 13 coded references clearly articulate
that the USA PATRIOT Act was a reaction to the terrorist attack.
Code: DOJ - USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11
Like the code “ACLU – USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11”, the code “DOJ
– USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11” was developed as part of the predictive logic
model to illustrate the validity of PET to this study. Also like the previous code, this code
gave credibility to the notion that the DOJ would consider the USA PATRIOT Act to be
a response to the 9/11 attacks. This code was used 18 times in 5 sources. The DOJ was
not as specific as the ACLU in this context, but it did allude to the USA PATRIOT Act as
correcting pre-9/11 deficiencies. Both of these codes will be further discussed in the
results section of this chapter when discussing the research questions. See Table 1 for a
summary of code occurrence.
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Table 1
Summary of Code Occurrence
Code
ACLU Opposition to FISA
DOJ Support of FISA
ACLU Opposition to Section 203
DOJ Support of Section 203
ACLU Opposition to Section 206
DOJ Support of Section 206
ACLU Opposition to Section 215
DOJ Support of Section 215
ACLU Opposition to Section 218
DOJ Support of Section 218
ACLU Act enacted due to 9/11
DOJ Act enacted due to 9/11

Number of occurrences
323
191
8
78
206
50
424
617
27
42
13
18

Number of sources
20
25
5
7
24
4
22
19
5
2
5
5

Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility (Internal Validity)
The credibility strategy described in Chapter 3 focused on 3 main aspects, the
theoretical framework, literature review, and researcher biases. In qualitative studies
credibility is highly influenced by the results of previous studies (Rudestam & Newton,
2007). To capitalize on this aspect of qualitative research the literature review and the
theoretical framework were examined to a point of saturation. To add to the credibility of
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this study I read and analyzed hundreds of articles and books related to U.S. national
security policies and the PET of public policy change. The continuous search for new
material related to national security and PET not only kept the study relevant and
credible, but was absolutely necessary in keeping up with the ever changing legal actions
between the ACLU and DOJ. Fortunately the recent developments with Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act, like the historic policies before it, followed the PET cycle.
The theoretical framework provided by the PET of public policy change is a key
component to the internal validity of this study. It was essential to validate this theory to
the study. The PET of public policy change has been a widely accepted theory for several
years (Givel, 2010; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Ripberger (2011) and Romano (2011)
explained that there is a natural ebb and flow to national security policies with spikes in
contentious policies following major events. This supports PET. The literature review in
this study examined national security policies and programs from the founding of the
United States through modern times. This examination revealed national security policy
throughout American history has consistently followed a basic PET cycle of stagnation,
incremental change, and rapid change following significant events.
This study is fundamentally dependent on the PET (PET) of public policy change
applying to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Both the literature review and the data
analysis suggest that the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted as a direct response to the
terrorist attacks of 2001. For several years following its enactment Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act remained largely stagnant. In 2015 Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act was
repeatedly on the verge of incremental change. While most of these changes failed to
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fully manifest, there were some significant changes to certain Title II authorities. The
evidence provided by the lifecycle of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act indicates that
thus far the law has followed a PET pattern.
Reviewing U.S. national security policies throughout American history was
essential not just to understanding and validating PET, it was also necessary to develop
perspective about the USA PATRIOT Act. To fully appreciate the nuances of a law it is
important to comprehend the historic policies relevant to the USA PATRIOT Act
(O’Brien, 2011). The literature review chronicled major national security policies, legal
decisions, and even security related scandals leading up to and including the USA
PATRIOT Act. This revealed a consistent trend of security policies and even abuses
following PET, but it also explained legal precedence, traditional policy standards,
historic abuses of authority, and the original intent of various laws. All of these concepts
were critical to developing a credible understanding of the USA PATRIOT Act and its
related controversies. The literature review provided a sound foundation for the study and
is nearly as important to the credibility of this work as the theoretical framework.
The next most important aspect related to the credibility of this study was
mitigating my biases about the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act is a very
polarizing subject, but by consistently evaluating my personal beliefs and actively trying
to understand both sides of the debate I found myself maintaining a neutral opinion about
the law. By having an open mind I was able to see that the USA PATRIOT Act is an
imperfect but useful law. I never developed strong opinions for or against the law. Even
after the data analysis, I contend that both sides of the debate have valid arguments. In
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addition, as stated in Chapter 3, the USA PATRIOT Act does not have any direct effect
on my life. I am neither a member of the ACLU or the DOJ. This has allowed me to
mitigate biases throughout the case study.
Transferability (External Validity)
Transferability is the capacity of study’s structure to be applied to a similar
subject matter (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) suggested that the
theoretical basis is essential to external validity. Much like the study’s internal validity,
the external validity of this case study is enhanced by the integration of the theoretical
framework throughout the study. As repeatedly observed and mentioned throughout each
chapter of the dissertation, the PET of public policy has been extraordinarily consistent
throughout American national security policy history including the USA PATRIOT Act.
Using PET as the theoretical framework this study could easily be transferred to a study
of a different title of the USA PATRIOT Act or even a different law altogether. In
addition, the case study could also be transferred to other groups that oppose and support
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. For example, this study format could be applied to
Electronic Frontier Foundation rather than the ACLU and the Office of Director of
National Intelligence rather than the DOJ.
The general application of the PET framework developed in this case study would
likely yield similar results in any controversial national security policy throughout U.S.
history. The most basic element of the policy lifecycles have shown that even the most
controversial of security policies have similar origins and conclusions. Major changes to
security policies tend to stem from a significant event that jolts the public and by
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extension the lawmakers into action. The bounded rationality of the situations have
historically generated imperfect laws, policies, or procedures. However, in the past once
these imperfect conditions were established there was a period of stagnation in which the
opposing and supporting forces were engaged in a gridlock induced stagnation. With the
historic examples, as pressure has mounted, the entrenched legislators have accomplished
limited incremental change until the law is either no longer controversial or another
outside source prompted dramatic change. This consistency has added credibility and
transferability to the case study.
Dependability
Dependability is the reduction in errors and biases in a study (Miles, Huberman,
& Saldaña, 2014, Yin 2014). This case study utilized a logic model technique of
deductive analysis which predicted results based upon historic evidence and the use of
theory. As discussed in the credibility and transferability sections of this chapter, both the
history of national security policies and the PET have been constant. This consistency
made it possible to accurately predict the views of both the DOJ and ACLU in regards to
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
While there were a few instances, mentioned previously in this chapter, when
statements of certain members of either the ACLU or DOJ differed slightly from the
predicted results, the overwhelming majority of the data collected and analyzed was
exactly as predicted. The DOJ generally supported Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act,
while the ACLU generally opposed the authorities. This is consistent with PET and the
historic references discussed earlier. There was a direct and consistent effort to look for
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any instance in which the DOJ opposed Title II or the ACLU supported Title II. Even the
examples of unexpected results laid forth in the data analysis section of the chapter were
not compelling, scarce, and genuinely unimportant. They were included in the study
primarily to demonstrate the effort to find data that fell outside expected results.
Confirmability
Confirmability is the degree of which a study is free from the burden of researcher
biases or how differently the results would be if the research was conducted by a different
researcher (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The theoretical framework and logic
model technique used in this study mitigated the potential for researcher biases to
significantly affect the results of the study. The codes were all predetermined based upon
assumptions made from an understanding of PET. There was never a need to alter or add
codes to meet unanticipated trends or inconsistent information in the data collection or
analysis. This study could as previously mentioned be readily transferred to a related
topic and it could also be confirmed by a different researcher due to the reliability of the
theory and the simplicity of the study’s structure.
A central objective of the study was to develop a thick description of both sides of
the debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. If another researcher were to analyze
the same documents using the same predetermined codes the results would necessarily be
similar. This is not due to anything other than the consistency of the period of stagnation
described in the PET theory. During this period the political or ideological polarization
unifies arguments in both directions. A different researcher would have similar results,
because the DOJ and ACLU arguments were consistent throughout thousands of pages of

150
court proceedings and congressional hearings. With greater than a decade of debate about
Title II neither organization strayed from their original viewpoints.
Research Results
Central Research Question
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?
The bounded rationality aspect of PET suggests the incremental Title II changes
have been insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information sharing goals while
mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns because ideological polarization prevents
effective political action. The results of this study illustrated that in the politically and
ideologically polarizing debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act there is little
room for compromise between the opposing viewpoints with each side posing convincing
arguments, but neither side willing to accept the other’s opinion. In addition, the
opposing viewpoints are correspondingly well thought out and persuasive. The natural
divide between 2 equally compelling arguments is akin to having twins on opposing sides
of a tug of war competition. As the data analysis and literature review have illustrated the
argument between the 2 groups has remained constant but after years of debate there has
not been a definitive court decision, policy change, legislative amendment, or procedural
adjustment.
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To explain the results of the Central Research Question it is useful to break the
question into its key elements. To begin with it is essential to determine if there is
evidence that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is an imperfect policy developed under
the stress of bounded rationality. For this research question the bounded rationality
effects both the enactment of the law and the extended period of policy change stagnation
the USA PATRIOT Act has had. During the period of dynamic change, lawmakers were
forced to make choices rapidly without extensive debate due to the public fear of a follow
on terrorist attacks. This resulted in the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. This
assertion will be more thoroughly explained later in this section of Chapter 4. During the
incremental period of change, the legislators were locked in a political and ideological
stalemate as neither those opposed to the law or those supporting the law were able to
conjure enough influence to elicit change.
To meet the criteria of bounded rationality the law would need to have been
hastily enacted resulting in a useful yet problematic policy. The primary evidence that the
law was enacted in haste comes from the timing of the enactment. The law was drafted,
debated, and enacted within 45 days of the September 11th attacks (Bellia, 2011). This is
a rapid enactment for even a minor bill and is astonishingly swift for a bill as far reaching
as the USA PATRIOT Act. As previously mentioned, the data analyzed in this case study
suggests that both the ACLU and DOJ contribute the quick passage of the law to the
September 11th attacks. In addition, the law itself mentions the attacks 25 times in its text.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the law was in response to the terrorist attacks.
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The next step is to determine if the law was affected by bounded rationality
during its creation. The data analysis suggests that the law was negatively affected by the
forces of bounded rationality. First while the act garnered very limited debate between
September 11, 2001 and its passage that October, almost immediately after its passage
the debate grew in frequency and intensity. This case study focused on congressional
hearings and court cases from 2004 through 2015. The number of high level debates
suggest the law is imperfect. When the suggested imperfection is combined with the rapid
enactment it seems that the law was impaired by bounded rationality during its creation.
The fact that the argument has lasted more than a decade suggests that bounded
rationality has restrained legislators from achieving adequate incremental change that
satisfies both sides of the debate.
It was important to address the bounded rationality of Title II of the USA
PATRIOT Act as it is paramount to designing a logic model technique based upon the
PET of public policy change. For the strategy to be an effective analysis tool the title
needed to display evidence of bounded rationality in its genesis and its period of
stagnation. The data indicates this is the case. The bounded rationality and PET created
the foundation of the Central Research Question, but confirming the presence of bounded
rationality was a small part of the data analysis regarding the question. The main
objective of the question is to evaluate both sides of the controversies surrounding Title II
and to look for any possibility of overcoming the bounded rationality caused stagnation.
The focal point of the controversies has stemmed from changes to surveillance
and information sharing. The contentious changes came in many forms with the ways in
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which Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act modified the FISA at the forefront of several of
the controversies. As described in the literature review, FISA was designed to
dramatically reform national security policies and procedures following the numerous
unsettling discoveries of the Church Committee. Originally FISA was meant to create
oversite of national security investigations and prevent the broadened authorities of the
intelligence agencies from being applied to U.S. citizens. The events of September 11,
2001 changed FISA’s role.
The 9/11 Commission (2004) asserted that the failure to prevent the 2001 attacks
was due in part to the “wall” between criminal and national security investigations. The
data analysis in this case study suggested that the DOJ firmly supports the 9/11
Commission’s observation. During an FBI oversight hearing Director Mueller stated “If
we learned one thing on September 11th and one thing only, it was the need to share
intelligence and gather intelligence to identify persons who would kill American citizens,
whether it be here domestically or overseas” (Oversight of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2012). In a 2004 congressional hearing James B. Comey, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, explained “The PATRIOT Act also did something radical, something
earth shattering, something breathtaking that nobody talks about. The PATRIOT Act
broke down the wall that separated intelligence investigators tracking terrorists from
criminal investigators tracking terrorists” (Preventing and responding to acts of
terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). The Deputy Attorney General went on to
explain that prior to the USA PATRIOT Act criminal and national security investigations
working out of the same building and focused on the same suspects could not collaborate
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in any meaningful way. In the data collected in this case study, the DOJ generally
expressed disapproval of the pre-9/11 barriers to information sharing and approval of the
ways in which the USA PATRIOT Act mitigated these obstacles.
This was a common theme throughout the data analysis as members of the DOJ
mentioned the wall or information sharing approximately 50 times. This number of
mentions would have been higher, but the DOJ often submitted identical letters and
testimony to multiple entities. When duplicate documents were found addressed to
different members of congress or hearing the duplicates were not added to the data
collection. Typically when the DOJ mentioned the wall it was to state that the wall made
America less safe. Typically when the DOJ addressed information sharing it was to
explain how it was making the nation safer. When the DOJ cited the wall, information
sharing, or FISA the focus was nearly always about terrorism or terrorists.
By contrast the ACLU responses in this study tended to warn about the dangers of
broadened authorities. The ACLU was particularly concerned with the potential for
Fourth Amendment violations if national security investigations shared FISA authorized
evidence with criminal prosecutors. In a letter submitted as testimony in a 2011
congressional hearing the ACLU remarked “The Patriot Act vastly – and
unconstitutionally – expanded the government’s authority to pry into people’s private
lives with little or no evidence of wrongdoing. This overbroad authority unnecessarily
and improperly infringes on Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search
and seizures” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT Act, 2011). In previous
congressional testimony the ACLU claimed “now the government can—for what are
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primarily criminal searches—evade the Fourth Amendment’s constraints of probable
cause of crime and notice to the person whose property is being searched” (USA
PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States
Senate, 2005).
The ACLU’s concern about the Fourth Amendment was the dominate theme for
the organization noted in this study. There were 72 ACLU mentions of potential Fourth
Amendment violations. The majority of the Fourth Amendment references came after the
Snowden leaks. Approximately 69% of the ACLU’s discussion about the Fourth
Amendment were directly related to Section 215 bulk collections. Prior to the Snowden
revelations the ACLU’s Fourth Amendment claims either referred to the Mayfield case or
were theoretical in nature. In addition, with the Mayfield references the Fourth
Amendment concerns always accompanied a First Amendment claim as well. After the
exposure of the bulk metadata collection program, the claims nearly always asserted that
the program was an example of Fourth Amendment violations.
This study found that the DOJ consistently defended constitutionality of Title II of
the USA PATRIOT Act. This study found that the DOJ mentions of the Fourth
Amendment were rebuttals to claims against the constitutionality of USA PATRIOT Act
programs rather than spontaneous proclamations. For this reason the DOJ references to
the Fourth Amendment spiked after the admission of the bulk collection programs. This
study found 86 DOJ mentions of the Fourth Amendment following the 2013 leaks.
Nearly all of the coded references involving the DOJ and the Fourth Amendment are
examples of the DOJ dismissing the claims of the ACLU or another organization.
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A leading DOJ rebuttal centered on the Third Party Doctrine. As mentioned in the
literature review, the Third Party Doctrine, established through the court cases of United
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, states that the assumption of privacy is lost
anytime documents are held by third party organization (United States President’s
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). The DOJ
asserted “the Smith Court reaffirmed the established principle that ‘a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties’” (Delery et al., 2014, p. 43). The Smith v. Maryland case was crucial to the
DOJ’s defense of bulk collections authorized by Section 215. The DOJ mentioned the
case 49 times. This particular reference was related to bulk metadata collections, as most
of the references were, but the argument applies to any record held by any public
company.
In regard to the central research question, this back and forth of debate between
the ACLU and DOJ illustrates that the 2 organizations are locked in a rigid ideological
dispute. Neither side is likely to be satisfied with the outcome of any compromise. This
notion is evident in the numerous appeals to any legal decision in the previous and
current court cases surrounding the Title II surveillance and information sharing. The
data analysis did not show any sign that either side wanted any compromise. The DOJ
generally argued Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act should remain as is, while the ACLU
suggested Sections 203, 206, 215, and 218 should at a minimum be amended. As
previously mentioned both sides claimed to have constitutional back and both made
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logical, articulate arguments for their opinion. Neither side seemed willing to concede to
the other’s points.
Another prime example of sides being locked in ideological polarization came
from a significant event related to Title II USA PATRIOT Act that occurred during the
course of this case study. In the summer of 2015, Section 215 was allowed expire, just to
be renewed the next day with the USA FREEDOM Act (Kelly, 2015; Whitaker, 2015).
The USA FREEDOM Act could have been seen somewhat as a compromise in that it
ended the most controversial aspect of Section 215 to date, the bulk metadata collection
by the NSA. The ACLU assessed the change as only a symbolic victory since Section
215 remained intact (Duncan, 2015). At first glance it seems that the ACLU should
consider the changes to be a significant victory. They argued against the federal
government collected the bulk metadata of innocent Americans and the bulk metadata
collection was stopped. Technically that should be considered a victory, but ACLU point
about it being a “symbolic victory” also seems valid because the legal mechanism for
bulk collection is still in place.
In addition, Section 215 isn’t necessarily limited metadata records and could in
theory be used to gather medical records, emails, financial statements, etc. The ACLU
has consistently argued against Section 215 authorities. The ACLU assertions of Section
215 improprieties began long before the bulk metadata program was revealed. In a 2004
congressional hearing the ACLU stated that the inefficiency of Section 215 programs
plus its potential for abuse “should prompt further review of Section 215 to find the
balance between its efficacy and the problems of perception that it creates, which could at
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least be mitigated by a restriction of its use to those for whom there is individualized
suspicion” (Preventing and responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law,
2004). This explains why the ACLU would consider the USA FREEDOM Act’s changes
to the metadata program to be symbolic. The organization wants to ensure all Section 215
authorities, many of which might be unknown to the public, are legally bound to
individual suspicion not broad surveillance.
By using the PET of public policy change to predict the life cycle of Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act the results of this study suggested Title II authorizations will likely
remain relatively unchanged until an external development shocks the equilibrium of the
debate. This study illustrated that throughout the politically and ideologically polarizing
dispute regarding Title II, the USA PATRIOT Act has been locked in stagnation with
only limited incremental change. The bounded rationality of PET explained that the
incremental changes were insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information sharing
goals of Title II while mitigating Fourth Amendment. In addition, the changes that have
occurred have not affected the controversies surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act. The evidence analyzed in this case study suggested that it is unlikely either side of
the debate is currently willing to accept any compromise. The conclusion that developed
from the data analysis is that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is expected to remain in
perpetual stasis with periods of limited incremental change unless an outside event
generates significant public enthusiasm for one side of the debate or the other.
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Subquestion 1
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act?
As explained above, the debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act has
developed 2 uncompromising points of view with relatively equally persuasive
arguments. This study focused upon the views of the ACLU and DOJ, but these
viewpoints are representative of the American populace and the U.S. political leaders.
Examining the strife between the DOJ and ACLU provides insight into the political and
ideological divide about the USA PATRIOT Act that exists throughout U.S. politics. By
realizing lawmakers are somewhat evenly split amongst those that generally side with the
ACLU’s opinion and those that typically side with the DOJ’s assertions it is apparent
why the law has remained relatively stagnant since 2001. The 2 views effectively cancel
each other out.
Throughout more than a decade of debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT
Act, the ACLU has remained steadfast that there are “provisions of the PATRIOT Act
that violate the Constitution and civil liberties” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT
Act, 2011). Many of the ACLU’s concerns have focused on how the USA PATRIOT Act
changed the FISA system. The ACLU claimed the broadened use of FISA authorities due
to the USA PATRIOT Act “exacerbated other constitutional problems with the statute
under both the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment” (USA PATRIOT Act:
Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005).
The ACLU claimed the FISA authorizations do not meet the same rigorous standards as
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criminal investigation authorizations. The ACLU claimed that the FISC, due to the USA
PATRIOT Act and FAA, no longer protects the Fourth Amendment and “is simply to
issue advisory opinions blessing in advance the vaguest of parameters, under which the
government is then free to conduct surveillance for up to one year” (Jaffer et al., 2012, p.
8). This study found very limited instances of the ACLU ever altering their message
about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The DOJ has been equally unwavering in its defense of Title II authorities. At no
point in this study was any information uncovered that suggested that the DOJ even
slightly questioned the constitutionality of any Title II authority. In fact in with each
mention of the U.S. Constitution by the DOJ was to explain how a particular program or
authority was constitutional. The DOJ also aggressively defended how the USA
PATRIOT Act affected FISA and FISA authorizations. The DOJ stated “the FISA Court
are far from a rubber stamp; instead, they review all of our pleadings thoroughly, they
question us, and they do not approve an order until they are satisfied that we have met all
statutory and constitutional requirements” (Strengthening privacy rights and national
security: Oversight of FISA surveillance programs, 2013). The DOJ repeated similar
statements throughout this study’s data.
The DOJ’s argument and the ACLU’s argument genuinely negate each other.
Applying the debate findings between the ACLU and DOJ to the broader stage of
American legal and political interactions it is clear that ideological polarization has
prolonged the stagnation period for the USA PATRIOT Act. As mentioned with the
central research question, the results of this study suggest that Title II of the act will
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remain basically unchanged unless a significant event sways public opinion about the
law. This outcome is not surprising. A review of PET illustrates that this is often the case
with national security policies.
Subquestion 2
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions
of the USA PATRIOT Act?
The PET of public policy change asserts that dramatic policies changes often stem
from a significant event and these changes are negatively affected by bounded rationality.
As previously mentioned, the USA PATRIOT Act was a direct response to the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Both the ACLU and DOJ repeatedly alluded to this fact. The
DOJ suggested the law was necessary to combat terrorism in the modern age. The DOJ
supported this affirmation with the findings from the 9/11 Commission. The ACLU also
accredited the passage of the law to the terrorist attack, but implied the law was imperfect
because it was rushed. “The Act was the product of an extraordinary time just after
September 11 in which Congress and the administration were working quickly, under
pressure, to give law enforcement and intelligence agencies new surveillance powers”
(Preventing and responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). This
ACLU comment illustrates bounded rationality in action, as does the fact that the sunset
provisions of the law have been repeatedly reaffirmed. While this study did to find any
direct statement mentioning the reenactments of the provisions being due to bounded
rationality, it does fit with the presumption that the law is stuck in a period of stagnation.
Even the sections that recently expired in 2015, were immediately reinstated the next day.
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Letting provisions actually expire would be a significant change and significant change
does not occur in stagnant periods in PET.
Subquestion 3
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law?
The significant portions of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act for this study affect
U.S. law in the following ways:
•

Section 203 promotes information sharing amongst criminal and national
security investigations.

•

Section 206 allows for roving wiretaps in national security investigations.

•

Section 215 grants access to any type of record deemed necessary to a
national security investigation.

•

Section 218 broadens the authority of the FISC by allowing FISA
authorizations to be used in any investigation when the significant purpose
of the investigation is security related.

Subquestion 4
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act?
The results of this study illustrated that the DOJ considered many of the Title II
provisions to be beneficial. In regard to the information sharing changes brought about by
Section 203 the DOJ stated “I think beginning with the PATRIOT Act, removing the
wall, we have made great steps to make sure that that information is shared” (Oversight
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). In reference to the roving wiretaps of
Section 206 the DOJ stated “Section 206 now gives us the authority in terrorism
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investigations to use the tools we had used in a wide range of criminal cases, including
drug and racketeering cases, since 1986” (Preventing and responding to acts of
terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). The DOJ also adamantly defended Section 215
of the act with “the government has provided examples in which the Section 215 program
provided timely and valuable assistance to ongoing counter-terrorism investigations”
(Branda, Olson, Letter, Byron III, & Whitaker, 2014, p. 67). Finally with Section 218 the
DOJ touted “the successful use of section 218, including investigation of the Portland
Seven and the Virginia Jihad” (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). The data analysis identified
hundreds of examples of the DOJ praising a benefit of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Subquestion 5
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial?
The data analysis also identified hundreds of examples of the ACLU expressing
concern about a provision of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. In regard to Section 203
the ACLU was most concerned with how and what information is shared. The ACLU
warned “little is known about the breadth of use or the distribution of our personal
information” (Reauthorization of the Patriot Act, 2011). Concerning Section 206 the
ACLU argued “that roving wiretaps should have the same Fourth Amendment warrant
requirements as Title III criminal wiretaps” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT Act,
2011). The data analysis identified Fourth Amendment concerns as a primary ACLU
theme that transcended each coding category. Since its enactment Section 215 has been
one of the most controversial aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act. The ACLU alleged it
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“has uncovered serious and unconstitutional chilling effects of section 215 on the
exercise of basic freedoms” (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). Finally with Section 218 the ACLU
explained “This seemingly minor change allows the government to use FISA to
circumvent the basic protections of the Fourth Amendment, even where criminal
prosecution is the government’s primary purpose for conducting the search or
surveillance” (Reauthorization of the Patriot Act, 2011). These ACLU quotes provide an
insight into the controversies of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Summary
The data analysis answered the research questions to a point of saturation
acceptable for this case study. The logic model technique based, upon the reliable
findings of the PET, yielded the results expected in the predictive pattern. The PET
bounded rationality suggested that incremental changes to Title II would be insufficient
to achieve the surveillance and information sharing goals while mitigating Fourth
Amendment concerns due to ideological polarization preventing effective political action.
The data analysis provided evidence that this prediction was accurate. The incremental
Title II changes have been insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information
sharing goals while mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns because ideological
polarization prevents effective political action, as the logic model suggested.
The DOJ and ACLU viewpoints were representative of the leading voices for and
against Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Throughout the data collection and analysis
neither party ever significantly changed their opinions. Ultimately this amounted to more
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than 10 years of consistent debate. Even when important developments occurred, such as
the Snowden releases, both organizations remained steadfast on their arguments. The data
lends evidence to the probability that Title II will remain controversial until a significant
outside event spurs political motivation either for or against the act. This probability is
expected under the PET of public policy change.
The study does not conclude with mere mention of the consistency of the ACLU
and DOJ arguments. Nor does it end with the effectiveness of PET in the logic model. It
is still necessary to report the interpretations of the findings and limitations of the study.
This case study also has recommendations and implications based upon insight acquired
through the course of the study. These items will all be addressed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
This chapter is designed to further explain the findings of the study, limitations of
the study, recommendations for further studies, and potential implications of this study.
The primary finding of the study was that provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are in a
prolonged state of imperfection brought about by consistent ideological polarization as
demonstrated by the leading voices of support and opposition to the law. This study
substantiated the consistency of the PET of public policy change with national security
policies, but its transferability is limited to national security policy. A key
recommendation for further study is to examine USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 under a
similar PET of public policy change theoretical framework. This could shed additional
light on ideological polarization and add validation to the framework. Because the data
and analysis presented in these 5 chapters is part of a dissertation, the potential
implication of the study is somewhat limited, but it does contribute to the base of
academic knowledge. Everything mentioned in this paragraph is further explained in the
chapter.
Purpose
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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Key Findings
The key findings from this case study are as follows:
•

Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act has been and continues to be in the
PET’s stage of imperfect stagnation prolonged by ideological polarization
contributing to bounded rationality.

•

There was no credible evidence of potential incremental changes that
could satisfy the surveillance and information sharing goals of Title II
while mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns.

•

The ACLU and DOJ viewpoints are unwaveringly polar opposites. This
study did not find any indication of the organizations being willing to
compromise on Title II provisions.

•

The primary ACLU concern found in this study was a concern that Title II
authorizations might have the potential for circumventing the Fourth
Amendment.

•

The DOJ aggressively disputed the ACLU constitutionality claims, relying
heavily upon the Third Party Doctrine and legal precedence.
Interpretation of the Findings

The literature review illustrated that most major U.S. national security policies
followed a life cycle that fit the PET of public policy change. This case study
demonstrated that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is currently in the stagnant stage of
punctuated equilibrium. During this stage, incremental change has only a limited effect
on the policy. The findings showed years of ideologically polarized debate with no

168
acceptance of opposing views by either side of the argument. Polarizing disagreement is a
key component to the sluggish period of change described in PET and has been a factor
in preventing substantial incremental change. During the course of the data collection and
analysis there was almost a significant incremental change with Section 215 being
allowed to expire, but within 24 hours the provision was reinstated. The voices for and
against Title II provisions effectively cancel each other out. The arguments on both sides
are convincing enough to have created a political and ideological rift that prevents
legislators from having the political capital or motivation to allow effective change.
During the literature review it became apparent that the DOJ and ACLU are the
most vocal supporting and opposing voices respectfully. Specifically the literature review
revealed that much of the controversy surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act
centered on Fourth Amendment concerns. Using PET as the theoretical framework for a
logic model data analysis technique, the primary prediction that developed was that the
ACLU and DOJ would consistently differ on Fourth Amendment concerns. The data
analysis discovered that this prediction held true throughout thousands of pages of debate
in the span of more than 1 decade. The DOJ solidly defended the constitutionality of Title
II. The ACLU repeatedly questioned the constitutionality of Title II. As explained in
Chapter 4, there is little evidence of either organization recognizing the legitimacy of the
other’s arguments.
Limitations of the Study
The transferability of this case study was restricted by the case boundaries. This
study verified the consistency of the PET of public policy change with national security
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policies only. Applying the findings to other facets of public policy would require
additional scrutiny of the theory as it is feasible that the theoretical framework would not
be as reliable with other public policies. The validity of the theory would need to be
tested against specific types of public policy. For example a study of national healthcare
policies could use this case study as a general testament to the consistency of PET, but
could not be used in place of assessing the theory against national healthcare policy life
cycles.
Similarly the data collection and data analysis were strictly limited to Title II of
the USA PATRIOT Act. This particular logic model based upon PET was adequate and
accurate for this case study, but it’s unproven outside Title II. It is possible if the logic
model technique was applied to a similar law or even other titles of the USA PATRIOT
Act it might not yield the same results. Thus the results must be limited to Title II of the
USA PATRIOT Act. A study of a similar law could help confirm the transferability of
this case study.
Recommendations
A potential follow on study that could help validate both the theoretical
framework and the logic model technique could be a study of the USA FREEDOM Act
of 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act is similar to the USA PATRIOT Act in function. In
addition, the law is starting to develop some controversy as it reinstated Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act. Presumably the DOJ would support the law and the ACLU
would generally oppose provisions of the act. If this outcome held true with a study of the
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USA FREEDOM Act it would help validate the logic model technique and theoretical
framework set forth in this study.
Implications
The social change implication this case study hoped to achieve was to identify
areas of potential compromise in the current, often contentious, debate regarding the
balance between national security surveillance and civil liberties. This study did not
identify any indication of potential compromise. The debate is simply too polarizing. As
repeatedly expressed neither side of the argument ever made any significant willingness
to negotiation. This dissertation will not affect the ongoing legal, political, and
ideological clashes between the ACLU and the DOJ, but it does add to the base of
knowledge about the processes that are keeping the organizations locked in debate about
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Scholars and legislators alike, could benefit from understanding the processes
explained in the PET of public policy change, as they relate to Title II controversies. The
implication that this dissertation achieved was to identify that both the ACLU and DOJ
made valid points and that it is essential to consider opposing views in legislation. In
issues of public policy and administration it is imperative to make decisions based upon
facts not ideology. Administrations are inhibited by the policy life cycle illustrated in
PET. As a result, national security policies often undergo a period of controversial
stagnation and understanding the reasons why could reduce tensions with imperfect
policies.
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Throughout American history bitter political, legal, and ideological stalemates
have prevented meaningful security policy changes. This is primarily is due to the
polarizing nature of national security arguments and the both the incremental changes and
the punctuated modifications are constrained by bounded rationality. The policies are
seldom if ever going to be acceptable to both sides of the debate until incremental policy
alterations eventually quell the contentions. The implication is that both sides should
attempt to work past their ideological and political differences and instead focus on the
valid aspects of their opponent’s argument. It is unlikely that any controversial provision
that remains in contempt is without fault or benefit, for it were it would be amended,
reaffirmed, or canceled without issue.
The prime example of this is with Section 215. Security agencies need to be able
to access records related to international terrorists, but equally as important is innocent
U.S. citizens should not have to have their records seized. Both sides made a valid
argument in their respective regards. Eventually the Section 215 metadata program made
it through its stagnation period and was transformed into an acceptable option under the
USA FREEDOM Act. While this act did not mitigate the broader concerns about Section
215 it did meet the metadata collection and the civil liberty goals of both the DOJ and
ACLU. The take away from this event for policy makers should be that examining both
sides of an issue can lead to an acceptable arrangement without compromising principles.
Conclusion
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is in a state of imperfect and often contentious
stagnation. The title has both clearly identifiable national security benefits and civil
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liberty problems. The PET of public policy change can be used to explain that the law is
currently held in this state due to bounded rationality. The bounded rationality has been
created by polarizing opinions about the title making it difficult for either side of the
debate being able to garner enough political capital to overcome the resistance being
generated by the other side. Currently there are no meaningful indications that Title II
will be amended to reduce contentions in the near future unless in response to an outside
force.
This case study came to this conclusion by examining more than a decade’s worth
of public debate between the leading voice of support for the law and its leading voice of
opposition. The DOJ has been the leading voice of support for the USA PATRIOT Act
and the ACLU has been the leading voice of opposition to the law. Both organizations
have presented effective well-articulated arguments expressing their concerns and praises
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act in the halls of congress, all levels of the courts, and
equally as important in the halls of public opinion. This dissertation contended that both
organizations have valid points, but data collection and analysis revealed that neither side
is likely to accept the other’s views as such. In conclusion ideological polarization will
keep Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act in imperfect stagnation due to the bounded
rationality explained in conjunction with the PET of public policy change.
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Appendix A: IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet
The following is the IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet. The results of this
worksheet suggest this case study will have a low level of ethical risk. Originally this
case study had considered using interviews with members of the ACLU and DOJ. I
received IRB approval to do so, but there was resistance from the organizations to
contribute to this study. Instead all data were collected from publically available sources,
which greatly reduced any ethical considerations with the study.
The first 13 questions apply to all studies (even when the researcher is not
interacting with participants to collect new data).
Answer each
question
below with
yes, no, or
N/A.
1. Has each data collection step been articulated in the method
yes
section of the proposal?
2. Will the research procedures ensure privacy during data collection? yes
3. Will data be stored securely?
yes
4. Will the data be stored for at least 5 years?
yes
5. If participants’ names or contact info will be recorded in the
yes
research records, are they absolutely necessary?
6. Do the research procedures and analysis/write up plans include all
possible measures to ensure that participant identities are not directly yes
or indirectly disclosed?
7. Have confidentiality agreements been signed by anyone who may
yes
view data that that contains identifiers? (e.g., transcriber, translator)
8. Has the researcher articulated a specific plan for sharing results
yes
with the participants and community stakeholders?
9. Have all potential psychological, relationship, legal,
economic/professional, physical, and other risks been fully
acknowledged and described? (If IRB staff judges the magnitude or
yes
probability of risks to be greater than minimal, then the researcher
will be asked to submit the long form ethics application in addition to
this self-check.)
10. Have the above risks been minimized as much as possible? Are
yes
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measures in place to provide participants with reasonable protection
from loss of privacy, distress, psychological harm, economic loss,
damage to professional reputation, and physical harm?
11. Has the researcher proactively managed any potential conflicts of
interest?
12. Are the research risks and burdens reasonable, in consideration of
the new knowledge that this research design can offer?

yes
yes

13. Is the research site willing to provide a Letter of Cooperation
granting permission for all relevant data access, access to
participants, facility use, and/or use of personnel time for research
yes
purposes? (Note that some research sites will only release data if a
more formal Data Use Agreement is in place, often in addition to a
Letter of Cooperation.)
The remaining questions only apply to studies that involve recruiting
participants to collect new data.
14. Is participant recruitment coordinated in a manner that is noncoercive? Coercive elements include: recruiting in a group setting,
extravagant compensation, recruiting individuals in a context of their
treatment or evaluation, etc. A researcher must disclose here
yes
whether/how the researcher may already be known to the participants
and explain how perceptions of coerced research participation will be
minimized.
15. If vulnerable individuals will be specifically sought out as
participants, is such targeted recruitment justified by a research
design that will specifically benefit that vulnerable group at large? To
N/A
specifically recruit vulnerable individuals as participants, the
researcher will need to submit a long form ethics application in
addition to this self-check.
16. If vulnerable adults might happen to be included (without the
N/A
researcher’s knowledge), would their inclusion be justified?
17. If anyone would be excluded from participating, is their exclusion
yes
justified? Is their exclusion handled respectfully and without stigma?
18. If the research procedures might reveal criminal activity or
child/elder abuse that necessitates reporting, are there suitable
N/A
procedures in place for managing this?
19. If the research procedures might reveal or create an acute
psychological state that necessitates referral, are there suitable
N/A
procedures in place to manage this?
20. Does the research design ensure that all participants can
N/A
potentially benefit equally from the research?
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21. Applicable for student researchers: Will this researcher be
appropriately qualified and supervised in all data collection
yes
procedures?
22. If an existing survey or other data collection tool will be used, has
the researcher appropriately complied with the requirements for legal N/A
usage?
Questions 23-40 pertain to the process of ensuring that potential participants
make an informed decision about the study, in accordance with the ethical
principle of “respect for persons.”
23. Do the informed consent procedures provide adequate time to
review the study information and ask questions before giving
yes
consent?
24. Will informed consent be appropriately documented?
yes
25. Is the consent form written using language that will be
yes
understandable to the potential participants?
26. Does the consent form explain the sample’s inclusion criteria in
such a way that the participants can understand how/why THEY are
being asked to participate?
27. Does the consent form include an understandable explanation of
the research purpose?
28. Does the consent form include an understandable description of
the data collection procedures?
29. Does the consent form include an estimate of the time
commitment for participation?
30. Does the consent form clearly state that participation is
voluntary?
31. Does the consent form convey that the participant has the right to
decline or discontinue participation at any time? When the researcher
is already known to the participant, the consent form must include
written assurance that declining or discontinuing will not negatively
impact the participant’s relationship with the researcher or (if
applicable) the participant’s access to services.
32. Does the consent form include a description of reasonably
foreseeable risks or discomforts?
33. Does the consent form include a description of anticipated
benefits to participants and/or others?
34. Does the consent form describe any thank you gift(s),
compensation, or reimbursement (for travel costs, etc.) or lack
thereof?
35. Does the consent form describe how privacy will be maintained?

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
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36. Does the consent form disclose all potential conflicts of interest?
37. Does the consent document preserve the participant’s legal
rights?
38. Does the consent form explain how the participant can contact the
researcher and the university’s Research Participant Advocate? (USA
number 001-612-312-1210 or email address irb@waldenu.edu).
39. Does the consent form include a statement that the participant
should keep/print a copy of the consent form?
40. If any aspect of the study is experimental (unproven), is that
stated in the consent form?

yes
yes
yes
yes
N/A
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